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ABSTRACT 
 
The Rhetoric of Writing:  
A Rhetorical Analysis of Modern Writing Memoirs. (December 2008) 
Lindsay Penelope Illich, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Jimmie Killingsworth 
 
 This dissertation analyzes concepts of the writing self in works about writing by 
professional creative writers (writers, poets, and essayists).  Through a rhetorical 
analysis of these texts, I observe that  writers view the writing self as a complex structure 
that is fully conscious as a rhetorical agent, an embodied self that interacts with the 
world and actively chooses linguistic representations of that experience, and maintains a 
concept of self that is subject to influences which the writers do not fully understand 
(such as inspiration and insight).  The discourse used by writers to describe their writing 
processes challenges recent critiques of expressionism and the model of social 
construction that pervades contemporary composition scholarship.    
 Chapter II examines Virginia Woolf's use of the central metaphor for invention in 
A Room of One's Own, a river, which sharply calls into question a unified view of the self 
which is central to critiques of expressivism by composition scholars.  Woolf's concept 
of invention requires a negation of the self and harmony with nature (widely conceived 
as the entire world, including texts).  Chapter III, an analysis of two writing memoirs by 
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contemporary professional creative writers, Annie Dillard's The Writing Life and Donald 
Hall's Life Work, finds that Dillard and Hall use metaphors that establish freedom 
(rhetorical agency) and bodily presence as primary characteristics of their writing 
processes.  Chapter IV, an analysis of two collections of essays about writing by 
professional creative writers, argues that the writers' use of metaphors of inspiration and 
instrumental metaphors creates a concept of the writing self that maintains a sense of 
writerly control (rhetorical agency) alternating with a sense of a diminished control; 
ultimately, the two concepts coexist in the minds of the writers.   
 Chapter V proposes that the rhetorical situation of the contemporary composition 
classroom affects students' creativity adversely.  The chapter also suggests further 
analyses of writing memoirs can provide new ways of understanding writing processes 
(as opposed to one writing process model) and therefore contribute substantially to 
composition scholarship and pedagogy. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Composition studies is a transition mode: process theory is waning while some 
scholars push for post-process and post-theory in order to discover new directions and 
new ways of thinking about writing.  This dissertation attempts to answer the call for a 
new direction and new ways of understanding how writers compose by opening the 
enormous cache of writings about writing in the form of writing memoirs by novelists, 
essayists, and poets.  From these works, we can gain valuable insights about the writing 
processes of working writers, particularly that writing is more complicated and 
"creative" than the textbooks steps on the writing process suggest.  Also, we can learn 
something about the nature of creativity and how we might address the lack of creativity 
in the composition classroom. 
 The seminal work of process model pedagogy, Janet Emig's The Composing 
Processes of Twelfth Graders, published in 1969, opens with a description of the 
available data sources for the researcher concerned with the composing process: 1) the 
works by what Emig terms "established writers" appearing in the form of the writers' 
own accounts of the writing process through diaries, letters, essays, etc; 2) dialogues and 
interviews such as the ones made famous in The Paris Review in which an interviewer 
delivers a series of questions to writers followed by the writers' responses; 3) literary  
 
This dissertation follows the style of the MLA Style Manual. 
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critics' analyses of the evolution of specific works of literature such as Jerome Beaty's 
study Middlemarch, From Notebook to Novel; 4) the advice given to students in 
composition textbooks (although Emig doesn't address how directives about writing 
offer insight about the writing process, unless we are to understand her study as one 
dealing with the perceptions about writing rather than writing itself); and finally, 5) 
theoretical and empirical (her word) research about the writing process (she classifies 
her work in this category). 
 She dismisses established writers as a source of data for inquiries into the writing 
process for the following reasons:  
 1.  Established writers are incapable of describing their composing processes.  
 Here, Emig quotes the novelist Peter de Vries: "Don’t ask the cow to analyze the 
 milk" (9). 
  
 2.  When writers discuss the writing process in modes that do have a specific 
 audience, such as an extended autobiography or critical essay—what I call in this 
 dissertation writing memoirs— writers are likely to lie because "they fear any 
 conscious, explicit probing into their methods of work" might "spook" their 
 writing (10). In this section, she refers to D. H Lawrence's claim in Studies 
 in Classic American Literature that "all of the old American artists were hopeless 
 liars" (9). 
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 3.  Established writers' descriptions of writing are post hoc endeavors and  most 
 likely do not reflect the actualities involved in the writing process because  the 
 descriptions are written after the fact. 
   
 4.  When writers discuss the writing process in expressive modes, i.e. diaries or 
 journals that do not have a specific audience other than the writers themselves, 
 they rarely address the act of writing itself and instead describe the  affective 
 aspects associated with writing, such as how they feel when they aren't writing. 
 She argues that "referring to these forms [writing memoirs]  exclusively, then, is 
 that they focus on partial phenomena" (11, emphasis mine).  She admits that 
 writing memoirs offer "brilliant" descriptions of "the context, the affective milieu 
 of the writing act" (11).  However, she contends, "the act itself remains 
 undescribed" (11).  
  
 5.  Finally, Emig dismisses writing memoirs as appropriate sources of data on 
 writing research because they represent the limited perspective of one writer, 
 what she describes as data that offers "an N of 1—a singular writer pursuing, 
 particularly if he is a major writer, a unique problem" (9). 
Each of these objections is problematic. The first objection, that writers are incapable of 
describing their writing processes, could be used as a criticism of Emig's work, a work 
that is based in part on descriptions of the writing process by eight twelfth graders.  Her 
second objection, related to the first objection, that writers lie when they describe writing 
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processes, reflects a deep historical bias against writers' general veracity—one that can 
be traced to Plato.  However, generally writers' accounts of the act of writing are 
remarkably similar, a fact that Jane Piirto, author of "My Teeming Brain": 
Understanding Creative Writers, argues throughout her book about accounts of writing.  
If all writers lied about their creative processes, the descriptions would be more likely to 
vary widely, and it would be difficult to discuss general issues like writer's block, 
inspiration, writing rituals, and flow.  In a footnote, Emig asserts that "Certain themes 
emerge from a reading of these studies [writing memoirs]," an assertion that suggests, at 
least on some level, the writers are truthful in their accounts of writing (14).  
 The second objection also reflects a general bias against literature that is 
common in composition studies, partly arising from the institutional politics that forced 
composition scholars to define themselves against their literature counterparts in English 
departments.  It is important to note that Emig's study was instrumental in establishing 
composition studies as a legitimate field of study; however, now that it is established, a 
return to primary sources in the form of writing memoirs by novelists and poets will 
open up composition studies to draw from the large number of these types of works and 
draw a better picture of what it means to compose.  
 Emig's third objection raises the question, can we trust the memories of writers 
when they describe what it is like to compose?  For every researcher who uses 
descriptions of experiences by people, this is an issue.  But the objection also applies to 
Emig, who asked one female subject to describe how she composed an imaginative work 
that she wrote in the third grade (103). 
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 The fourth objection is more compelling.  Emig claims that the vast majority of 
writing memoirs focus on partial phenomena, meaning that the context of the writing, 
including the emotions surrounding the subject matter, are the things discussed rather 
than the actual writing.  Interestingly, Emig's research concludes that what we refer to as 
writing, the act of inscription, also should include moments during which no composing 
is actually happening.  For example, when a student writer stops composing and looks 
up in a moment of contemplation, the writer is still writing.  Writers, in other words, 
remain engaged in the writing process even when symbol-making on a page or computer 
screen isn't occurring.  Current research in composition scholarship confirms this 
conclusion and expands it further.  As Nedra Reynolds argues in Geographies of 
Writing, place matters and is an essential component of the writing process.   
 Finally, Emig's last objection raises concerns about sample sizes if composition 
researchers use established writers' accounts of the writing process.  She claims that the 
case study method reveals conclusions that only apply to the writer who is being studied.  
For those who are familiar with The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders, this 
claim may seem particularly peculiar because her sample size is limited to eight 
students.   From this small number of research subjects, Emig draws broad conclusions.  
Composition scholars have recently begun to question the process model, based in part 
on the assumption that conclusions about the process of writing can be applied to all 
writers in all writing situations.  Gary Olson in "Toward a Post-Process Composition: 
Abandoning the Rhetoric of Assertion," writes  
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  the process orientation has its own limitations.  Key among these  
  limitations is the fact that the process orientation, as we have conceived 
  it, imagines that the writing process can be described in some way; that is, 
  process theorists assume that we can somehow make statements about the 
  process that would apply to all or most writing situations. (7) 
In other words, A Theory of Writing is a flawed goal for composition scholarship.  An 
alternative goal, suggests Olson, would be to discover the multiple and varied ways that 
writers compose.  The conclusions one draws from writing memoirs from poets and 
novelists would move composition scholarship closer to "a more dialogic, dynamic, 
open-ended, receptive, nonassertive stance" as advocated by the post-process orientation 
(15).  
 As part of her argument that writers' memoirs about writing rarely address the act 
of writing itself, Emig quotes a passage from Virginia Woolf's A Writer's Diary  in 
which Woolf describes the composition of Jacob's Room: "It is worth mentioning, for 
future reference, that the creative power which bubbles so pleasantly in beginning a new 
book quiets down after a time, and one goes on more steadily," and "Directly one gets to 
work, one is like a person walking, who has seen the country stretching out before" (11).  
Emig does not seem to recognize the powerful metaphorical structures at play in these 
passages.  Woolf compares writing to the flow of a river, bubbling at the headwaters and 
smoothing out as it pushes on toward the sea.  In the second quote, the metaphor for 
writing is walking.  More specifically, Woolf understands the process of composing as 
walking that is geographically situated.   
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 As a student of composition and poetics (and a writer of imaginative works), I 
am fascinated by Emig's arguments against using writing memoirs as legitimate sources 
of data for composition scholarship, primarily because the arguments are motivated by 
assumptions about language that have been recently contested.  Emig's objections could 
be said to be based on a view of language that is primarily positivistic—a windowpane 
theory of language that assumes a one-to-one correspondence between reality and the 
representation of reality.  Her assumptions are informed by and re-inscribe the chasm 
between the study of poetics and the study of rhetoric and composition because she does 
not recognize the rhetoricity of the account given to her by beginning writers.  Perhaps 
one reason Emig chose this position concerned the institutional politics of composition 
and English studies.  Emig was, after all, writing in 1969, a time when composition was 
still struggling to establish itself as an independent field of study with is own sphere of 
influence and respect.   
 Almost forty years after the publication of The Composing Processes of Twelfth 
Graders, when creative nonfiction has again become a topic of interest among 
composition scholars (most notably by scholars such as Cynthia Selfe who studies 
literacy narratives), and at a time when the post-process movement has opened up new 
ways of thinking about identity and the writing self, writing memoirs by established 
writers have yet to be studied as serious contributions to understanding composition, 
broadly defined.  Long before Emig published The Composing Processes of Twelfth 
Graders, works by established writers describing the writing process had begun to gain 
popularity and grow in number.  In the 1950's, The Paris Review began to interview 
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writers about their working habits and theories about artistic creation.  In 1978, the 
University of Michigan Press inaugurated its series of books called "Poets on Poetry," 
founded by Donald Hall and now edited by David Lehman (who also edits the popular 
"Best American Poetry" series).  The Michigan series includes more than ninety books 
by poets writing about the creative process and poetics.  In 1981, an annotated 
bibliography on the subject was published, David Madden and Richard Powers's Writer's 
Revision: An Annotated Bibliography of Articles and Books About Writers' Revision and 
Their Comments on the Creative Process.  In 1999, Tim Mayers wrote in CCC 
("(Re)Writing Craft") that "possible intersections between composition and creative 
writing" could be explored by analyzing writing memoirs, works he calls "craft 
criticism" in which writers "challenge and unsettle some deeply-embedded, implicit 
ideas" about writing and explore "the relation of poetic craft to rhetoric" (82, 83, and 
88).  
 One particularly useful method of analysis for writer memoirs comes from 
composition scholarship's sister discipline, rhetorical criticism.  The quotes Emig uses to 
dispel the notion that writing memoirs can be useful is only one example among many 
that suggests the metaphors writers use to describe writing point to complex 
relationships between writers and their perceived agency as creators of texts (the concept 
of authorship as it is referred to in literary studies), between writers and the way they 
conceive of writing as reflective of a writing self, between writers and their material 
bodies, and between writers and their physical and cultural environments.  In 1989, Lad 
Tobin began this work by studying the metaphors student writers used to describe 
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writing in "Bridging Gaps: Analyzing Our Students' Metaphors for Composing."  Also, 
MFA programs emphasize the practices of writers as a way to understand the composing 
process.  However, this data is primarily anecdotal and has not been subject to rhetorical 
or linguistic analyses.   
 We are left, then, with two relevant issues that must be addressed: the extent to 
which an historically rich and widely available cache of writing memoirs exists for 
study, and the extent to which writing memoirs have already been studied in 
composition scholarship. 
 
A Brief History of Modern Writing Memoirs  
 Written in 1293, Dante’s Vita Nuova is one of the first works to reflect on the 
writing process.  A mixture of prose and poetry, Dante narrates chronologically his 
obsession with Beatrice and the 27 poems that resulted from that obsession, starting with 
the first time he saw Beatrice when he was nine, to being visited by a cloaked man in a 
dream in which the swaddled child-Beatrice is fed Dante’s flaming heart, and finally to 
Beatrice's death and the end of Dante’s obsession with her.  The basic structure of the 
short work is this: (1) a narrated event from Dante's life (such as seeing Beatrice on the 
street flanked by two older women, or Beatrice publicly deriding Dante for the sustained 
attention she was receiving from him), (2) Dante's description of writing the poem 
inspired by the event, (3) the resulting poem, and finally, (4) Dante's explication of the 
poem.  Though the act of writing itself isn’t described directly, the general process is.  
More importantly, Vita Nuova introduces one of the major threads in theories of literary 
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production, life experiences (events, observations, etc.) as sources for a work of 
composition. 
 In 1580, Montaigne introduced the vernacular essay and amplified earlier 
definitions of the genre.  For Montaigne, the essay is a way to test himself in a situation 
or concept–-on skepticism, imagination, friendship.  Rather than narrate his life 
chronologically and according to events that he experienced, he uses topics, the 
rhetorical topoi of invention (an influence of Cicero, whom Montaigne read widely).  
The collective effect of his Essays is that Montaigne emerges as a figure with a central 
consciousness, rather than a subject being acting upon and changing over the course of 
his life.  In other words, the essay as opposed to narration allowed Montaigne to depict 
himself as having an “essence” or “core” personality as opposed to a dynamic self as 
seen in chronologically narrated autobiography, a self that is always becoming and 
teleological.  The self as it is represented in the essays, in this sense, is deontological, 
governed by an internal rule or law.    
 His essays were also some of the first attempts by an author to describe his own 
writing process, including how he chose subject matter, how he chose to incorporate the 
ideas and texts from others, and his working conditions.  In his statements about writing 
he constructs a writing self that vacillates from embodiment in his comparisons between 
writing and physical activity, to transcendence in his treatment of writing as done by 
“another self.”  For example, in one passage he draws a comparison between writing and 
speaking as he defends his use of the essay instead of the conventionally chronologically 
narrated autobiography: "I am a sworn foe to constraint, assiduity, and perseverance; and 
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that nothing is so foreign to my style as an extended narrative.  So often I break off for 
lack of breath" (47).  In another passage in which he addresses problems of structure and 
organization in the process of composing, Montaigne compares writing to the 
aimlessness of a flaneur wandering the streets (160). In other passages, however, 
embodiment gives way to transcendence.  By transcendence, I mean a sense that the act 
of composing occurs while he is somehow not present.  Consider the following passage 
in which he contemplates his writing persona: 
  I am then another self, or because I approach my subject under different  
  circumstances and with other considerations.  Hence it is that I may well  
  contradict myself, but the truth, as Demades said, I do not contradict.   
  Could my mind find a firm footing, I should not be making essays, but  
  coming to conclusions; it is, however, always in its apprenticeship and on  
  trial. (235) 
One particular issue that Montaigne brings up in the previous passage is the issue of 
genre.  Unlike Dante who merely narrated the circumstances surrounding the production 
of his poems, which, remember, was one of Emig complaints against writers who write 
about the composing process, Montaigne includes in his essays the problematic features 
of textual production: issues of genre, style, organization, and invention, among others.   
 During the Romantic period, when the concern about the figure of the writer 
reached new heights, many poets wrote about the process of writing and creativity, 
dedicating entire essays on the subject rather than intermittently commenting on the 
writing process in a larger work with another subject matter or as part of a work of 
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autobiography.  Edward Young's “Conjectures on Original Composition” is one of the 
first works to compare the writing process to plant life: “The mind of a man of genius is 
a fertile and pleasant field...An original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises 
spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made” (Adams 328).  
Keats, as well, thought that the organic metaphor was the most accurate description of 
the writing process: “If poetry comes not as naturally as the leaves to a tree it had better 
not come at all” (Adams 492).  Shelley, also embracing organicism, extended the 
metaphor to include the natural processes of the physical world by comparing the mind 
of the writer during the creative act to “a fading coal, which some invisible influence, 
like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness; this power arises from within, 
like the color of a flower which fades and changes as it is developed” (Adams 575).  
Extending the metaphor emphasized the primacy and irrational nature of creativity and 
of the writing self.   
 Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Philosophy of Composition,” published in April 1848, 
ushered in the modern writing memoir as it has come to be written in the twentieth 
century. As Dana Gioia has noted, the essay was the only one of its kind in nineteenth- 
century American letters. While the predecessors to Poe did serve to animate theories of 
literary invention, they also manage to present theories of invention that abstract the 
writer; the act of writing, the practice of writing, isn't described directly (one of Emig's 
complaints against writers who write about composing).  Poe's essay, compared to its 
precursors, addresses practical composing practices such as deciding what to write and 
choosing literary devices for effect—the step-by-step process he followed to write "The 
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Raven."   
 Equally important to the shift in content of Poe's essay from its precursors in 
literary criticism and theory, Poe's shift to the practical side of composing, is the 
historical shift that occurred during the nineteenth century in which writing as a 
profession began to take shape.  Before this time, the idea of writing as a something that 
was difficult was rarely mentioned.  The concept of writer's block, for example, didn't 
exist.  Only as the writers began to see themselves (as well as the public began to see 
them) as professionals, did the complaints about writing begin to seem ubiquitous.  One 
way to view this shift is understand writers writing about writing as positioning 
themselves against the non-professional, as experts against the non-experts.  Chapter IV 
of this dissertation, "Inspiration and Instrumentalism," will address this historical shift 
more fully. 
 In the introduction, Poe writes that he intends to give the public "a peep behind 
the scenes" of writing in order to show  
  the wheels and pinions—the tackle for scene-shifting—the stepladders  
  and demon-traps—the cock feathers, the red paint and the black patches,  
  which, in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of  
  the literary histrio. (1618). 
His account, meant to rebut Shakespeare's claim that poets write in a "fine frenzy" (in A 
Midsummer Night's Dream) reveals a writer for whom composition is a controlled, 
rational process that proceeds from the general to the specific—a process he compares to 
solving a mathematical problem.    
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 After deciding on the length of the poem (about a hundred lines), the province of 
the poem (beauty), and tone of the poem (sadness), Poe considers a literary device that 
would serve as a "key-note" in the poem, "some pivot upon which the whole structure 
might turn," and settles on the refrain (1620). After considering that the most effective 
refrain is one that is repeated word for word, he decides that his refrain should consist of 
one word; specifically, he wanted a word that was sonorous, having ideally the long "o" 
sound and the consonant "r" sound.  The word "Nevermore" was "the very first which 
presented itself" (1620).  Since no reasoning being, according to Poe, would repeat one 
word over and over, he decides that a raven should speak the word (though he did 
consider a parrot).  Once these things had been decided, the plot of the bereaved lover 
(beauty and death epitomized in the death of a beautiful woman, according to Poe) is 
settled, and then, Poe writes the last stanza of the poem, further defining the rhyme and 
meter that would dictate the composition of the rest of the poem.  Next, he decides on 
the locale of the poem—a chamber—and settles on the specific incidents and questions 
the bereaved lover asks the bird, then writes those stanzas.  Finally, rereading his draft, 
he decides the poem requires two more stanzas to achieve a proper level of 
suggestiveness, and he writes them.   
 At the end of the essay, the "peep behind the scene," the reality show of "The 
Raven," doesn't so much accomplish the task of de-mystifying the process of 
composition as refashioning the "fine frenzy" he meant to decry into a hyper-rationalized 
meting out of a work of art, one that is as difficult to believe.  As many readers of the 
essay comment, Poe's account seems forced, too mechanical and rigid, too linear and 
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structured.  Poe portrays himself as one who fully controls language and his art, an art 
for which inspiration or epiphany play no part.  In Language As Symbolic Action, 
describing Poe's essay, Burke writes:  
though he [Poe] might be expected to know more about his procedures 
than any one else, the general tendency has been to feel that he is making 
the genesis of the poem look much more deliberate than could possibly be 
the case, and to assume that he did so either for purposes of showmanship 
or to compensate for his own personal shortcomings by representing 
himself as a paragon of rational control. (27) 
Burke, sounding so much like Janet Emig, is revealing the dialectic at play in the essay: 
on one hand, the artist is craftsman; on the other, the artist is midwife to a work that 
came from nowhere, the “something-out-of-nothing” for which the writing process is 
sometimes represented as cloaked in mystery.  For example, the word "nevermore" 
simply "presented itself" (1620).  What Burke suggests in his “compensation” theory 
about the essay and the representation of Poe’s writing self is that the artist, by using 
mechanical metaphors to describe his writing process, is attempting to fashion for 
himself a more practical, rational account of writing than was the case.  As chapter IV in 
this dissertation argues, such instrumental descriptions of composing often are 
accompanied by metaphors of the religious, the two antipodes sharing at their core the 
anxieties writers have about their control or lack of control over their writing process.  
 In the next generation of American writers, Henry James writes The Art of the 
Novel, published in 1934. The book is a collection of the prefaces he wrote for his novels 
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in preparation for the New York Edition of his collected works, related to Poe's "The 
Philosophy of Composition" in that it duplicates the "peep behind the scenes" approach 
Poe uses for "The Raven" for each of James's novels.  In addition to describing his 
writing processes, James also expands on Poe's theme by describing his consciousness as 
he composed.  In James's words, the prefaces that make up The Art of the Novel are 
examples of a genre he calls "the story of a story."  Some of the major subjects covered 
in the prefaces include: the relation of art and the artist, the finding of subjects, and the 
growth of subjects (as identified by Richard P. Blackmur in the introduction to the 
book).  James's idea of the genesis and development is based on the concept of "the 
germ," that "subjects never come ready-made or complete, but always from hints, notes, 
the merest suggestion" (xv). One example of his germ theory comes from the preface to 
Portrait of a Lady: 
  Trying to recover here, for recognition, the germ of my idea, I see that it 
  must have consisted not at all in any conceit of a ‘plot’, nefarious name, 
  in any flash, upon the fancy, of a set of relations, or in any one of those 
  situations that, by a logic of their own, immediately fall, for the fabulist, 
  into movement, into a march or a rush, a patter of quick steps; but  
  altogether in the sense of a single character, the character and aspect of a 
  particular engaging young woman, to which all the usual elements of a 
  ‘subject’, certainly of a setting, were to need to be superadded. (42) 
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In chapters 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 21, James returns again and again to the germ 
theory.  In the preface for The Portrait of a Lady, he theorizes the origin of the germ that 
grows into the work: 
  As for the origin of one’s wind-blown germs themselves, who shall say, 
  as you ask, where they come from? We have to go too far back, too far 
  behind, to say. Isn’t it all we can say that they come from every quarter of 
  heaven, that they are there at almost any turn of the road? They  
  accumulate, and we are always picking them over, selecting among them. 
  They are the breath of life – by which I mean that life, in its own way, 
  breathes them  upon us. They are so, in a manner prescribed and imposed 
  – floated into our minds by the current of life. (43) 
In this passage, the metaphor of the germ is complicated by the addition of the metaphor 
of "the current of life"—or, life is a river.  He also referred to the "stream of 
composition" (the full phrase "I remount the stream of composition," a rather coarse 
transitional device James is fond of using in the prefaces).  Wayne Booth called James a 
"fountainhead" in The Rhetoric of Fiction, a work that effectively argued that the 
rhetorical features of fictions underlie the highly crafted and deliberate nature of 
composition, but in The Art of the Novel, James's own accounts of invention and 
inspiration cast some doubt about the purposeful writer actively writing without the 
presence of something else, though even James is unsure about what that something else 
might be, choosing to articulate the genesis of his works through metaphor, many of 
which reappear in the works I analyze in this dissertation. 
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 Several themes emerge from James's central metaphors related to composition.  
The river metaphor, as I mentioned earlier, appears in his discussion of Portrait of a 
Lady.  In the preface to The Aspern Papers, James returns to the metaphor of the river to 
represent literary invention, this time to warn of the dangers of the flooded imagination: 
  Nothing is so easy as improvisation, the running on and on of invention; 
  it is sadly compromised, however, from the moment its stream breaks 
  bounds and gets into flood.  Then the waters may spread indeed,  
  gathering houses and herd and crops and cities into their arms and  
  wrenching off, for our amusement, the whole face of the land—only 
  violating by the same stroke our sense of the course and the channel, 
  which is our sense of the uses of a stream and the virtue of a story. (172)  
To paraphrase James, he is admonishing writers not to get carried away.  His warning 
strikes at the heart of a two ideas running countercurrent in the memoirs I analyze in this 
dissertation: the river takes a writer places and in this sense the writer is passive; 
however, in another sense, a writer's control of his subject and composing process is 
paramount to the success of the literary work.  The idea recurs in other contradictory 
metaphors, such as the metaphor of the hunt (159 and 311) against the metaphor of the 
builder (296).  In the hunt metaphor, the writer trails the scent passively as a bloodhound 
(311); in the building metaphor, the writer must painstakingly give order to the "solid 
blocks of material" (296). The balance of these two ideas, freedom and control, James 
describes further in a later paragraph of his preface to The Aspern Papers: 
 19 
  The thing was to aim at absolute singleness, clearness and roundness, and 
  yet to depend on an imagination working freely, working (call it) with 
  extravagance; by which law it wouldn't be thinkable except as free and 
  wouldn't be amusing except as controlled.  (172) 
The balance between freedom and control, a contradictory state of being, is the heart of 
what he refers to throughout the prefaces as the "fun" of composing.  But, the state he 
must maintain, the delicate balance of extravagance and focus, becomes in later prefaces, 
an economy of the writerly self, one in which the controlled supply of the "explosive 
principle in one's material" he allows "to flush and colour and animate the disputed 
value" but ultimately is required to be "kept down," else the "space-hunger and space-
cunning" imagination takes over and spoils the work (278).  The reward for such an 
economy, which again reflects how James's sense of writerly self relates to freedom and 
control, is renewed energy: 
  the range of choice as to treatment, by which I mean as to my pressing the 
  clear liquor of amusement and refreshment from the golden apple of 
  composition, that blest freedom, with its infinite power of renewal, was 
  still my resource, and I felt myself invoke it not in vain. (277) 
In this passage, renewal is the reward for the work of maintaining the economy of 
freedom and control.  Yet again, a contradiction is revealed: composition is work and its 
own reward (it is pleasurable and renews him), what he calls in the preface to The 
Golden Bowl "the religion of doing," which is a feature of the writer's freedom to "do" 
what James calls "literary deeds" (347). 
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 The "literary deeds" of writers, and more specifically the "story of the story" 
James memorialized in The Art of the Novel, became the focus of The Paris Review 
interviews, first published in 1953.  For the writers who were interviewed in the 
following issues and the readers of the publication, this feature of the magazine became 
widely popular.  Writers considered it a laurel to be interviewed.  The reading public 
loved the interviews.  Viking Press has published the Writers at Work interviews from 
The Paris Review in eight hardback volumes since the first issue of The Paris Review: 
1958, 1963, 1967, 1976, 1981, 1984, 1986, and 1988.  The Paris Review's complete 
archives are now available online at The Paris Review website: 
http://www.parisreview.org/literature.php. 
 The appearance of The Paris Review interviews marks a tipping point in the 
publication of works about writing by working writers.  In each decade following the 
first Paris Review interviews, the number of full-length writing memoirs and collections 
of essay-length writing memoirs has multiplied. 
 Writing memoirs by Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck were published in 
the 1960's (1964 and 1969, respectively).  A Moveable Feast elegantly describes 
Hemingway's time in Paris among other literati such as Gertrude Stein, F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, Ezra Pound, and James Joyce.  The opening chapters describe his experiences 
writing in Parisian cafés and various apartments.  In the few paragraphs, several themes 
emerge: writing about a place from which he is physically removed (writing about 
Michigan in Paris), learning to forget about a work in progress while away from the 
writing desk, ending the day knowing where to pick up the next day, writing the "true 
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sentence" as opposed to the elaborate, ornamental sentence ("All you have to do is write 
one true sentence.  Write the truest sentence that you know." [12]), and getting "lost" in 
the moment of composition, a state of absorbed concentration during which the writer 
loses awareness that he or she is composing, a theme that appears in Donald Hall's Life 
Work, discussed in chapter III of this dissertation. 
 Steinbeck's Journal of a Novel is an epistolary account of composing East of 
Eden.  The journal and the novel were both kept in the same notebook, the text of the 
journal on one side and the novel on the other.  Addressed to his editor, the letters of the 
journal describe the day-to-day problems with interruptions and family commitments, 
the lassitude after a bad day's work at the writing desk or the happiness following a good 
day's work, structural or character problems with the novel, and general comments about 
literature.  Interestingly, the journal opens on a Monday, and Steinbeck isn't able to work 
up the momentum to begin writing the novel until Friday:  
  Just as it always does—the work started without warning.  It is always 
  just that way.  I must sit a certain length of time before it happens.  
  Yesterday it began to come and I think the form is set now.  I know it is 
  for the  alternate chapters.  I only hope I can do as well with the other 
  parts of the alternate.  Now I have sat a week.  It is Friday and I have 
  sweated out one page and a half.  If I did not know this process so well, I 
  would consider it a week of waste.  (12) 
Steinbeck, in other words, had to wait, a period of time that he would have considered 
wasted had he not known what he doesn't say in this passage: the waiting is as much a 
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part of the process of composition and the actual writing itself, a theme that is also 
addressed by the writers I analyze in this dissertation. 
   In the 1970's and 1980's, six significant works by writers on writing were 
published: 1) May Sarton's Journal of a Solitude (1973), 2) John Gardner's On Becoming 
a Novelist (1983), 3) Eudora Welty's One Writer's Beginnings (1984), 4) Brenda 
Ueland's If You Want to Write (1987), 5) Natalie Goldberg's Writing Down the Bones: 
Freeing the Writer Within (1986), and 6) Annie Dillard's The Writing Life (1989, a work 
I analyze in chapter III of this dissertation).  The books by Gardner, Ueland, and 
Goldberg take the pose of instructional advice to novice writers.  The works by Sarton, 
Welty, and Dillard are writing memoirs. 
 In the 1990's, the following were published: John Jerome's The Writing Trade: A 
Year in the Life (1992), Donald Hall's Life Work (1993), Ray Bradbury's Zen in the Art 
of Writing (1994) Anne Lamott's Bird By Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life 
(1995); Donald Maass's The Career Novelist (1996), Why I Write: Thoughts on the Craft 
of Fiction (1998) edited by Will Blythe (which includes essays by Norman Mailer, 
Richard Ford, Pat Conroy, Ann Patchett, Rick Bass, David Foster Wallace, and Jim 
Harrison, among others), bell hooks's Remembered Rapture: The Writer at Work (1999), 
Frederich Busch's A Dangerous Profession: A Book About the Writing Life (1999). 
 Since then, even more: Stephen King's On Writing (2000), The Spirit of Writing: 
Classic and Contemporary Essays Celebrating the Writing Life (2001) edited by Mark 
Robert Waldman (which includes essays by Annie Dillard, Stephen Kind, Anne Lamott, 
Robert Pinsky, Erica Jong, and William Zinsser, among others), Margaret Atwood's 
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Negotiating with the Dead: A Writer on Writing (2002), The Writing Life: Writers on 
How They Think and Work (2003) edited by Marie Arana (a collection of essays from 
the Washington Post Book World), Norman Mailer's A Spooky Art (2003), Joyce Carol 
Oates's The Faith of a Writer: Life, Craft, Art (2003), Toward the Open Field: Poets on 
the Art of Poetry 1800-1950 (2004) edited by Melissa Kwasny, Bret Lott's Before We 
Get Started: A Practical Memoir of the Writer's Life (2005), The Very Telling: 
Conversations with American Writers (2006) edited by Sarah Anne Johnson.  In addition 
to print works, Oprah Winfrey, as part of Oprah's Book Club, features on her website a 
Writers on Writing page: http://www.oprah.com/obc/writers/obc_writers_prep.jhtml. 
A Brief Overview of Writers on Writing Scholarship in Composition Studies 
 In the preface to Shoptalk: Learning to Write With Writers (1990), Donald 
Murray writes: 
  The serious student of writing and the teacher of writing should know that 
  the extensive testimony of writers has largely been ignored by  
  composition researchers.  What writers know about their craft has been 
  dismissed, for example, as the "lore of the practitioner." (xiv) 
This statement is as true now as it was in 1990, even though there are some important 
research studies that anticipate the use of writing memoirs by professional creative 
writers. 
 One work that demonstrates the possibilities of using writer's accounts of writing 
processes is Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction.  Booth, through close reading, 
reveals the highly crafted nature of works of fiction.  He discusses authors' narrative 
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techniques used to achieve rhetorical effects such as an author's choice of perspective (or 
point of view) for the narrator, which conveys a more or less distant relationship to the 
implied author, the characters of the story, or the reader.  More directly relevant to this 
study is his inclusion of many works by writers about their writing processes, some of 
which are prominently featured as epigraphs for chapters.  Booth's elaborate 
bibliography included in the second edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction includes 
Sherwood Anderson's Notebook, E. M. Forster's Aspects of the Novel, The Journal of 
Katherine Mansfield, Edith Wharton's The Writing of Fiction, Writers at Work: The 
Paris Review Interviews, Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Essays and Lectures on 
Shakespeare, C. E. Montague's A Writer's Notes on His Trade, Joseph Conrad's Prefaces 
to His Work, the Prefaces of Henry James, Virginia Woolf's The Common Reader and 
The Second Common Reader, Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition, 
Anton Chekohov's Letters on the Short Story, the Drama and Other Literary Topics, 
Ezra Pound's Make It New, and Paul Valery's The Art of Poetry.  Though Booth's study 
focuses on the symbolic evidence of craft (instead of the material, physical or cognitive 
processes at work during composition), his study opens up its correlative—a focus on 
invention and writing processes. 
 After writing process studies "dried up" by the end of the 1980's (as Russel K. 
Durst puts it), another strand of composition scholarship related to studies focusing on 
professional creative writers' writing memoirs began to grow in popularity: the study of 
the literacy narrative (80).  In "Literacy Narratives as Genres of Possibility: Students' 
Voices, Reflective Writing, and Rhetorical Awareness," Susan DeRosa defines literacy 
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narrative: 
  an account of one’s experiences with language and writing in specific 
  contexts, and I see literacy narratives as flexible genres, as fluid and 
  changing as the discourses that inform them. Literacy narratives, I suggest, 
  provide writers with a lens through which they may examine their literacy 
  experiences as critical acts of inquiry. In literacy narratives, writers may 
  be self-reflective and critical of their roles and responsibilities as writers, 
  their writing strategies, and their interactions with generic forms, as they 
  (re)position themselves in the discourses of different genres. (De Rosa 3) 
Generally, those who study literacy narratives do not include writing memoirs by 
professional creative writers in the genre, focusing instead on literacy narratives of 
student writers, a bias I believe is a hold over from Emig's blistering arguments against 
works on writing by "established writers."   
 The writing memoirs I analyze do share some important elements with literacy 
narratives: navigating the symbolic realm of reading and writing, negotiating the 
constraints of specific genres, and formulating ideas about their responsibilities as 
writers.  However, there is an important distinction: literacy narratives are already about 
literacy in a direct way, while writing memoirs usually lack content that directly 
addresses language acquisition.  Finally, I resist classifying writing memoirs as literacy 
narratives because the study of literacy narratives brings with it a particular critical lens  
associated with social constructionism and the critique of expressivism that I attempt to 
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address.  In other words, literacy narratives often describe the powers at play in the 
social area that affect the writer; however, the actual practice of writing goes 
undescribed, a similar objection that Emig had of writing memoirs, even though I 
disagree with her objection. 
 In 2005, Barbara Tomlinson published the only full-length work in composition 
scholarship that analyzes what writers have to say about writing processes, Authors on 
Writing: Metaphors and Intellectual Labor, a metaphorical analysis of interviews such 
as the ones that began appearing in The Paris Review in 1953.  The work is exceptional.  
She argues the interview genre affords researchers  the opportunity to view the discourse 
of authorship within a context of a conversation.  She argues "sustained study of writers' 
metaphors about writing processes reveals the existence of a meta-narrative community 
among writers and in the general culture" (3).  Further, analyzing what writers say about 
writing "might enable us to supplement, revive, or even replace the epistemological tools 
lost to writers, readers, and teachers because of society's celebration and mystification of 
authorship" (3).   
 Tomlinson's work has obvious and applicable value for further studies of writing 
memoirs, as well as a key limitation.  One of her most interesting observations is the 
identification of a central metaphor for writing, "writing is mining," and the way this 
metaphor functions to highlight the embodied nature of the act of writing (i.e., the work 
or labor involved).  Pushing up against this metaphor, which is largely a metaphor about 
the interiority of the writing act, is another system of metaphors, a system Tomlinson 
calls metaphors of dynamic discursivity, such as "the character as co-author" metaphor, 
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functions to highlight the social nature of the composing process.  However, in the 
concluding chapter, Tomlinson admits that her study focuses almost exclusively on 
active metaphors, i.e., metaphors of doing, even though "creativity involves both active 
and receptive processes" (131).  She concludes the book by reporting that even though 
she has seldom had "experiences of transcribing dictation, working in a trance, receiving 
the gift of ideas, or being a vehicle for others" that she remains "primed for them" (131).  
For "inspiration" she keeps on the bulletin board above her writing desk the following 
excerpt from an interview with Harry Casey (K.C. from K.C. and the Sunshine Band): 
  "I didn't really write [that song]," KC confesses, eyes wide, his hand 
  running through still damp hair…"Some spirit came over the whole room.  
  I mean, my hands were beyond human control…Like an egg was cracked 
  open and all this music came out."  He shakes his head and says quietly, 
  "Something much greater than me wrote 'Shake your Booty.'"(131) 
Like KC, many writers affirm similar experiences.  They feel as if they did not create the 
work, that it was given to them by an unnamed source.  I believe Tomlinson's study is an 
important first study in the descriptions of writers' writing processes, but as she admits, 
more work is necessary to fully understand the creative process in composition. 
 
Method and Approach 
As I proposed in the beginning of this chapter, there are few studies of works by 
professional creative writers describing writing processes (works I call writing 
memoirs).  Based on the work by rhetorical scholars such Wayne Booth, composition 
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scholars such as Cynthia Selfe and Barbara Tomlinson (and even Janet Emig), I believe 
a rhetorical analysis of writing memoirs is warranted and necessary.  By analyzing 
professional creative writers' accounts of their writing processes, we can begin to 
uncover the multiple, varied ways writers approach specific writing situations and apply 
that knowledge to a meaningful understanding of composition.   
 This dissertation is primarily a work of rhetorical criticism that analyzes writing 
memoirs.  Although it is not an historical study, I will historicize when necessary 
concepts that emerge in the texts of the primary works (which I list below in the chapter 
descriptions).  As for method, I draw on the work of I. A. Richards, Wayne Booth, and 
the work on metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson.  I will also draw on the work of M. 
Jimmie Killingsworth, specifically Appeals in Modern Rhetoric: An Ordinary-Language 
Approach, in which he argues that tropes and narrative are some of the most persuasive 
rhetorical appeals available to speakers and writers.  These approaches assume a 
definition of rhetoric that expands the classical definitions of rhetoric and ethos 
(Aristotle), invention (Cicero), rhetoric as identification as Burke describes 
identification—all of which are rooted in situation, in exigencies, as Bitzer argued in 
"The Rhetorical Situation."  
 More specifically, the method of analysis in this dissertation focuses on the 
metaphors writers use when describing the act of writing, an approach that involves 
identifying the central metaphors writers use and related, satellite metaphors writers use 
when they address readers.  As Lakoff and Johnson have argued, metaphors point to 
underlying systems of thought, an idea that suggests metaphors reveal attitudes and ideas 
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that may be unconscious or covert, even to the writers themselves.  Richards took the 
view that metaphor could offer what psychoanalysts could not, that metaphor "will tell 
us how our mind works" (136).  Modern writing memoirs offer a rich reserve of 
metaphorical description due to the fact that the process of writing is one that is hidden 
from view and must be described in terms of something else; the something else (the 
vehicle, to use Richards's terminology)—the metaphors writers use—offer insight into 
their beliefs about who they are as writers and what they do when they sit down (or stand 
up, in Hemingway's case) at the writing desk.  Metaphors reveal motivations, beliefs, 
perceptions about a writer's purpose, and ultimately, are constitutive: writing metaphors 
construct the writing self.  
 In Chapter II, "The Expressivist Aim Reconsidered: A View from A Room of 
One's Own," I analyze Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own as a writing memoir that 
contests the traditional concept of invention that views invention as self-expression.  I 
argue that Woolf's concept of invention, in fact, requires a negation of self, a process of 
experiencing harmony (which includes the entire world, including texts) which results in 
a special kind of "vision" available to the writer, a "vision" that precludes rhetoric as 
much as it does interiority.  This process emerges from Woolf's central metaphor for the 
process of composing: rivers—rivers of perception (especially sight), thought, language, 
texts, and the literary tradition.  Finally, I suggest that what has been called expressivist 
rhetoric is really a mode of invention that historically has been particular to poetics and 
could be eliminated altogether as a discursive aim even while the poetical inventive pose 
could be applied to each discursive aim—literary, informative, and persuasive. 
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 In Chapter III, "A Writing Life and Life Work: The Writing Bodies of Annie 
Dillard and Donald Hall," I argue Dillard's and Hall's metaphors for writing and their 
narratives of poetic origin create a concept of self which maintains freedom (rhetorical 
agency) and bodily presence as characteristics of their writing processes.  In Chapter IV, 
"Inspiration and Instrumentalism: The New York Times's Writing on Writing Series," I 
argue that instrumental metaphors and metaphors of inspiration implicate one another in 
a way that complicates both sets of metaphors.  Specifically, the essays in Writers on 
Writing create a view of writing that is both instrumentalist and religious, which makes 
the spectrum an instrument of a false dualism in the discourse about writing by creative 
writers.  The essays, taken together, create a concept of the writing self that maintains a 
sense of writerly control (rhetorical agency) as well as a sense of a diminished control; 
ultimately, the two concepts are married in the minds of the writers and scholars alike.  
Finally, I will argue that there are negative pedagogical consequences (i.e., the effect of 
students of composition) if composition scholarship continues to insist on an 
instrumentalist view of writing and the absence of inspiration in the writing process.  In 
the concluding chapter, "Creativity and the Composition Classroom," I argue that the 
constraints of the composition classroom impede students' creative processes as creative 
processes articulated by the writers I analyzed in chapters II-IV.  
 Ultimately, this dissertation takes as its starting point a very specific and fairly 
limited claim: we can learn something from what professional creative writers have to 
say about the composing process.  This is really no different from what composition 
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scholars who study literacy narratives claim: reflective works on writing can be used as a 
basis for a robust approach to composition pedagogy.   
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CHAPTER II 
 THE EXPRESSIVIST AIM RECONSIDERED:  
 
A VIEW FROM A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 
 
   
 In the concluding paragraphs of A Room of One's Own, Virginia Woolf offers a 
series of conditions that must be fulfilled before Judith Shakespeare can be reborn:  
  For my belief is that if we live another century or so—I am talking of the 
  common life which is the real life and not of the little separate lives 
  which  we live as individuals—and have five hundred a year each of us 
  and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of freedom and the courage to 
  write exactly what we think; if we escape a little from the common 
  sitting- room and see human beings not always in their relation to each 
  other but in relation to reality; and the sky, too, and the trees or whatever 
  it may be in themselves; if we look past Milton's bogey, for no human 
  being should shut out the view; if we face the fact, for it is a fact, that 
  there is no arm to cling to, but that we go alone and that our relation is to 
  the world of reality and not only to the world of men and women, then the 
  opportunity will come and the dead poet who was Shakespeare's sister 
  will put on the body which she has so often laid down. (118) 
Taken out of context from the rest of A Room of One's Own, the series of dependent 
clauses could be used to describe what is known as the expressivist orientation in 
composition studies.  The clauses reflect the notion of community in the meaning-
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making process (the "common life"), a focus on invention ("habit of freedom," as in 
free-writing exercises), and an emphasis on the development of voice ("the courage to 
write what we think").  Based on a surface and incorrect reading of this sentence, Woolf 
could be considered an expressivist, at least by critics such as Lester Faigley, James 
Berlin, and Jeanette Harris, for the clauses reflect three key theoretical concepts for 
which the expressivist orientation is frequently derided: 
1. Expressivist rhetoric privileges an Enlightenment theory of individualism and 
epistemology:  the self is unified and is able to discern accurately an 
objective reality. 
2. Expressivist rhetoric conveys a Romantic belief in an autonomous, authentic 
self apart from or above historical and material circumstances of textual 
production. 
3. Expressive rhetoric uses the metaphors of the window [windowpane theory 
of language] and vehicle  [basically the conduit metaphor] to describe the 
function of language, an outmoded theory of language that does not reflect 
current thinking about the social construction of communication. 
Interpreted in context (which I will do during the course of this chapter), Woolf's 
sentence in A Room of One's Own opens up a means by which expressivism as a 
rhetorical category, as it has been defined by those working within this critical 
orientation and those who have defined expressivism who identify themselves as 
working within other critical orientations (social-epistemic, for example), can be 
reconsidered.  What are the real theoretical and historical under-girdings of what has 
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been called expressivist rhetoric?  While critics claim that expressivist rhetoric maintains 
a concept of self that is (curiously) based on both Enlightenment and Romantic concepts 
of a unified, autonomous core, works that have been called expressivist are not based on 
a simple concept of self.   Though singular sentences and quotes can be taken out of 
context to reflect a notion of the self that is unified and autonomous, and thereby 
expressivist, Woolf develops and addresses the fact that she does not have a resolution to 
questions of self, and even claims that writing is categorically not self expression.  A 
Room of One's Own sharply calls into question the historical concepts upon which 
critiques of self expressionism are based.  On one hand, we could use A Room of One's 
Own as a means to address and to correct current, inadequate theories of expressivist 
discourse in composition studies.  On the other hand, A Room of One's Own also 
establishes the means to call into question the entire category of the expressivist aim of 
discourse.  The study of creative nonfiction writing shows that the rhetoric and poetics of 
selfhood are far more complex than the compositionist critique of "expressionist" 
discourse suggests.  The complexity appears obviously in modernist writers like Virginia 
Woolf, who displays many of the features associated with the category of expressivism, 
but it is likewise apparent in the romantic writers who are considered to be the 
fountainhead of expressivism, such as Keats (one of Woolf's sources) and even Emerson, 
whom Berlin identifies as the father of the expressionism. 
 As a work of composition theory, A Room of One’s Own has received little 
attention, an exception being James L. Hoban’s “Rhetorical Topoi in A Room of One’s 
Own,” in which he calls Virginia Woolf an “inventive rhetorician” and insists that A 
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Room of One’s Own is “a text about rhetoric” (148).1  I agree, specifically with his claim 
that Woolf focuses on matters of invention. I argue that Woolf’s concept of invention 
reverses the inward reflection that is considered part and parcel of the expressivist view.  
In fact, Woolf's concept of invention requires a negation of the self, a process of 
experiencing harmony with nature (the entire world, including texts) which results in a 
special kind of "vision" available to the writer, a "vision" that precludes rhetoric as much 
as it does interiority.   Negating the self, in other words, is the process of denying a 
unified self, approaching reality subjectively, and welcoming the influence of historical 
and material circumstances surrounding writing.  This process emerges from Woolf's 
central metaphor for the process of invention:  rivers—rivers of perception (especially 
sight), thought, language, texts, and the literary tradition.  Finally, I suggest that what 
has been called expressivist rhetoric is really a mode of invention that historically has 
been particular to poetics and could be eliminated altogether as a discursive aim even 
while the poetical inventive pose could be applied to each discursive aim—literary, 
informative, and persuasive.  To demonstrate this argument, I will offer the following 
examples from Woolf's texts (primarily A Room of One's Own): 1) Woolf's descriptions 
of and metaphors relating to invention; 2) Woolf's definition of reality; and  3) Woolf's 
critiques of the works of Shakespeare and others. 
 
_______________ 
 
1 Another treatment of Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own as a work of composition theory is Vara Neverov’s 
“Reading A Room of One’s Own as a model of Composition Theory.” Neverov argues that A Room of 
One’s Own is about overcoming anxieties about the writing process.  She does not, as I do in this chapter, 
consider the metaphors Woolf uses to describe the writing process; instead, she limits her discussion to 
Woolf’s obscuring of her authorial identity through the characters of Mary Beton, Mary Seton, and Mary 
Carmichael. 
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Rivers of Invention 
 Woolf's central metaphor for invention, rivers, complicates the notion of unified 
self often associated with expressivism.  Woolf "fishes" for ideas about her (assigned) 
writing topic, Women and Fiction, on the banks of a river at the fictional Oxbridge in the 
opening chapter of A Room of One's Own: 
Thought—to call it by a prouder name than it deserved—had let its line 
down into the stream.  It swayed, minute after minute, hither and thither 
among the reflections and the weeds, letting the water lift it and sink it, 
until—you know the little tug—the sudden conglomeration of an idea at 
the end of one's line… (5) 
This passage indicates Woolf's approach to the river as a source (or re-source) for 
writing material.  Admitting her idea isn't yet worth frying, she puts the fish-idea back 
"into her mind," the equivalent of releasing the fish into the river in order that it may 
grow and develop.  In the first example, she "fishes" for ideas in the river; in the latter 
example, her mind is the river into which she releases her idea.  Then, walking along the 
banks of the river again, her mind flows from idea to idea, winding through mental 
associations, mimicking the river flowing: 
some stray memory of some old essay about revisiting Oxbridge in the 
long vacation brought Charles Lamb to mind—Saint Charles, said 
Thackeray, putting a letter of Lamb’s to his forehead…For his essays are 
superior even to Max Beerbohm’s, I thought, with all their perfection, 
because of that wild flash of imagination…Certainly he wrote an essay—
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the name escapes me—about a manuscript of one of Milton’s poems 
which he saw here.  It was Lycidas perhaps, and Lamb wrote how it 
shocked him to think it possible that any word in Lycidas could have been 
different from what it is…It then occurred to me that the very manuscript 
itself which Lamb had looked at was only a few hundred yards 
away…Moreover, I recollected, as I put this plan into execution, it is in 
this famous library that the manuscript of Thackeray’s Esmond is also 
preserved…(6-7) 
The writer's mind is agile, weaving through the landscape of the English literary 
tradition.   Also emphasized is the potency of her surroundings on the writer's thoughts: 
the quadrangles of Oxbridge bring to mind Charles Lamb and finally the memory of the 
library at the college which houses the manuscripts of Lycidas and Esmond.  Here, 
Woolf takes on the quality of the river as she described it:  it reflects whatever it wants 
to reflect as it moves through the landscape.  In her case, the reflection is mental rather 
than the mirrored surface of the water reflecting the images of flora and the occasional 
undergraduate rowing through the water.  Also, she is physically moving through the 
landscape: she is walking and thinking.  Identifying with the river in this way, she takes 
on three qualities of “riverness”: just as the river moves through landscape so she is 
moving through landscape by walking; just as the river’s current circulates so Woolf is 
moving through discursive connections; and finally, just as the river moves freely, 
without design, so Woolf allows herself the freedom of reflection (and motion—she is 
chided for walking on the “turf” reserved for the Beadles' ambulations through campus).  
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 Though the term “stream of consciousness” was already in use when Woolf 
published A Room of One’s Own, she never employs the term to describe her writing 
process or her representations of mental activity. The first use of the phrase “stream of 
consciousness” in English was by George Henry Lewes in Problems of Life and Mind, in 
an addendum to a section entitled, “The Sphere of Sense and Logic of Feeling,” 
Paragraph 132, published in 1880.2  Perhaps one reason Woolf refrained from it stems 
from the abstract and diminutive quality of the phrase: “Stream of consciousness” 
signifies a constant flow, one that is automatic but trickling—much different from the 
thundering rush of a river.  As a metaphor, it lacks the resonance that metaphors which 
omit the tenor provide and detaches the "stream" from the realities of real rivers: they 
can be dammed up, blocked, diverted, or dry.  Woolf's metaphor is more riddling—it 
doesn't name the literal topic (consciousness), only the figurative topic (stream or river).  
As a result, Woolf emphasizes the tenuousness of the flow of invention, a quality that 
Woolf develops as a part of her theory of invention and which I address later in this 
chapter.  Finally, "stream of consciousness" doesn't distinguish between kinds of 
thinking or consciousness; for Woolf, riverness indicates a kind of thinking that is not 
calculated.  Not employing "stream of consciousness" also indicates that Woolf at least 
partially opposed the idea of a unified consciousness, one of the precepts of 
_______________ 
 
2 Though the term has long been attributed to William James, J. Gill Holland discovered the 
original use of the term.  His findings are published in the article “George Henry Lewes and ‘Stream of 
Consciousness’: The First Use of the Term in English.” South Atlantic Review, Vol. 51, No. 1, Jan. 1986, 
31-39.  For a full treatment of the subject of “stream of consciousness,” see Melvin Friedman’s Stream of 
Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method. 
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expressionism according to its many critics that connect it to Enlightenment 
individualism (Berlin, for example).   
The river is a metaphor for Woolf, but in the context of A Room of One's Own, it 
is also more than just a metaphor.  It suggests a deep identification with rivers as entities 
she attempts to merge with or emulate during her writing process as an approach to 
cognition.   Elizabeth Waller has commented on this aspect of Woolf’s writing when she 
argues that Woolf had an understanding “that human bodies can merge with a collective 
earth-body which, via corporeal experience, alters cognitive perception” (138).  The 
effect of merging with the river, an alteration of cognitive perception, is emphasized 
more than once in A Room of One's Own.  One example of this merging occurs while the 
writer is composing at a window and watches the street scene below her: 
At this moment, as so often happens in London, there was a complete lull 
and suspension of traffic.  Nothing came down the street; nobody passes. 
A single leaf detached itself from the plane tree at the end of the street, 
and in that pause and suspension fell.  Somehow it was like a signal 
falling, a signal pointing to a force in things which one had overlooked. It 
seemed to point to a river, which flowed past, invisible, round the corner, 
down the street, and took people and eddied them along, as the stream at 
Oxbridge had taken the undergraduate in his boat and the dead leaves. 
Now it was bringing from one side of the street to the other diagonally a 
girl in patent leather boots, and then a young man in a maroon overcoat; it 
was also bringing a taxi-cab; and it brought all three together at a point 
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directly beneath my window; where the taxi stopped; and the girl and the 
young man stopped; and they got into the taxi; and then the cab glided off 
as if it were swept on by the current elsewhere. (100) 
In this passage, the river is a form that she transposes on the city scene: simply, the river 
is a metaphor for the street activity.  The identification between the street scene and a 
river, however, alters the writer's perception of the events by making the activities 
appear synchronized or possessing the rhythmic quality of rushing waters, suggesting 
that Woolf's river metaphors reveal a connection to nature transcending metaphor.  Her 
identification with rivers or riverness comes near to regarding the world as a spiritual 
entity with which she is coming into relationship.  Woolf’s deep identification with earth 
could also be referred to as an attitude, one that Killingsworth and Palmer identify as 
“nature as spirit” in Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America—an 
attitude which "places human beings on a par with the rest of nature" characterized by 
specific types of action including "prayer, meditation, and bearing witness" (12-13).  
Also, the nature as spirit attitude obviates any interpretation of the self as unified or 
autonomous; nature as spirit reflects exactly the opposite view of self propogated by 
Enlightenment approaches to individualism.      
 Woolf's river metaphors, when they are viewed as an attitude toward nature, 
concurrently imply an attitude toward the self which is necessary to invention.  
Specifically, the inventive pose requires a negation of the self.  Theorists commonly use 
"negate" to denote the supplanting of an idea for another idea, as in the sentence, 
Evolution does not negate the idea of a prime mover.  When I speak of Woolf negating 
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the self, this meaning is implied, that of the supplanting of an idea.  In her case, negating 
the self is the means by which blind egotism is supplanted by a clear perception of the 
world, what she calls "vision" in the closing paragraphs of A Room of One's Own.  
Vision is an inflowing unimpeded by any blocks, dams, filters, or flotsam.  In this 
definition, the world (everything) flows into the eyes like a river, another layer of 
meaning for Woolf's other river metaphors.    
 Though Woolf is considered the quintessential Modernist, her insistent rejection 
of writing in which the self is cynosure owes a debt to both English and American 
Romanticism.  Emerson exuberantly recalls that on Boston Common, "Standing on the 
bare ground,--my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space,--all mean 
egotism vanishes.  I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of 
the Universal Being circulate through me.  I am part and particle of God" (10).  
Emerson's experience on the common is one in which the self is supplanted by a 
particular kind of seeing, a clear perception that allows an inflowing of "currents."  In 
the section of Nature entitled "Language," Emerson asserts that when the writer's life is 
"in harmony with nature, love of truth and virtue" then the writer's eyes will be purged 
and will be able to "understand her text" [the book of nature] (25).  On the common, 
Emerson's eye is purged to the point of transparency; concurrently, the self becomes 
"nothing."   
 Woolf similarly relates the eye as the aperture through which the flow of nature 
enters the consciousness of the writer.  Emerson's "transparent eyeball" in A Room of 
One's Own becomes "a miraculous glass cabinet" as the writer strolls the quadrangles of 
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Oxbridge.  Recalling Emerson's mention of a warm October in the opening of the essay 
"Nature," Woolf recounts a harmonious encounter with nature: 
  The spirit of peace descended like a cloud from heaven, for if the spirit of 
  peace dwells anywhere, it is in the courts and quadrangles of Oxbridge on 
  a fine October morning.  Strolling through those colleges past those 
  ancient halls the roughness of the present seemed smoothed away; the 
  body seemed contained in a miraculous glass cabinet through which no 
  sound could penetrate, and the mind, freed from any contact with facts 
  (unless one trespassed on the turf again), was at liberty to settle down 
  upon whatever meditation was in harmony with the moment. (6) 
The natural world, when she is in harmony with it, had the effect of clearing away all 
obstructions that would permit the mind from composing, able in Emerson's words to 
"see all," a state of mind in which "mean egotism" vanishes.   The implication is that the 
self gets in the way of invention.  Also, her insistence on a "harmonious" encounter with 
nature suggests a subjective state, one in which the experience of nature is mediated by 
the attitude of the writer.  She does not claim an objective perception of reality; rather, 
reality is perceived as a spirit.   
 Woolf further clarifies her attitude toward nature and its relationship to writing in 
her definition of “reality,” a keyword that she uses to describe a transformative 
experience in nature:  
What is meant by “reality”?  It would seem to be some thing very erratic, 
very undependable—now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of 
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newspaper in the street, now in a daffodil in the sun.  It lights up a group 
in a room and stamps some casual saying.  It overwhelms one walking 
beneath the stars and makes the silent world more real than the world of 
speech—and then there it is again in an omnibus in the uproar of 
Piccadilly.  Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in shapes too far away for 
us to discern what their nature is.  But whatever it touches, it fixes and 
makes permanent.  That is what remains when the skin of the day has 
been cast into the hedge; that is what is left of past time and of our loves 
and hates.  Now the writer, as I think, has the chance to live more than 
other people in the presence of this reality. (114) 
Woolf’s reality is one that is always “now,” and requires a writer who is in proper 
relation to the world.  When a writer is fully present in a place, the effect is like water 
rushing over her; reality “overwhelms."  Woolf’s definition of reality further emphasizes 
her attitude toward nature as spirit because her field of action related to nature in this 
description of reality is one of meditative witnessing.  Like her observation at the 
windowsill where she experienced the rhythm of the river in the traffic below her, 
reality, a catchword for harmonious nature, is a key element of her invention.  It is also 
one in which requires the skin to be removed, another kind of negating the self by 
understanding the world or reality as a body whose meat lies underneath the surface, 
beneath what we perceive on the surface where the lens is clouded by our "past loves 
and hates." 
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That the experience of the reality of nature will purge the eye presents a passive 
element of negating the self.  To continue in Woolf's metaphor of the river of language, 
negating the self is a natural wearing away of the impediments/sediments that lay in the 
path of the river; it is erosion.  Woolf's praise of Shakespeare as "one for whom all 
impediments had been burned away until he was incandescent," is one example of the 
passive element of negating the self.  Impediments, in her passage about Shakespeare, 
are the things that the river slowly wears down and finally sweeps away.  The river itself 
does the work of getting rid of the impediments.  Incandescent in this context refers to 
the result of the wearing away of impediments—clear or transparent perception, lucidity.  
A second understanding of negating the self is more active on the part of the 
writer: merging with the waters that are present.  Woolf meant the waters to be both the 
literary tradition and the world of things.  To follow through with her metaphor is to 
understand the true meaning of negating the self: when a tributary flows into the waters 
of a larger river, the tributary is no longer itself—it becomes the larger river.  To negate 
the self is to merge into something or someone else.   
Similar to this second understanding of negating the self is the religious idea of 
"dying to the self."  In a religious context, negating the self is part of the daily practice of 
Christianity (specifically the protestant tradition), a symbolic “killing” of the self so that 
the spirit of Christ can live in the heart of the believer, the same practice that Emerson 
refers to when he claims that "a self denial, no less austere than the saint's, is demanded 
by the scholar" (425).  In this context, the self is emptied out by denying the desires of 
what is called "the flesh."  The symbolic gesture for the death of the self is baptism, a 
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death by water. Once this symbolic death has occurred, the believer is said to be part of 
the body of Christ, the collective term for the church.  So, too, does the water imagery 
prevail in Emerson.  Denying the self, a person is said to be "aloof from all moorings, 
and afloat.  He will abstain from dogmatism, and recognize all the opposite negations, 
between which, as walls, his being is swung" (426). 
Though Woolf isn’t coming out of the religious tradition, the “impediments” she 
wants, for example, "Mr. A" (the writer Woolf criticizes as boring) to do away with 
could be understood as similar to the impediments Christians seek to dispel in order that 
something else (the spirit of Christ) can flow into them (Christ calls himself the "living 
water").  Mr. A's ubiquitous "I," the reason Woolf decides he is boring, in this context, 
prevents the inflow of the world and the literary tradition (words, again, being things).  
Likewise, she refers to works of art not as “singular solitary births” but amassed by the 
collective body of the literary tradition.  Just as the collective term for believers is the 
body of Christ (ie. the indwelling of Christ includes one in the larger group of believers 
also possessing the indwelling of Christ) so for Woolf the works of the literary tradition 
make up a body (her sense of a church), the force of which, like water, dissolve the 
sediment/impediment of the concept of self.  Her definition of the work of art negates 
the concept of self in the sense that she denies individual genius as the genesis of works 
of art and replaces it with the collective body (the western literary tradition) out of which 
flows more works of art (perhaps in what one could understand as a protean version of 
heteroglossia).  She expresses a similar notion in "Letter to a Young Poet" in which she  
tries to persuade the addressee that he, like all poets, is "a poet in whom live all the poets 
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of the past, from which all poets in time to come will spring," and that in him, like a 
Christian who has partaken of the blood of Christ symbolically through Communion, the 
poets of the past will "stir in your blood and sometimes move your pen a little to the 
right or to the left" (3).   
In both criticisms, that of Mr. A for his overuses of the first person pronoun (and 
corresponding egotist perspective, that is, a unified Enlightenment self) and her implicit 
criticism of individual genius when she describes the work of art, Woolf urges the reader 
to consider the self as an idea, one for which if we relied on vision to confirm it (our 
eyes facing outward) we would be without proof.  Had we never seen our face in a 
mirror or reflective surface, how would we describe it?  We would be unable to do so.  
Woolf acknowledges this evolutionary fact and uses it to further suggest it is impossible 
to base writing solely on the idea of self expression.  To attempt to do so produces what 
she calls in Mr.A's work "aridity"— dryness, proof of an “impediment” that prevents a 
writer from merging with the world by an inflow through the eyes.   
When Kinneavy describes expressive discourse in A Theory of Discourse, he 
offers the suicide note as this discourse’s prime example.  Though he develops his theory 
of expressive discourse based on existentialism, and goes on to offer as a prime example 
The Declaration of Independence, the suicide note captures the essence of negating the 
self that Woolf describes in A Room of One’s Own—self annihilation.  For 
existentialists, suicide was the ultimate existential question: should I continue to exist or 
end it?  In this case of the suicide note is the symbolic negation of the self that is 
followed by the literal annihilation of the self. What does it mean to negate the self if it 
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is not a literally killing of the self?  Symbolically, Woolf negates the concept of self 
through language.  The title itself is a distancing by using the third person.  Similarly, the 
master trope that Burke identifies with distance is irony, easily the most complicated and 
misunderstood of the tropes (much like expressionism is the most misunderstood 
tradition in rhetoric).  In effect, irony is the hyperbole of metaphor, the superlative not-
ing.  When Woolf praises Shakespeare and Jane Austen, it is for their ability to convey a 
distance from their subjects, a mastery of the master trope of irony.   
Burke also famously states that man is the inventor of the negative.3  Playing on 
his words, one could say that man’s sense of an inner self that expresses interiority is the 
photo negative of the material self, in which case the negative that Burke speaks of is the 
not-ness we cannot see yet invent for ourselves.  Negating the self is not only realizing 
that the concept of the self could be an invention but also acting in the world based on 
the truth of that realization.  In other words, negating the self creates the standard of an 
ethical approach toward others and toward nature.    
While she does not use "voice" as a metonym for self, neither does she refer to 
the process of literary invention as inspiration.  Inspiration relies on a concept of self –a 
self respirating, giving life to the concept of individual genius.  Woolf's vision is not 
inspiration.  Woolf's vision provides for the agency of the writer.  To write is a way to be 
in the world, but to do so requires the true vision, outward vision not inward vision.  If a 
writer is "looking within and not without," the writing is marked by "a fixity" and a 
_______________ 
 
3 Umberto Eco's definition of the sign as anything that can be used to tell a lie (in A Theory of Semiotics), 
shares with Burke the same sense of the negative. 
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"gloom" ("Letter" 6).  Her argument: to write well you must gain pure, incandescent 
sight by seeing as much of the world as you can and submerging yourself in the literary 
tradition, both of which will act as reagents to wear away the impediments of your idea 
of self. The idea of self is an impediment or "restricted" as she calls it elsewhere 
("Letter" 6). 
The significance of this position is that Woolf's invention is on some level 
arhetorical, a process of rejecting "mean egotism."  In other instances in A Room of 
One's Own, her position on rhetoric is more direct.  The "fact" that she could not walk 
freely while she was thinking about her writing topic opposes her writing process.  The 
idea seems self-evident: you cannot compose in an environment of constant interruptions 
or prescriptive rules (in her case, not being able to walk on the turf).  The implications of 
the example, however, are farther reaching because she defines the “facts” as all things 
obstructing the writing process.  Only when the mind is “freed from any contact with 
facts” was it able to be “at liberty to settle down upon whatever meditation was in 
harmony with the moment” (6).  Interestingly, Woolf's description of invention as an 
opposition to facts reverses the conventional rhetorical concepts of invention that define 
it as a process of discovering the facts of the rhetorical situation.  In Woolf's concept of 
invention, the writer directs her attention away from what is known (the facts) about the 
subject, allowing herself the "liberty" to wander/wonder.  
Woolf's separation of facts from the composing process is similar to the quality 
that Keats’s calls negative capability: “I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man 
is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
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after fact and reason” (Richter 336).  Keats’s definition of negative capability 
emphasizes not-knowing, or at least a different kind of thinking than what is implied by 
logic.  “[R]eaching after fact and reason” is “irritable.”  Keats's “irritable reaching after 
fact and reason” can be compared to the state of mind that Woolf associates with facts, 
one that is “less comfortable than others.  In order to keep oneself continuing in them, 
one is unconsciously holding something back, and gradually the repression becomes an 
effort” (101).  Her discomfort is Keats's irritation.  The "facts" and "reaching after fact 
and reason" prohibit other ideas from flowing, in other words.  She compares it to the 
state of mind in which the irritations are cleared away, described as the following: 
the state of mind in which one could continue without effort because 
nothing is required to be held back.  And this, perhaps, I thought, coming 
in from the window, is one of them.  For certainly when I saw the couple 
get into the taxi-cab the mind felt as if, after being divided, it had come 
together again in a natural fusion. (101)   
The instance she is referring to is one in which she perceived the traffic below the 
window as “a river which flowed past, invisibly, round the corner, down the street, and 
took people and eddied them along, as the stream at Oxbridge had taken the 
undergraduate in his boat and the dead leaves” (100).  If we understand an antonym of 
“irritable” is “harmony,” then Woolf’s turning away from facts to the “harmony with the 
moment” and the harmony that she experienced at the window are examples of Woolf, 
the quintessential Modernist, drawing on the tradition of the English Romantics.  Woolf 
is formulating a theory of invention that calls upon the writer to clear away the 
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impediments that are getting in the way of invention, another way of stating what Keats 
stated in the same letter in which he defined negative capability that “with a great poet 
the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all 
consideration” (Richter 336).   Similarly, her praise of Shakespeare was based on what 
she viewed as his ability,  in Keats's terms,  to obliterate "all considerations."  Keats, in fact, 
claimed that Shakespeare possessed negative capability "enormously."  Like Keats, Woolf 
used Shakespeare as an exemplar of negating the self.  One reason Shakespeare is the ideal 
exemplar for both Keats and Woolf is the absence of biographical material associated with 
Shakespeare.  He is the blank slate on which Keats and Woolf can credit as being in 
possession of an ideal inventive method.  Of Shakespeare, Woolf comments: 
All desire to protest, to preach,  to proclaim an injury, to pay off a score, to 
make the world a witness of some hardship or grievance was fired out of 
him and consumed.  Therefore poetry flows from him free and unimpeded.  
If ever a human being got his work expressed completely, it was 
Shakespeare.  If ever a mind as incandescent, unimpeded, I thought, turning 
again to the bookcase, it was Shakespeare's mind.  (58-59) 
She is repeating more or less Keats's ideal of "negative capability," one that she repeats 
when she praises Jane Austen:   
Without boasting or giving pain to the opposite sex, one may say that Pride 
and Prejudice is a good book.  At any rate, one would not have been 
ashamed to have been caught in the act of writing Pride and 
Prejudice…Here was a woman about the year 1800 writing without hate, 
without bitterness, without fear, without protest, without preaching.  That 
was how Shakespeare wrote, I thought, looking at Antony and Cleopatra; 
and when people compare Shakespeare and Jane Austen, they may mean 
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that the minds of both had consumed all impediments; and for that reason 
we do not know Jane Austen and we do not know Shakespeare, and for that 
reason Jane Austen pervades every word that she wrote, and so does 
Shakespeare. (71, emphasis mine). 
In both instances, Woolf emphasizes that the Shakespeare and Austen in essence turned 
away from concerns of the self or self expression; neither revealed a sense of personal 
desire—to preach or protest—or from negative self concepts—fear, for instance.  Both 
writers accomplished the necessity of invention, a negating of the self.  Walter Bate's 
paraphrase of Keats's "negative capability" offers an interesting gloss to Woolf's idea:  
In our life of uncertainties, where no one system or formula can explain 
everything—where even a word is at best, in Bacon’s phrase, a “wager of 
thought”—what is needed is an imaginative openness of mind and 
heightened receptivity to reality in its full and diverse concreteness.  This, 
however, involves negating one’s own ego. (332) 
To go a step further, I would suggest that for Woolf and Keats, writing doesn't "involve" 
negating one's ego but necessitates negating one's ego.  Keats’s “facts and reasons” and 
Woolf’s “facts” are the things which a writer knows and believes, the systems of 
knowledge and understanding—what is available to them as a means of communicating.  In 
this way, invention is defined as a negating of rhetoric, rhetoric in the sense of a 
compartmentalizing system of thought, one that hampers the openness of the mind to 
perceive the world as “full” (in Bate’s term) or unified.  
 If we extend the definition of rhetoric to include a theory of stasis (as Cicero does 
in De Inventione), we find further evidence in A Room of One’s Own that invention in 
the classical sense could be characterized in Keats’s terms as the “irritable reaching after 
facts and reasons.”  For example, Woolf goes to the British Museum with stasis 
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questions: “Why did men drink wine and women water?  Why was one sex so 
prosperous and the other so poor?  What effect has poverty on fiction?  What conditions 
are necessary for the creation of works of art?” (25).  In stasis theory, all of these 
questions fall under either questions of conjecture (What is its cause?  Where did it come 
from?  How did it begin?) or questions of definition (What kind of thing or event is it?  
To what larger class of things or events does it belong?) (Crowley and Hawhee 49, 50).  
Woolf was attempting to work through a heuristic system, but in frustration she 
declared: “But one needed answers, not questions” (25).  To state the situation in her 
own words, she needed to “strain off what was personal and accidental” in order to get to 
“the essential oil of truth” (99).  What she found at the library to her “seemed a pure 
waste of time,” and casually remarks, “One might as well leave their books unopened” 
(31). 
 Her moment of discovery comes to her after she drifts into the idle activity of 
sketching one of the imagined authors of the books about women.  She realizes she has 
been drawing in anger, and after her anger was “done away with,” she decided that her 
anger was a reflection of the professors' (she collectively referred to the authors of the 
books about women as the “professors”) anger, concluding their anger arises from 
perceived threats to the superiority of men, which “was a jewel to him of the rarest 
price,” so much so that “he was protecting rather hot-headedly and with too much 
emphasis” the claim of his superiority.  Her observation, she claims, was discovered in 
“idleness” not during the systematic approach to her topic through a heuristic system: “it 
is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the submerged truth sometimes comes to the top” 
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(31-32).  Referring back to the river metaphor, Woolf re-emphasizes the importance of 
getting beyond what is known or believed to discover truth, to invent. 
 Woolf's most systematic definition of invention appears in the concluding 
paragraphs of A Room of One's Own in an extended periodic sentence, the same sentence 
I opened this chapter with and to which now I will return, having given proper context to 
the dependent clauses.  With an understanding of Woolf’s metaphors for invention, her 
understanding of the primacy of vision which includes a negation of the self and of 
rhetoric, the dependent clauses of the sentence create a matrix for understanding 
invention.  She defines the conditions for Judith Shakespeare's rebirth as time ("a century 
or so"), community  ("common life which is the real life"), adequate financial means,  
"freedom" and  "courage to write exactly what we think," an understanding of the 
relationship between "human beings" and "reality" based on experience outside the 
"sitting-room,"  the endowment of nature with an independent identity, an avoidance of 
those who would seek to block writers' views of reality (Milton's bogey, a phrase that I 
will interpret shortly), and a proper understanding of writers' relationship to nature and 
to others (117-118).  
 The dependent clause that refers to "Milton's bogey" is the most enigmatic of the 
clauses and has historically been the clause taken out of the context and subsequently 
misinterpreted.  Taken together, the clauses complement one another, emphasizing and 
reemphasizing the writer’s concept of self as it relates to the physical world, to other 
human beings, and herself as a writer.  The proper way to interpret  “Milton’s bogey” is 
first to place it in its immediate context (the surrounding clauses and sentence), then 
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within the context of A Room of One’s Own, then in the context of other works by Woolf 
about Milton.   
 Given the clause's immediate context, between two descriptions of the necessity 
of endowing nature with an identity, then I believe this clause refers to her personal 
experience with a "bogey" in the library.  When Woolf experienced the river and let her 
mind wonder about the word changed in Milton’s Lycidas and she decided to go look at 
the manuscript in the University library, she was chased away from the library by “a 
guardian angel barring the way with a flutter of black gown instead of white wings, a 
deprecating, silvery, kindly gentleman” (6).  This is, I believe, is Milton’s bogey, the 
ghostlike Beadle who prohibited her from looking up her reference.  “The view” in the 
clause is precisely “the view” she described while she was walking and thinking about 
Milton: “The spirit of peace descended like a cloud from heaven, for if the spirit of peace 
dwells anywhere, it is in the courts and quadrangles of Oxbridge on a fine October 
morning” (6).  It is here that Woolf describes the way a writer experiences contact with 
the natural world, the experience of “reality” as she defined it as the experience of being 
a glass cabinet through the mind could apprehend "reality" in its harmonious fullness.  
“The view” described in the clause is in keeping with Woolf’s prior experience of 
experiencing reality in a state of meditative witnessing.  Taken in this context, Milton 
isn’t an antagonistic presence in the sentence.  Let me offer further evidence in a 
description of Milton’s Paradise Lost that Woolf wrote in her diary in 1918.  Recall her 
praise of Shakespeare and Austen as writers of impersonality in her praise of Milton for 
his willful blindness, a version of negating the self:  
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I am struck by the extreme difference between this poem and any other.  
It lies, I think, in the sublime aloofness and impersonality of the 
emotion…He deals in horror and immensity and squalor and sublimity 
but never in the passions of the human heart.  Has any great poem ever let 
in so little light upon one’s own joys and sorrows?  I get no help in 
judging life; I scarcely feel that Milton lived or knew men and women; 
except for the peevish personalities about marriage and the woman’s 
duties.  He was the first of the masculinists, but his disparagement rises 
from his own ill luck and seems even a spiteful last word in his domestic 
quarrels.  But how smooth, strong and elaborate it all is!  What poetry!  I 
can conceive that even Shakespeare after this would seem a little trouble, 
personally hot and imperfect.  I can conceive that this is the essence, of 
which almost all other poetry is dilution. (Writer’s Diary 5-6) 
In keeping with her theory of invention, Woolf thought that Milton was using “writing as 
an art, not as a method of self-expression” (83).  The context created by the surrounding 
clauses, the work in which the clause appears, and the larger corpus of Woolf’s criticism, 
leads to an interpretation that is literal in this case.  Gilbert and Gubar have argued 
otherwise, using the figure of Milton’s bogey as a figure of authorial anxiety for Woolf, 
like Bloom’s daemon in his theory of influences (word that means literally an inflowing, 
though Bloom does not emphasize this point).  Gilbert and Gubar's opening paragraph in 
“Milton’s Bogey: Patriarchal Poetry and Women Readers” states that the phrase 
overshadows any reading except a feminist reading of A Room of One’s Own: 
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Shutting out the view, Milton’s bogey cuts women off from the 
spaciousness of possibility, the predominantly male landscapes of 
fulfillment Woolf has been describing throughout A Room.  Worse, 
locking women into “the common sitting room” that denies them 
individuality, it is a murderous phantom that, if it didn’t actually kill 
‘Judith Shakespeare,’ has helped to keep her dead for hundreds of years, 
over and over again separating her creative spirit from ‘the body which 
she has so often laid down.’ (188). 
For Gilbert and Gubar, the other clauses in the periodic sentence do not offer much to 
clarify the "enigmatic" presence of "Milton's bogey."  In my reading, her focus in the 
closing paragraphs is on a call to action directed to the women students in her audience.  
The women are the agents whom she asks to bear children in “two and threes, not in tens 
and twelves” (117).  She chides them for having made no important discoveries even 
though two colleges had been admitting women since 1866 (116).  Moreover, it isn’t 
Milton’s bogey shutting women up in sitting rooms, it is the women themselves; she is 
telling them to get outdoors and experience “reality,” her catchword for harmonious 
nature.  In other words, Gilbert and Gubar do not consider Woolf’s metaphors of 
invention as revelatory of her attitude toward nature as spirit.  
 Another possible interpretation of "Milton's bogey" that would be in keeping 
with Woolf's inventive pose that involves a negation of the self is understanding the 
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bogey as Milton's ultimate egotistic character, Satan.  In Paradise Lost, Satan's "sin" was 
ambition, the attempt to elevate rather than negate the self.  Curiously, only a negation of 
the self allows the inventive pose necessary to see nature and others as equal to the self, 
the "vision" necessary for writing.   
 
The Eddies of Expressivism 
 Let us now return to the three theoretical concepts that critics (critics who do not 
claim to work within the expressivist orientation) have used to define the expressivist 
orientation.  First, expressivist rhetoric is said to privilege an Enlightenment theory of 
individualism and epistemology.  Second, expressivist rhetoric adheres to a Romantic 
belief in a self which is autonomous and authentic, separate from historical and material 
circumstances of textual production.  Finally, expressivist rhetoric views thought as prior 
to language by employing metaphors of the windowpane and the conduit to describe 
how language functions.  In this section I address each concept by using writers who 
have been identified as Enlightenment writers, Romantic writers, and I compare the 
metaphors of the windowpane and the conduit to Woolf’s metaphor of the river in order 
to show that the concept of the self has always been problematical.  In essence, critics 
have constructed expressivist rhetoric as a straw man in order to bolster their own 
theoretical orientations. 
  
 Enlightenment.   The two charges against expressivism having to do with the 
Enlightenment period concern two theories: 1) individualism and 2) epistemology. 
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Though Berlin never explicitly aligns what he terms "expressionistic" rhetoric in  
Rhetoric and Reality, he does so implicitly in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures.  There, 
he positions social-epistemic rhetoric as the critical orientation that offers a critique of 
Enlightenment similar to critiques found in works by Foucault, Jameson, Lyotard, and 
Derrida.  By calling Enlightenment concepts of the self—the "unified, coherent, 
autonomous, self-present subject"—the "centerpiece of liberal humanism," Berlin claims 
that expressivist rhetoric found its roots in liberal humanism (Rhetorics 65, Reality 73).    
On the subject of Enlightenment epistemology, Berlin cites the work of Foucault and 
Lyotard.  For Foucault, knowledge-formation is based on institutional discursive and 
non-discursive practices.  The human subject is a result.  Berlin cites Lyotard as arguing 
that "the postmodern condition denounces the Enlightenment faith in reason, totalizing 
truth claims, and historical coherence" (Rhetorics 67).   
 In A Room of One's Own, Woolf actively resists the notion of a unified subject 
who is able to discern accurately an objective reality.  In the opening pages, she 
concedes that the "I" of the lecture/essay is merely a textual construction: "'I' is only a 
convenient term for somebody who has no real being," and parenthetically, the reader 
can "call me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name you please—it 
is not a matter of any importance" (4, 5).  Here, she is distancing herself from an 
identification with the first person narrating A Room in a move that is similar to the title 
of her book: she does not call it A Room of My Own or A Room of Your Own.    
 Her Enlightenment counterpart is Montaigne, the Enlightenment writer who 
originated the essay.  His essays are also some of the first descriptions of the writing 
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process, including how he chooses subject matter, how he chooses to incorporate the 
ideas and texts from others, and how he works.  In his statements about writing he 
constructs a writing self that vacillates between embodiment (in his comparisons 
between writing and physical activity) and transcendence in his treatment of writing as 
done by “another self”:   
I am then another self, or because I approach my subject under different 
circumstances and with other considerations.  Hence it is that I may well 
contradict myself, but the truth, as Demades said, I do not contradict.  
Could my mind find a firm footing, I should not be making essays, but 
coming to conclusions; it is, however, always in its apprenticeship and on 
trial. (235) 
Like Woolf who admonished her audience not to look for truth in her lecture because 
"lies would flow from her lips," Montaigne urges his addressee to separate the notions of 
self from the writing subject.   
 Also, Montaigne includes in his essays the problematic features of textual 
production: issues of genre, style, organization, and invention, among others.  Writing is 
equated with physical activity, something for which Montaigne cannot sustain for an 
extended period of time (or textual space); he breaks off for “lack of breath.”  Later, this 
notion is elaborated: 
I have no other drill sergeant but chance to put order into my writings.  
As my thoughts come into my head, so I pile them up; sometimes they 
press on in crowds, sometimes they come dragging in single file.  Even if 
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I have strayed from the road I would have everyone see my natural and 
ordinary pace.  I let myself go forward as I am. (160) 
In this quote, writing style is compared to a person’s gait.  The movement of one leg 
followed by the swinging pendulum of the other leg and shifting positions again, the 
movement of walking—writing is tied up with the body, thus Montaigne represents his 
writing self as an embodied self.  Two truths emerge: there is an essential self, and there 
is no essential self.  He is unfettered by the possibility that he is contradicting himself 
(and also forerunning Whitman’s declaration of capacious ambivalence in “Song of 
Myself”); however, embodiment, at least, requires for Montaigne a body—his own body.   
 Montaigne writing, however, is also “another self”; his essays lack totalizing 
thesis statements; his thoughts are as people waiting in a check-out line at the grocery 
store.  Montaigne’s writing self, in other words, aligns with the functions of the genre in 
which he has chosen to write.  And though the essays attempted to represent “the true 
man,” they also raise questions about the possibility of an essential, “writerly” core.  In 
the reader’s preface, Montaigne tells us that his book can substitute for getting to know 
him personally, that the book is Michel de Montaigne: “In other cases, one may 
commend the work apart from the workman; not so here; he who touches the one 
touches the other.” 
 At the time Montaigne was composing his essays, the word “self” in the English 
language had not yet been invented, or at least had not been used in the modern sense 
but only in its function as a pronoun (myself). The modern sense of the word wasn’t part 
of the English lexicon until 1674, its earliest record usage: “a secret self I had enclos’d 
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within / That was not bounded by my clothes or skin,” written by Thomas Trayherne in 
Poetical Works.  This etymology suggests a concept of the self as much more 
problematical than Berlin suggests it is when he writes Rhetorics, Poetics, and Culture.   
 Like Woolf, when Montaigne is composing, the result is often a transcendent 
state in which he is "another self" in which "contradictions" occur.  This vein of the 
writing self is similar to the state of observing the world that Woolf writes about at her 
windowsill, a world that she saw subjectively organized into a river.  In "Letter to a 
Young Poet," she describes this state as one in which "All you need" is "to stand at the 
window and let your rhythmical sense open and shut, open and shut, boldly and freely, 
until one thing melts in another, until the taxis are dancing with daffodils" (9).  This state 
is what she has described elsewhere as experiencing nature as a "harmonious whole."  
The "contradictions" that Montaigne mentions are a result of the differences between 
subjective experiences of the world, again calling into question what Berlin calls 
"Enlightenment epistemologies.”  In fact, Montaigne's Essais and Woolf's A Room of 
One's Own appear to have a striking resemblance to what Lyotard calls a petit recit: "a 
limited and localized account that attempts to come to terms with features of experience 
that grand narratives exclude" (Rhetorics 67).  
 When critics base their critiques of expressionism on reductive accounts of 
historical movements such as Enlightenment, the result is a weakening of their own 
position.  In this case, the critique that is based on what is called “Enlightenment 
epistemology” has been shown to be empty, a straw man. 
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 Romanticism.   More than any other historical "ism," critics have cited 
Romanticism as the originary force behind expressivist rhetoric even though which 
Romanticism, British or American, is rarely cited (Brahminical romanticism being an 
exception, which Berlin cites in Rhetoric and Reality as a source of "expressionistic" 
rhetoric).  Chiefly, the so-called Romantic concept of the autonomous self, the self apart 
from historical or material circumstances, is the concept that is most criticized in the 
context of expressivist rhetoric.  Berlin cites Emerson as one the main proponent of this 
concept, and for that reason in addition to the similarities in concepts of the self with 
Woolf, I discuss Emerson's concept of the self.  Also, I discuss a key British 
Romanticist, Coleridge, and the concepts of self that emerge in Biographia Literaria.  
Again, it is similar to the concept of self found in Woolf.  For both Romantics that I 
consider, what has been called the "autonomous" self is much more problematical than 
critics who rely on this critique admit.  By arguing against Romanticism (and 
subsequently against expressionism) using reductive or ahistorical ideas, critics have 
strengthened their own position (what I referred to earlier as a straw man strategy). 
 I have already developed a connection between Woolf's concept of negating the 
self, Emerson's vanishing "mean egotism," and Keats's "negative capability," all of 
which result in the disappearance of the self, a dissolution of "mean egotism" in which a 
special kind of vision replaces the self.  Also included alongside the experiencing of 
nature in this state is the necessity to become submerged in the waters of the literary 
tradition.  In Emerson's essay "Intellect" this connection is articulated clearly: 
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  Silence is the solvent that destroys personality, and gives us leave to be 
  great and universal.  Every man's progress is through a succession of 
  teachers, each of whom seems at the time to have a superlative influence, 
  but it at last gives place to a new.  Frankly let him accept all.  Jesus says, 
  leave father, mother, house and lands, and follow me.  Who leaves all, 
  receives more.  This is as true intellectually as morally.  Each new mind 
  we approach seems to require an abdication of all our past and present 
  possessions. (426) 
Emerson's "silence" that "destroys personality" reflects the notion he expressed in "The 
Poet": "Man is only half himself, the other half is his expression" (448).  In the silence of 
observation, and with Woolf the silencing of the first person and egotist impulses, the 
writer negates the self.  Emerson here and Woolf elsewhere clearly articulate the 
constitutive effect of texts.  In "Circles," Emerson writes that the self is that which "we 
seek with insatiable desire" to "forget" in order to be "to be surprised out of our 
propriety" so that one may "do something without knowing how or why" (414).  
Similarly, the inventive pose in A Room of One's Own charges the writer to negate the 
self in order to invent, for invention as Woolf conceived it was outside what the writer 
already knows (an invention in the literal sense).  
 For Coleridge, a British Romantic, the source of art is the instantaneous union 
between artist and the world.  His explanation of the union comes in his Biographia 
Literaria in which he defines the artist as the conscious subject and the unconscious 
material world (nature) as object.  While Woolf examines invention in the light of 
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experience and cognition, Coleridge's purpose is to explain how and why this union of 
subject and object happens, and exploring this question means moving beyond literary 
criticism and into epistemological problems, one of which is the question of which is 
first or predominate—the object which exists apart from the subject, or the thinking 
subject taking in the object. Coleridge accepts both propositions because, he concludes, 
nature (object) and human consciousness (subject) are identical in essence: “There is no 
first, and no second; both are coinstantaneous and one” (476). Coleridge is attempting to 
rationalize the union of subject and object, even though they are identical in essence 
(according to him), and by so doing demonstrate that aesthetics is connected or is a kind 
of “knowing.” In this formulation, art, and specifically poetry, is a way of knowing the 
external, objective world—the coming together of the subject and object is experience. 
Clearly, though, his argument rests on the moment of physical contact between the 
subject and object—the moment of contact is the moment of knowledge production and 
literary invention—in other words, the writing process.  Much like the poststructuralists, 
Coleridge’s concept of the writing self is an absent self—or if not absent, then certainly 
emptied out, in any case, problematical on a much larger scale than any critics of 
expressionist rhetoric would care to admit.  To do so would demonstrate the weakness of 
their own position and call into question the viability of the category they have called 
expressivist rhetoric. 
  
 The Windowpane Theory of Language.  When I explain the windowpane theory 
of language to undergraduate students, I use the metaphor of the peanut M&M: the 
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writer's idea is the peanut, and if the chocolate and candy shell could just be "clear 
enough" we could see the peanut.  This is just another way to say that if the language 
were clear enough we could "see through" the windowpane (language) and view 
accurately the underlying idea.  In social construction, I explain, the shell itself is 
understood as the meaning.  Similar to the windowpane theory of language, the conduit 
metaphor implies that meanings are placed into linguistic containers and sent to 
audiences or readers who remove the idea from its container. 
 Woolf's use of river metaphors subverts these metaphors, including my metaphor 
of the peanut M&M.  In her first description of trying to think of something to say for 
her lecture on Women and Fiction, Woolf goes to the river to look for ideas.  She lowers 
her line to try and catch what's there for her.  The river is the container.  What she 
conveys in this example is the difficulty for the river to "contain" anything.  In fact, a 
river is the worst kind of container because it is always in the process of emptying out 
into something larger, merging into bigger waters.  The second time she contemplates 
her topic, she takes on the qualities of the river instead of merely looking to it for ideas.  
In effect, she becomes absorbed into the river, suggesting that language itself is the river 
and requires a writer to come into contact with it.  It also suggests the circularity of the 
process of textual production: swimming in the river and coming into contact with the 
world the writer produces another text that is a part of the river (is literally "circulated") 
in which other writers swim and produce texts. 
 In both the windowpane theory of language and the conduit metaphor, the writer 
is deliberate: she places the idea into a container or behind the glass of language.  In 
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Woolf's metaphor, the spontaneity of the process is emphasized.  Her experience of the 
city scene at the windowpane was a spontaneous one.  In "Letter to a Young Poet," she 
calls this state "the wild torrent of spontaneous nonsense which is now" (12).  Also using 
a river metaphor in conjunctive with the concept of spontaneity, Emerson writes in 
"Intellect" that  
  the imaginative vocabulary seems to be spontaneous also.  It does not  
  flow from experience only or mainly, but from a richer source.  Not by    
  conscious imitation of particular forms are the grand strokes of the painter 
  executed, but by repairing to the fountain-head of all forms in his mind.   
  (423) 
Recalling Wordsworth's "spontaneous overflow," the difference between the active 
writer placing ideas into containers and the passive writer floating down a current rests 
on the one hand a unified autonomous self, the one of expressivist rhetoric, and on the 
other, a more complicated version of the self that is acted upon even while it acts in the 
world.   
  
 Again, just as with reductive versions of Enlightenment and Romantic concepts 
of the self, the representation of expressivist rhetoric as based singularly on metaphors 
related to the windowpane theory of language is misguided and ultimately false.   
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The Expressivist Aim Reconsidered 
 Curiously, some of the criticisms of the expressivist orientation not only are 
reductive or wrong, but also they often are charged with inflammatory language.  Kelly 
Pender in "Kairos and the Subject of Expressive Discourse," lists the four main critiques 
of expressionism as follows:  
 1. Theories of expressive discourse are based on vestiges of realism, 
  humanism, or Romanticism;  
 2. Theories and practices of expressive discourse imply, if not depend on, 
  an erroneous conception of the relationship between the self and  
  language;  
 3. Expressive discourse encourages solipsistic kinds of writing that are 
  indebted to bourgeois individualism and to capitalism.  Because of  
  this indebtedness, expressive discourse cannot teach the socially  
  constructed and negotiated discourses of the academy;  
 4. Finally, as a category, expressive discourse does not exist. (92)   
This list is based on the critiques of composition scholars such as David Bartholomae, 
Lester Faigley, James Berlin, and Jeanette Harris.  Pender's list succinctly captures the 
spirit of most critiques of expressivism.  For example, James Berlin writing in "Rhetoric 
and Ideology in the Writing Classroom," charges expressivist orientation with 
 68 
concerning itself only with the "individual subject" and treating the rest of the world 
(material, social, linguistic) as means to an end, which is "locating the individual's 
authentic nature."  In other words, expressivist rhetoric is selfish, the goal for which 
could be described as "mean egotism" to use Emerson's term.  Berlin’s critiques when 
compared to the theoretical backdrop of A Room of One's Own seem unanalyzed, 
stretched, disingenuous.  Woolf doesn’t understand the world or others as means.  She 
insistently asserts through her metaphors and descriptions of composing that the world 
and others should be treated as ends only, on par with the writer.  In terms of an 
“authentic nature,” Woolf actively resists the idea of a unified subject through her 
insistence of negating the self during the process of composing, supplanting it with an 
inflowing of vision.  Authenticity isn’t a subject that she takes up in A Room of One’s 
Own.  The ideological dimension of A Room of One's Own is one that is extremely 
ethical, granting agency to the self, to the earth, and to others in a way that no other 
rhetorical orientation has yet to do so. 
Just as the narrator in A Room of One's Own wondered about the source of the 
professors’ anger toward women, I am likewise curious about the anger toward what has 
been called “expressivist rhetoric.”   In A Room the narrator analyzes the situation and 
concludes that the professors are angry at women because they were concerned not with 
women's inferiority, but with their own "superiority"(35).  In other words, "when the 
professor insisted a little too emphatically upon the superiority of women," he did so 
because "he was protecting rather hot-headedly" his own position of power over women, 
an "arduous, difficult, a perpetual struggle" (35).  In the same way, we could consider 
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that when scholars criticize expressivism rather hot-headedly, it is perhaps for the same 
reason Woolf believed that the professors insisted on the inferiority of women—to 
strengthen their own orientations.  
In the communication triangle, persuasion, expression, and information are the 
three purposes that form its points, corresponding to Aristotle's artistic proofs (pathos, 
ethos, logos).  In Kinneavy's schema, the literary aim is the purpose that lies in the 
middle of the triangle.  It isn't outside the communication triangle, but in the middle it 
appears as a ship before it goes off the radar in the Bermuda triangle: it's there, but keep 
your eye on it because it may disappear.  The strength and weakness of this visual 
schema is the physical separation of the literary and expressive aims of communication.  
First, the schema separates the purpose of literature, form and a focus on language, from 
the expression of the writer.  However, it is the literary aim that remains the odd-aim-
out, left in the middle to rot, and primacy is given to expression, even though its roots in 
the literary tradition render it an empty term when it is separated from the literary aim. 
Jeanette Harris offers as an alternative model the dyad of pragmatic discourse 
and aesthetic discourse, a renaming of rhetoric and poetics.  One problem with this 
model is that it privileges rhetoric as the only discourse that achieves any ends in the 
world even though all language is symbolic action because of the social associations 
with the term "pragmatic"—practical, action-oriented, focused on a goal, teleological, as 
opposed to "poetic"—as in decorative, purposeless, deontological.  Harris's model 
doesn't provide for the possibility of poetics accomplishing anything in the world, or at 
least anything of value.  The actions poetics accomplish need to be explored further--but 
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it is beyond the scope of my purposes here--but one problem with her critique of 
expressionism is identified in Peter Elbow's review of the book.  Elbow takes Harris to 
task for making broad generalizations about the history of expressivism as an intellectual 
movement.  Berlin, Elbow noted, gave a "satellite picture" of the field of composition 
and could be forgiven for summing up Aristotle in a few sentences based on a secondary 
source; however, Harris dedicated an entire book to one movement within the field and 
should be held to a higher standard.  Could Harris be thinking of "actual readers" when 
she breezed over the entire Medieval period in two sentences?, Elbow asks.  She gives 
the same treatment to empiricism, romanticism, and psychology, what Elbow refers to as 
"canned intellectual history" (5).  A real critique of expressionism, in other words, would 
require on the part of its writer "an obligation to understand it and to present it more 
accurately and in more detail—not just look at it through an inverted telescope as an 
alien threat" (3-4).  His criticism points out a lack of specific detail in Harris's 
description of expressionism, a weakness that he insists is one of the reasons literary 
scholars view composition studies with disdain.    Britton's model comes closer, I 
believe, to reflecting honestly the powerful resonance of both what he terms 
"transactional" discourse and poetic discourse.  However, even Britton retains self 
expression as a middle term in his schema.  
The aims approach has implicit weaknesses, as well.  One weakness is that it 
conflates the generative modes with discursive ends.  If we consider the persuasive aim 
contains a subset of rhetorical modes—Aristotelian, Rogerian, the Toulmin approach, 
etc.—it is no stretch to imagine that within the literary aim there exist subsets, one of 
 71 
which is the inventive mode that Woolf describes in A Room.  One approach to this 
refiguring of the literary aim is to consider Abrams's categories for works of literature: 
objective, pragmatic, subjective, mimetic.  Each can also be defined as a mode of 
approaching the writing of literature, thus fulfilling a particular literary aim 
accomplished through a mode. An alternative conception of the communication might 
situate Woolf's inventive pose as one of the subsets of the literary aim: 
     Informative Aim 
 
  
 
 
   Literary Aim   Persuasive Aim  
 
The informative aim and the persuasive aim remain in the realm of rhetoric, while the 
literary aim alone remains in the realm of poetics.  This model also reflects more 
accurately Cicero's definition of the purposes of rhetoric: to please, to teach, and to 
persuade.   
 This configuration addresses what I believe is a danger of separating the 
expressive aim from the literary aim: separated, the two aims reflect a bias for the 
literary aim over and against composition studies.  Perhaps, like Burke, many students of 
rhetoric began as aesthetes and secretly privilege the literary aim: whereas artists can 
work from the literary aim, beginning students work from the expressive aim.  Woolf 
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didn't limit the writers she addressed to "literary" writers or even artists; she addressed 
all writers.   A Room of One's Own also suggests that the inventive pose, both rhetorical 
and poetic, requires a negation of the self and its consequential ethical schema of 
conceiving of the world, others, and other texts as things which flow into the writer 
unimpeded.  
That this model emerges from a reading of A Room of One’s Own suggests that 
scholars should study creative nonfiction because it offers valuable insights into our 
current thinking about  invention.  Woolf's contribution is not limited to poetics because 
she describes a method or mode that can be applied to other aims of discourse – 
persuasive and informative, as well as literary.  What she offers enriches what rhetorical 
scholars and compositionists have often described as prescriptive models of invention: 
stasis theory and Aristotle's topics, for example. Thus, composition scholars should 
study A Room of One's Own (and related works of literary nonfiction): to recognize the 
available means of invention; to re-cognize writing as experiential, embodied, and fun; 
to strengthen institutional alliances between literary studies, composition studies, 
rhetoric, and creative writing; and finally, to consider the ways in which Woolf's literary 
invention tacitly implies an ethics that could be applied to discussions of ethics within 
composition studies.     
 Woolf's model of literary invention is only one approach to literary invention 
among many others.  Just as composition studies seeks to theorize pedagogical lore it 
should also seek to theorize the lore involved with the production of literary texts.  What 
exactly is the mechanism that Hemingway refers to as a writer's "built in bullshit 
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detector"?  Can it be cultivated in students?  Why did Eudora Welty pin together 
paragraphs like an elaborate dress pattern?  In terms of source material, they abound.  
Since the Paris Review interviews are archived online, composition scholars have much 
material that could be analyzed in order to offer a theoretically rich discussion of matters 
of invention.  Consider also that almost every practicing writer has written a book about 
writing.  In this light, I consider Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as a charge, that as 
composition scholars we must recognize the available means of persuasion, including 
what has been overlooked or miscategorized—in this case, expressivist rhetoric. 
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CHAPTER III 
A WRITING LIFE AND LIFE WORK:  
THE WRITING BODIES OF ANNIE DILLARD AND DONALD HALL  
 
 
 As a subset of the literary aim, the inventive pose I am calling expressivist invites 
further investigation into works of literary nonfiction that describe writing processes 
(writing memoirs).  In this chapter, I consider two such works by two living, well known 
American writers: The Writing Life by Annie Dillard, and Life Work by Donald Hall.  
Dillard gained notoriety after her first book, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, was awarded a 
Pulitzer Prize.  Since then, her writing has gained considerable status for its Thoreauvian 
view of the world.  Although Pilgrim is a work of nonfiction, Dillard also writes fiction 
and poetry.  Like Dillard, Hall works in multiple genres: criticism, journalism, 
nonfiction, children's books, and most notably, poetry (a former U.S. Poet Laureate). 
 I argue Dillard’s and Hall's metaphors for writing and their narratives of poetic 
origin create a concept of self which maintains freedom (rhetorical agency) and bodily 
presence as characteristics of their writing processes, two concepts that run counter to 
poststructuralist theories of writing (and in particular Berlin's social-epistemic rhetoric) 
that deny rhetorical agency and insist that writing inscribes absence rather than presence.  
Dillard’s and Hall's descriptions turn social constructionism on its head because they 
never deny that their subject positions are anything but discursive while they practice an 
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active form of subject positioning, a self that is actively constructed rather than passively 
received.  "Putting a book together," Dillard states, "is life at its most free," an act that 
Hall describes as occupying him "from footsole to skulltop" (11 and 41).   
This notion will not be without its detractors.  Berlin insists that current thinking 
about the postmodern subject is a given: 
  We have already seen that the subject of the rhetorical act is not the 
  unified, coherent, autonomous, transcendent subject of liberal humanism.  
  The subject is instead multiple and conflicted, composed of numerous 
  subject formations and positions.  From one perspective, the protean 
  subject is a standard feature of many historical rhetorics in their concern 
  for the speaker's ethos, his or her presentation of the appropriate image of 
  his or her character through language, voice, bearing, and the like.  For a 
  postmodern rhetoric, the writer and reader or the speaker and listener 
  must likewise be aware that the subject, or producer, of discourse is a 
  construction, a fabrication, established through the devices of signifying 
  practices. (Rhetoric, Poetics, and Cultures 88) 
The question that arises for "a postmodern rhetoric" is who exactly is performing the 
"construction" and "fabrication"?  It is unclear whether society or the writer/speaker 
performs this action because Berlin obscures the agents through the use of passive voice 
and nominalizations.  Perhaps as a measure to pre-empt such criticisms, Berlin qualifies 
his statement by stating that "each of us displays a measure of singularity" and it is 
through our "own separate position in networks of intersecting discourses" that 
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"differences among us as well as possibilities for political agency, for resistance and 
negotiation in responding to discursive appeals" are created (88).  While Berlin admits 
that historically the protean subject has been part of classical rhetoric's "concern for the 
speaker's ethos" as a persuasive move, that is, establishing a precedent for the socially 
constructed subject of post-modern rhetoric.  However, Berlin conflates a generative 
model (rhetorical appeals and the history of ethos) with an interpretive model that 
focuses on imperatives: "the writer and reader or the speaker and listener must likewise 
be aware"  that a rhetor's subject position is constructed whether that construction is a 
product of historical, economic, social, or political discursive practices (or more likely a 
matrix of these) (88).  However, he does not grant a rhetor the agency to shape that 
subject position. 
  Susan Miller's essay appearing at the end of Berlin's Rhetorics, Poetics, and 
Cultures expresses worry over this conflation of interpretive and generative models of 
rhetoric because "[w]riting taught as reading, that is, accomplishes political stasis" rather 
than the democratic activism that Berlin claims as the reason social-epistemic rhetoric is 
necessary (209).  More importantly, she argues that writing courses should instead 
"focus on what powerful writers know and do.  They should not, that is, distance 
students from an ineffable 'authorship,' nor focus on what English teachers want students 
to 'think' about the readings they now teach" (210).   
 In the gap between “ineffable authorship” and what “writers know and do” is the 
writing body—corporeality.  Miller’s critique points out the limits of social 
epistemicism: when everything is discourse then nothing is material.  As Kristie S. 
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Fleckenstein notes, Berlin’s social epistemicism, “by textualizing that junction between 
body and sign,” elides the body; it “skips over rather than illuminates the dialectic 
between materiality and language” (283).  Only through bodies can a person create and 
interpret discourse, a notion that Jack Selzer uses to justify the recent collection, 
Rhetorical Bodies.  In his words, “Words have been mattering more than matter” (4).   
  Corollary to the presence of the body in the act of composition is the presence of 
death that haunts both works.  Hall is diagnosed with cancer while he composes Life 
Work.  Dillard ends her book with a celebratory narrative of David Rahm, the trick pilot 
who plunges to his death while writing the skies (recalling Dillard's fear of falling from 
her sometimes treetop study).  Also, both write in liminal places.  Dillard often 
composes in coastal areas in the Northwest United States where she describes the diurnal 
currents as sometimes so strong that they could carry one off to death; Hall's family farm 
is imbued with the ghosts of his dead parents and grandparents, and the ground itself is 
part of the annual cycles of death and rebirth. The presence of life's end is, in other 
words, a byproduct of the work of writing.  As writing bodies, the awareness of the 
singular nature of existence, the solitude of writing, is never more palpable than when 
the writers engage the page.  While composition studies insist on the collaborative nature 
of the writing process, Dillard and Hall emphasize the opposite: absolute solitude to the 
point of existential contemplation of death.  Ultimately, the descriptions of motion 
associated with writing are the intermediate sensations that produce culminating effects I 
will address in the next two sections of this chapter: a theory of embodiment that 
accounts for a writer’s agency (freedom). 
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 In the titles of their works, Dillard and Hall affirm the active construction of a 
concept of self that is, above all else, living, but not a living that is beyond place, history, 
or the physical body, a fact that is emphasized by the repeated references to death, 
illness, time, struggle, solitude, and revision.  Dillard's texts show evidence, in her 
words, of "bloodstains, teethmarks, gashes, and burns," and Hall's poem "Another 
Elegy" was completed only after drafting it five hundred times.  Ultimately, the concept 
of self in The Writing Life and Life Work is the reverse of Christian incarnation: their 
works are flesh made word.  
 
Getting Started: The Body in Motion 
 Dillard and Hall both spend lengthy sections of their books discussing what they 
do in order to get started on their daily writing tasks.  They represent the problem of 
getting started as one of inertia or cold muscles; they must struggle to begin 
moving/writing.  Initiating motion, warming up, stirring the motor, stoking the fire—
these figures of speech describe the initial phases of writing as shifting from a state of 
stillness to a state of motion necessary for writing.  Dillard calls it a "task," that requires 
her "to change intellectual passion to physical energy and some sort of narrative mastery, 
from a standing start" (49).  She accomplishes the conversion of intellectual passion to 
physical energy that produces a state of motion in a number of ways: "To crank myself 
up I stood on a jack and ran myself up.  I tightened myself like a bolt.  I inserted myself 
in a vise-clamp and wound the handle till the pressure built.  I drank coffee in titrated 
doses" (49).  Also, "I pointed myself.  I walked to the water.  I played the hateful 
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recorder, washed dishes, drank coffee, stood on a beach log, watched bird" (50).  This 
stage is "the first part" and "could take all morning, or all month" (50).  Stacking up 
verbs in parallel declarative sentences creates a similar rhythm to the kind of rhythm she 
is trying to achieve to begin writing, like the parallels she describes in a poetry 
anthology's index of first lines whose strong suggestive parallels she sometimes read so 
that they may "set" her "off" (50).   
 In another passage, she uses the trope of hyperbole to emphasize the rhythmic 
quality associated with writing energy: “If you were a Zulu warrior banging on your 
shield with your spear for a couple of hours along with a hundred other Zulu warriors, 
you might be able to prepare yourself to write” (47).  The acceleration or momentum to 
which she is referring is also illustrated in a story she relates about the writer Charlie 
Butts.  Butts, recalls Dillard, “so prizes momentum, and so fears self consciousness, that 
he writes fiction in a rush of his own devising” (2).  Upon returning to his house after 
errands, he  
hurries in the door, and without taking off his coat, sits at a typewriter and 
retypes in a blur of speed all of the story he has written to date.  Impetus 
propels him to add another sentence or two before he notices he is writing 
and seizes up. (15-16) 
Afterwards, he repeats the process and ekes out another sentence or two, “the way some 
car engines turn over after the ignition is off” (16).  One way of thinking about Pilgrim 
at Tinker Creek is a litany of these warm-up activities: looking at bull frogs or the 
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migratory patterns of ducks, staring at the waves off the coast of Florida until she spots 
sharks. 
 A similar rhythm is found in Hall's description of a morning before getting 
started: 
  By four-thirty I can wait no longer.  I leap out of bed, feed the cat, let the 
  dog out, start the coffee which is timed for five but can be persuaded of 
  an early start, dress, drive two miles for the Globe, carry a cup of coffee 
  to Jane, read the paper while I eat a blueberry bagel, then finish my 
  breakfast with skim milk, an apple, and a small peanut butter sandwich.  I 
  wake as I eat, drink, and read the paper.  As I approach the end of the 
  Globe, saving  the sports section until last, I feel work-excitement  
  building, joy-pressure mounting—until I need resist it no more but sit at 
  the desk and open the folder that holds the day's beginning, its desire and 
  its hope. (41) 
The stress on the verbs in this lyrical passage creates a rhythm like the one in Dillard's 
list of verbs.  Hall describes a sensation like a motor’s ignition, the "work-excitement" or 
"joy pressure" which mounts as he anticipates the work that lies ahead.   
The difference between the two writers’ emotions as they gear up for writing 
creates antipodes of feeling.  On one hand, Dillard expresses anxiety about getting 
started.  She puns on being caught in "a fool's paragraph" and realizes as she is telling 
her neighbor about her work that she dreads it as much as a person who works in a 
factory might hate the prospect of beginning a day's worth of repetitive tasks.  She 
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comments that one reason writers are reluctant to revise or cut early chapters in books 
because the writer feels gratitude, “relief that he was writing anything at all” (6).  Hall, 
in contrast, has to restrain himself until the "poetry juices" are flowing.  Getting started 
is joyous, exciting, and offers hope and desire to what, readers must assume, would be 
an otherwise empty and hopeless life.  Whether it is Dillard's dread or Hall's joy, both 
use similar metaphors representing the building up of momentum.  Both experience the 
building up of the sense of motion as energy, the same pith required in physics to move 
any object. 
 Specifically, the metaphors Dillard and Hall use to describe getting started 
suggest that writing is a process that mimics the process of putting a physical body in 
motion; it is the writing body as machine.  For example, one morning after her usual 
dose of physical and mental activity, she remarks, "This morning, as on so many 
mornings, I lacked sufficient fuel for liftoff" (50).  The writing body is a rocket; in 
another passage, it is an airplane, and her task is "to keep cranking the flywheel that 
turns the gears that spin the belt in the engine of belief that keeps you and your desk 
midair" (11).  Alone, these pronouncements would suggest that Dillard, like many post-
Enlightenment thinkers, affirms the Cartesian split between body and mind.   The 
"flywheel" and "fuel" are, indeed, metaphors for mental processes, but they also potently 
suggest the likeness of mental and bodily processes.  Only if the metaphors are divorced 
from Dillard's prior statements about the physicality of getting started could they be used 
to inform a strictly Cartesian concept of mind and body.  Taken together, a more 
complete picture emerges of the writer: body and mind are unified, inseparable.   
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 The writing body as machine manifests a bit differently in Life Work.  First, Hall 
announces in the opening sentence 
  I've never worked a day in my life.  With the trivial exceptions of some 
  teenage summers, I've never worked with my hands or shoulders or legs.  
  I've never stood on the line in Flint among  the clangor and stench of 
  embryonic Buicks for ten hours of small operation repeated on a large 
  machine. (3)   
In this passage work, as a term, denotes physical labor performed for a wage.  In this 
pronouncement Hall, like Dillard, seems to be in the company of much post-
Enlightenment thought which separates body and mind; yet, his writing body is often 
compared to the body of an athlete—specifically, baseball players—George "Shotgun" 
Shuba, Roger Clemens ("The Rocket"), and Wade Boggs—playing on the common 
metaphor for athletic performance that equates body and machines.  Writing six hundred 
drafts of the poem "Another Elegy" is compared to George "Shotgun" Shuba's "arduous 
practice all winter" in which Shuba hauled potatoes all day and swung a bat at a clump 
he hung on the ceiling 600 times a day (47,200 swings every winter) (38).  He quotes 
Roger Clemens saying, "People write articles about how you're blessed with the right 
arm…That might be true, for some people, but I had to work to get where I'm at," and 
describes Clemens's spring training routine in 1992: running before he pitched five 
innings, doing sit-ups or catching pick-ups on alternating sides of field between innings. 
He states, "Like Wade Boggs I know not only how many singles I have hit but also what 
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count I had each single on, where it went, and what kind of pitch I hit. (I know even 
more detail about striking out with the bases loaded)" (24).   
 According to Susan Miller in Rescuing the Subject, the performing actor as writer 
is a pervasive metaphor of authorship: "That is, this version of the subject performs an 
assertion by inscribing language, like an actor who concretizes a script when performing 
in the face of unstable but enabling theatrical conventions" (15 Rescuing).  She does, 
however, qualify this remark by stating the writer "also defers personal desires and 
motives in favor of highlighting 'the text' that is being performed, but that will be 'fixed' 
on in this performance" (15).   The operative word in Miller's quote is "this," the 
particular performance fixed in time—the text—suggesting that another will perform the 
same text again.  Like the closing couplet in "Shall I compare thee to a summer's day," 
the "this" in Miller's quote is the "this" in which writers "claim fixed existence"—"only 
in grounded and conventional lines on a page" (16, emphasis mine).   Carried to its 
logical end, the acting metaphor complements Dillard's and Hall's description of getting 
started because, like actors, they warm up before the performance.  However, neither 
writer uses the metaphor explicitly.  One reason I believe they resist the acting metaphor 
is the given-ness of the script implied by the acting-writing metaphor.  The reason they 
must "gear up" or "warm up" is the fact of the text's absence; it doesn't exist—they must 
make it.  Also, the writing memoirs emphasize the other aspects of a writer's life that 
affect her or him: body chemistry, boredom, frustration, the presence of others.  It is as if 
in the memoirs they are affirming that their writerly-self extends beyond the page, and in 
fact permeates all other areas of their existence.  In the acting-writing metaphor, two 
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things are de-emphasized that are emphasized in Dillard and Hall: 1) the emotional or 
affective element of the performance and 2) the physical (or bodily) element of the 
performance.  Finally, it is important to note that the acting-writing metaphor finds its 
roots in literary criticism and not in the works of writers about writing.   
 Hall's athlete-writer metaphor is related to the actor-writer metaphor, but the 
emphasis on the body in the athlete-writer metaphor is more closely related to the root 
conceptual metaphor of the body as machine, a machine that produces objects.  In the 
actor-writer metaphor, nothing is made.  Texts are recounted, read from dictation, 
written always already.  The capacity to make something new isn't part of the logical 
equation.  Hall's attentiveness to product when he recollects "how many singles" and 
"the count" for each reflect the notion that he doesn't exist only in the margins of the 
page that are subject to continual revision but as a conscious self that makes a strict 
accounting of his works and his life.  In a more direct application of the body as machine 
metaphor is Hall’s description of his texts’ material production.  He often dictates, then 
sends the tapes to a typist; or he hand-writes his texts and sends them to the typist.  The 
next morning, he picks up the fresh print and makes further revisions by hand then sends 
the revisions back to the typist.  During this process, he sometimes uses more than one 
research assistant who looks up material at a university library, saving Hall the time on 
the road driving to Concord or Hanover (50).  All of these helpers he refers to as his 
“staff” whose labor “saves me hours by the dozen—freeing me to work, helping me to 
manufacture the best day” (50).  His machine-body is one to which others attend and 
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contribute; if his body is a machine then it exists in a small factory with the machine-
bodies of others supplementing the work of the central machine.   
 On the whole, Hall’s writing process is much more systematic (hence 
mechanical) than Dillard’s writing process.  While they both share in the belief that a 
certain motion or energy is required, Dillard’s text reflects a preoccupation with the idea 
of controlling the energy: “He [the writer] must be sufficiently excited to rouse himself 
to the task at hand, and not so excited he cannot sit down to it.  He must have faith 
sufficient to impel and renew the work” (46).  The excitement she refers to is the concept 
of motion, once again.  Motion is characterized as an energy, a pressure to be controlled, 
a frenetic, directionless projection, and a vibration that produces a polyphonic hum or 
resonating buzz.  These attributes share qualities associated with control, repetition, 
sustenance, and pain—all of which are addressed in the context of the writing process 
and all of which depend upon an understanding of a concept of writing connate with the 
body.     
The briefest chapter in A Writing Life addresses the idea of controlling the 
energies necessary to writing through a dream Dillard has about her typewriter.  Perhaps 
because she sometimes writes near the Cascades (she mentions that Mount Baker is 
volcanic), Dillard dreams about an erupting volcano (99).  The dreamscape is a two-
story house.  She is upstairs when she feels the ground begin to shake.  Thinking it is an 
earthquake, she rushes downstairs where she sees the typewriter pouring smoke and ash; 
the old Smith-Corona is erupting.  Peering into its caldera ("the dark hollow in which the 
keys lie"), sparks burn holes in her shirt while rumblings, exploding and grinding noises, 
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and sparks shower down on curtains, the pitching table, and Dillard's own shoulders 
(64).  After twenty minutes or so, the eruption subsides.  Dillard cleans the lampblack 
coating the old Smith-Corona and reports, "I have had no trouble with it since.  Of 
course, now I know it can happen" (64).  Her dream emphasizes what she is theorizing 
about in the majority of The Writing Life: the body and mind share energies.  Though the 
eruption occurs on the keys of her typewriter, Dillard contends that the typewriter, 
because she uses it to write, is part of her physical body.  The explosion of ash in the 
volcano metaphor equates body and mind.   
The way in which body and mind become connate in Dillard’s dream relies on an 
understanding of the body that can be understood using Gregory Bateson’s concept of 
the body.  In his Korzybski Memorial Lecture, he asks, is a blind man’s cane is part of 
him as he walks? Bateson’s answer is yes because the cane is part of his being-in-a- 
material-place thereby blurring the boundaries between flesh and technology (in this 
case, the cane).  In the same way, the typewriter in Dillard’s dream is part of her writing 
body for which the dream reveals an anxiety about controlling the energy she uses to 
write.  Writing, she understands the typewriter is an extension of her body.  She 
comments similarly on the way tubes of paint are like fingers for the painter: “they work 
only if, inside the painter, the neural pathways are wide and clear to the brain.  Cell by 
cell, molecule by molecule, atom by atom, part of the brain changes physical shape to 
accommodate and fit paint” (59).  Likewise, speaking of David Rahm the trick-pilot, 
Dillard unifies an artist’s materials with his body: “Rahm made beauty with his whole 
body” (95). 
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Hall’s reference to “work-excitement” and “joy-pressure” express a similar 
feeling of impending eruption, though he seems to be in control of the force whereas 
Dillard seems to be continually in search of a way to arouse the force.  Although neither 
of the writers use explicitly sexual tropes to discuss the writing process, the sexuality of 
“joy-pressure” and dreams of erupting volcanoes evoke a sexual reading of the energies 
the writers describe as synonymous with writing.  Also, an existing tradition in 
American literature links the figure of the volcano to poetic voice (thereby further 
evoking the presence of corporeality).  Emerson used the figure of the erupting, flowing 
volcano in “The American Scholar” to suggest the divinity of man:  
The human mind cannot be enshrined in a person, who shall set a barrier 
on any one side to this unbounded, unboundable empire.  It is one central 
fire, which, flaming now out of the lips of Etna, lightens the capes of 
Sicily; and now, the throat of Vesuvius, illuminates the towers and 
vineyards of Naples.  It is one light which beams out of a thousand stars.  
It is one soul which animates all men. (67) 
For Emerson, the “lips” of the volcano spill forth the expression of the Over-soul.  In 
this passage, his poetic corresponds with Hall’s; that is, the lava will flow.  The volcano 
is an active one, like the "active soul" that Emerson praises earlier in the essay (57).  
Dillard, on the other hand, expresses anxiety, worry about whether or not the volcano 
will erupt.  After her dream, she is reassured (she knows, at least, that the typewriter is 
capable of eruption).  Her worry corresponds to a similar worry of Emily Dickinson.  
Two Dickinson poems, “The reticent volcano” (1748) and “A still—Volcano—Life—” 
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(601), rely on the central metaphor of the quiet volcano.  In “The reticent volcano,” the 
volcano has “buckled lips”; in “A still—Volcano—Life—” the volcano has “lips that 
never lie.”  Both Dickinson’s and Emerson’s volcano metaphor, whether dormant or 
active, create a body-volcano through whose lips flow a message, words.  As the 
metaphor suggests, only when sufficient pressure builds will the rock give way making a 
passage through which the lava will flow. 
 Like Woolf’s concern about what gets in the way of writing, the volcano 
metaphor is in one way about blockages, the things getting in the way of writing.  While 
Woolf insists that it is subjectivity, the self, that blocks the flow of language, Dillard’s 
insistence that she must rouse herself to the task of writing suggests that it is a lack of 
energy to break through the conical top of the mountain.  Still, and this point cannot be 
overstressed—neither Woolf nor Dillard claim that the “message” is the expression of 
the self.  Dillard states, “Your freedom as a writer is not freedom of expression in the 
sense of wild blurting; you may not let rip” (11).  Dillard’s physical exercises to animate 
her body are more like pitching, getting her body to a certain musical pitch before she 
can write.  Hers is a matter of controlling the energies of the body.    
 Her dream not only reveals a desire to control what may be uncontrollable but 
also reveals a deeper concern: lurking behind the writing energies (because it is similar 
to a life-force) is an acute awareness of the body’s demise: physical death.  It follows 
from her metaphors of embodiment that such an awareness would be present in her 
writing because the body’s opposite isn’t a transcendent soul in Dillard concept of 
writing; the opposite of embodiment is death.   This attentiveness or attitude toward 
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mortality figures as one of the key requirements of the writing self.  For example, Dillard 
relates the tale of an Algonquin woman who was left with her baby in a camp where 
everyone else had starved to death one bad winter: 
The woman walked from the camp where everyone had died, and found 
at a lake a cache.  The cache contained one small fishhook.  It was simple 
to rig a line, but she had no bait, and no hope of bait.  The baby cried.  
She took a knife and cut a strip from her own thigh.  She fished with the 
worm of her own flesh and caught a jackfish; she fed the child and 
herself. (12-13) 
The story serves as a parable for what is sometimes required of the writer to get started: 
“You may wonder how you start, how you catch the first one.  What do you use for 
bait?” she asks (12).  Her answer is to use your own body, much the way she describes 
writing as picking at a sore until it bleeds; then, you “write with that blood.  If the sore 
spot is not fatal, if it does not grow and block something, you can use its power for many 
years, until the heart resorbs it” (20).  Referring again to the idea of potential blockages, 
Dillard suggests that the potentially mutilated or sacrificed body is concurrent with the 
adrenaline accompanying physical activity (the kind she describes to get started), an idea 
she mentions again in a reference to another volcano: 
If you were an Aztec maiden who knew months in advance that on a 
certain morning the priests were going to throw you into a hot volcano, 
and if you spent those months undergoing a series of purification rituals 
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and drinking dubious liquids, you might, when the time came, be ready to 
write. (47) 
Emphasized in this passage is an awareness of impending death and the activities to 
prepare one to be a worthy sacrifice.  Even though actual death isn’t required of the 
writer, Dillard is remarking on the writer’s need to be aware of his or her mortality—not 
in an abstract way, but in a way that evokes physical danger and the adrenaline that 
accompanies a fight or flight response in all animals (fighting sentences like an alligator 
wrestler is another analogy she uses) (75). 
 In more direct passages, Dillard directs the writer to “write as if you were dying” 
(68).  Likewise, she directs the writer “to assume you write for an audience consisting 
solely of terminal patients.  That is, after all, the case.  What would you begin writing if 
you knew you would die soon?  What could you say to a dying person that would not 
enrage by its triviality” (68).  The imperatives could be read as clichés on par with live 
each day as if it is your last.  Her as if logic, however, is concretized through her 
constant pointing to the physical body as a participant in the act of composing.  Further, 
her attitude toward death suggests that the writer who becomes momentarily sentient of 
mortality experiences an opening, a point of departure—in Dillard’s words, liftoff. 
 The culminating effect of putting the body in motion and arousing a real sense of 
impending death is what Hall terms absorbedness.  Absorbedness describes a state in 
which the writer forgets himself, much like the writer Charlie Butts that Dillard includes 
in The Writing Life: 
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With enthusiasm I agreed with him [about absorbedness], speaking of 
early morning hours, concentration on the page and its words, total loss of 
identity, hours that pass like seconds or without any notion of time 
elapsing: It is always the paradox of contentment—of happiness or joys—
that to remain at its pitch it must include no consciousness of itself; you 
are only content when you have no notion of contentment. (23-24) 
Loss of identity and the lack of sense about the passage of time—these are the two key 
components of Hall’s absorbedness: “Then I lose myself.  In the best part of the best 
day, absorbedness occupies me from footsole to skulltop.  Hours or minutes or days—
who cares?—lapse without signifying” (86).  It allows him, after he is diagnosed with 
cancer, to escape from the “dread and suffering” that accompanies the diagnosis.  The 
experience of absorbedness also appears in a later chapter in which Hall describes scythe 
mowing, an activity during which “one surrenders oneself to the guidance of object and 
task, where worker and work are one” (86).  Scythe mowing 
is a rhythmic motion like dancing or lovemaking.  It is a studious 
sweeping crescent in which the trick is to keep the heel (where blade joins 
snath) close to the ground.  I no longer mow with a scythe—a certain 
recipe for lower-back muscle spasms—but remember it the way the body 
remembers weights and leanings: riding a bicycle, skiing, casting flies.  
Finding a meter, one abandons oneself to the swing of it…There is 
something ecstatic about mowing a scythe. (86) 
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It is muscle memory that actuates the loss of identity or presence in a place and the loss 
of time, like a musician playing a memorized piece of music or a pitcher sending the ball 
to home plate.  And just as Dillard’s embodied writing called attention to her own 
mortality so does Hall’s absorbedness: “I realized that I had always worked-the real 
thing, the absorbedness—in defiance of death” (62). 
 Although Dillard doesn’t use the term absorbedness, she does comment on the 
same kind of experience that the term describes. Specifically, she comments on the 
lapse, the gap, the unconsciousness of surroundings and the loss of time.  While 
completing Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, she borrowed a small room in a library with a 
single window.  It was the Fourth of July, and she had begged off when invited by her 
husband and friends to attend the fireworks.  She worked instead.  She began writing.  
Later that night she heard a June bug hitting the window repeatedly.  She had long since 
drawn the blinds to prevent herself from daydreaming so she didn’t actually see the June 
bug; she only heard its insistent, hollow knock on the window.  After thirty minutes or 
so, she finally got up to check on what she by this time figured was a behemoth of a June 
bug: 
And there were the fireworks, far away.  It was the Fourth of July.  I had 
forgotten…It was the Fourth of July, and I had forgotten all of wide space 
and all historical time.  I opened the blinds a crack like eyelids, and it all 
came exploding in on me at once—oh yes, the world. (31) 
She was astonished at how fully writing occupied her consciousness.  At times, the lack 
of awareness of the material world and her place in it caused problems: a whistle-less 
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teakettle in an English department resulted in burned coffee.  The next time she made 
coffee, she put a clothespin on her finger to remind her that she had water boiling.  The 
pain of the clothespin would bring her back to the present moment.  Her account of 
being somewhere else or unaware of her material reality is predicated by the 
absorbedness she experiences while she composes.  
 
Writing Exercises, Writing Practices, and Un-Disciplined Bodies 
 In the last section of this chapter, I discussed one similarity between Annie 
Dillard's The Writing Life and Donald Hall's Life Work—both writers' descriptions of 
commencing the act of composing and the state of mind that accompanies/results from 
writing, i.e., absorbedness.  In this section, I discuss another prominent topic that 
receives both writers' attention in the memoirs: establishing the daily practice of 
composing.  I will compare their discussions of habit, discipline, and schedules to two 
theorists' concepts of habit and discipline.  First, I will draw a comparison between 
Dillard's and Hall's concept of habit and Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and body hexis.  
Next, I will discuss Dillard's and Hall's descriptions of their writing practices (practice in 
its most formal definition of a repetitive activity) as un-disciplined, a kind of 
circumvention of the surveilled, disciplined body described in Foucault's Discipline and 
Punish.  Both discussions will establish the operative element of Dillard's and Hall's 
writing bodies—freedom, and concurrently, rhetorical agency.  Here, I will return to the 
two writers' preoccupation with death (or dis-embodiment).  The attentiveness each 
writer gives to their awareness of death serves to highlight the fact that embodiment 
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entails both temporality and spatiality, bringing Dillard and Hall into conversation with 
current theories in ecocomposition and postmodern theorists of space and place (such as 
Michel de Certeau). 
 Hall’s comparison between the writerly self (specifically the writing body) and 
baseball players (the body of an athlete), as I discussed earlier, is one example of the 
body-as-machine conceptual metaphor that shows up in his discussion of composing.  
Another part of writing is also revealed in his comparison: the writer, like the athlete, 
must practice arduously.  Just like the baseball player must swing the bat everyday, the 
writer must write everyday; thus, the concept of habit is a crucial element of the writer’s 
life.  Later in the book, Hall gives other examples to illustrate the importance of habit.  
He recalls Freud, a lover of work, one who “was said to live by the clock” (92).  Hall 
details Freud’s workday at fifty: 
He went to bed at one in the morning, rose at seven, saw analytic patients 
from eight to twelve, dined with his family at one, then walked in the 
city—where he bought cigars, where he did errands like delivering 
proof—and at three began appointments again.  Sometimes he saw 
patients until nine at night.  Supper.  Then maybe a card game, maybe 
another walk with his wife to a café, then reading and writing and editing. 
(92) 
Like Pasteur and Mann for Dillard, Freud’s workday highlights the role of habit—work 
begets work.  The day, the way it is spent, is cynosure; it is the synecdoche for a life.   
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Combined with the athlete comparison, the concept of habit encompasses another aspect: 
a thing done over and over again (a practice) develops muscle-memory.  Hall’s term 
absorbedness, is, in fact, very similar to the idea of muscle-memory.  The writer 
experiences a loss of ego, a loss of self consciousness, being able to do with your body 
without conscious thought.   
 Paradoxically, the way the effects of daily practice (a habit) are described are 
often contradictory while sharing the same root metaphor—the body as container.  In 
one description, when the writer is engaged in the practice of writing, he or she is 
blocking out everything (the objective world).  When Dillard writes about the June bug 
on her window really being fireworks, she is blocking out an objective reality.  On the 
other hand, when engaged in a practice, the writer is in a state in which everything (the 
objective world) is able to flow inward (the boundaries between subjective and objective 
becoming blurred).  This meaning is implied by Hall’s term absorbedness. 
 One way to resolve this paradox is to consider that both effects occur 
simultaneously, primarily because both meanings (blocking out and letting in) of the 
effect of daily practice imply the falling away of distinctions between subject and object.  
When Dillard states that “a schedule defends against chaos and whim,” she suggests this 
interpretation (32).  “Chaos,” in this case, represents external factors that might distract 
(thus the need to  “block out”) while “whim” represents subjectivity, a drive that 
excludes everything else in the world except interiority (thus preventing an “inflowing”).  
The daily practice defends against all kinds of distractions—those resulting from 
external factors and those which seem to come from the writer herself. 
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 Bourdieu's two concepts habitus and body hexis are helpful in understanding the 
paradoxical qualities of daily practice that Hall and Dillard describe in The Writing Life 
and Life Work.    Expressing a similar view expressed by Lakoff and Johnson, though 
working within the field of anthropology, Bourdieu states "the very mental structures 
which come to construct the world of objects are themselves nothing other than 
constructs derived directly from an individual's practice in a world of objects born from 
those self-same structures" (Throop and Murphy 188).  This is related to Lakoff and 
Johnson's idea that conceptual metaphors, on the most basic level, derive from the 
experience of the body in the world (conceptual metaphors that reference verticality, for 
example), except that Bourdieu is going a bit further in his argument.  Habitus is the 
term he uses to refer to this phenomenon, and it is characterized as a 'conductorless 
orchestration' that, as anthropologists Throop and Murphy describe it, serves to give 
systematicity, coherence, and consistency to an individual's practices.  Throop and 
Murphy also go on to explain that body hexis, Bourdieu's related term, is the 
performative aspect of habitus; in other words, the way a body moves through the world 
(body hexis) is informed by the modus operandi of habitus (188).  Body hexis is tied to 
motor function, postures, gestures, and expressive orientations, and—most interestingly 
to this chapter—discourse.  It is a form of body memory "which is crystallized through 
practical interaction with the structure of the environmental surround" (188).   
 On the surface, the complementary concepts habitus and body hexis seem to 
dismiss agency, a fact for which Bourdieu’s practice theory has often been criticized.   
The theory is totalizing, and the human subject is thoroughly determined.  It is a view of 
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enculturation, however, that pays special attention to environment, which makes it 
different from most theories that insist on the separation of mind and body.  At this 
point, Bourdieu differs from Dillard and Hall.  However, whereas Bourdieu's practice 
theory discounts agency, Dillard and Hall suggest that daily practice can counteract 
habitus.  In other words, change the body hexis, the performative function of habitus, 
and the structural dispositions will change, resulting in a state of absorbedness, the state 
during writing that Dillard describes as "something you memorized once and forgot" or 
"as though I were copying from a folio held open by smiling angels" (76, 29).   If body 
hexis is the conditioned result, then why not condition the body differently, they seem to 
suggest. To use a writing metaphor, Dillard and Hall suggest that habitus (which 
Bourdieu understands to be socially and materially determined) can be rewritten (or 
overwritten).   
 A comparison with Bourdieu also reveals the ways in which Dillard and Hall 
enrich the concept of writing process by adding to it the multiple ways in which the body 
and world contribute to a practice (for Dillard and Hall, writing).  Nedra Reynolds, citing 
the work of Lester Faigley and Andy Merrifield, argues in Geographies of Writing that 
one reason process theory is lacking is the overemphasis on temporality: "process 
usually means temporal, and therefore writing becomes a time-bound concept" (5).  
Also, Dillard’s and Hall's understanding of daily practices as rewriting underlying 
structures or dispositions suggest that rather than being disciplined by external factors, 
the practice of writing is capable of undoing enculturation, an exercise of freedom.  In 
that way, writing is also a practice of undisciplining the body in a Foucauldian sense.  
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 Foucault’s study of prisons, penal codes, and modern institutions of power in 
Discipline and Punish articulates a relationship between the control of bodies 
(discipline) and vision (referred to as “gaze” in his book).  However, the amount of 
power that can be exercised is relative to the extent to which the surveilled believe they 
are being watched.  Therefore, architecture plays an important role in the disciplining of 
bodies, the reason why Foucault notes that “stones can make people docile and 
knowable” and the reason “prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, 
which all resemble prisons (172 and 228).  “Discipline,” for Foucault, is a codification of 
time, space, and movement imposed upon a subject by a network of supervisors who are 
also surveilled.  The system resembles, Foucault tells us, a machine, and manifests in 
codes that regulate where a subject/body works, a time table for specific activities, the 
temporal elaboration of an act (such as marching to the beat of a drum), and the 
exhaustive use of a subject. 
 Relating this to Dillard and Hall’s elaboration of a theory of process that includes 
both the temporal and spatial suggests that the daily practices both writers describe also 
involve escaping those power structures that discipline their bodies, especially those that 
function via visibility.  Both writers describe writing as a solitary activity, an activity 
that requires hours, days, and weeks of separation from others.  Even though Foucault 
insists that networks of power based on discipline are enculturated much the same way 
Bourdieu insists that habitus is enculturated and thus determines behavior, Dillard’s and 
Hall’s language suggests that their writing practices offer a way of escape (pardon my 
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use of a containment metaphor)—an exercise of freedom.  Self-imposed habit for these 
writers empowers them to fly below the radar so to speak. 
Hall describes the work day of sculptor Henry Moore that suggests that the more 
a writer controls his or her own movements through place and time, the more freedom 
the writer possesses.  Moore is offered to the reader as Freud is, a model of the artist 
who lives by the clock and the list: 
  Moore interrupted himself for lunch, tea, drinks, and supper; for mail, 
  although mail was a burden; for the telephone; for the founder's truck that 
  came to haul away a great plaster for casting.  All day he rode a bicycle 
  over his acreage in the rolling farmland, patrolling his studios to work on 
  different projects.  At night after supper he and Irina might watch a BBC 
  detective mystery, but as he watched he kept a pad open on his lap and 
  made automatic or random marks in pencil—and sometimes ideas derived 
  from his idle doodles.  When I last saw him at eighty he had built a new 
  graphic studio next to the house, where he retreated for an hour after 
  television, working again between nine and ten at night. (52) 
Here is a portrait of the quotidian.  Yet, in it lies a key to the creative life: the schedule is 
offered as evidence that days spent consecutively in the same way contribute to a 
rhythm, to the motion required of the writer.  Henry Moore, in short, knew the secret of 
life: "The secret of life is to have a task, something you devote your entire life to, 
something you bring everything to, every minute of the day for your whole life" (54).  
Dillard says it another way: 
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What then shall I do this morning?  How we spend our days is, of course, 
how we spend our lives.  What we do with this hour, and that one, is what 
we are doing.  A schedule defends from chaos and whim.  It is a net for 
catching days.  It is a scaffolding on which a worker can stand and labor 
with both hands at sections of time.  A schedule is a mock-up of reason 
and order—willed, faked, and so brought into being; it is a peace and a 
haven set into the wreck of time; it is a lifeboat on which you find 
yourself, decades later, still living.  Each day is the same, so you 
remember the series afterward as a blurred and powerful pattern. (32) 
While writing Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, the blurred and powerful pattern consisted of 
sleeping until noon every day, writing in the afternoon, breaking for an early dinner and 
a walk.  She subsisted, she says, on "that dinner, coffee, Coke, chocolate milk, and 
Vantage cigarettes" (27).  After working until midnight or one or two, she would quit for 
the day, and when she came home in the middle of the night, she was tired.  She "longed 
for a tolerant giant, a person as big as a house, to hold me and rock me" (27).  Willed or 
faked, the "blurred and powerful pattern" is repeated by both writers' references to daily 
practice, the habituation necessary to keep "living"—that is, writing.   
 Days stacked on top of days, of course, result in larger time units—weeks, 
months, years, decades, units of time that once were planned in to do lists and later, 
when the time has passed, becomes a tool of accounting.  Units of time provide the 
writers a measurement of productivity, the flipside of the planned schedule.  For Hall, 
the accounting sometimes gives way to goodhearted braggadocio.  After all, he says, "I 
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average four books a year," and "I reckon I publish about one item a week, year-in year-
out" (27).  Sheepishly, he admits, "Were I fifteen years old, this would be the moment 
when I would pretend to blow on the backs of my fingernails, then rub them against my 
chest. Work, work, work." (27).  To Hall, "work was holy; work was the daily text of the 
life lived" (9).  Just as Hall has to restrain himself to race to the writing desk at 3:30 am 
while Dillard has to rouse herself physically to the task, Dillard's accounting of the time 
it takes to produce a book is much different.  In her estimation, producing even one book 
in a year is an anomaly, a task that she believes only twenty people out of an entire 
human population of four and half billion can accomplish, to which she adds, "Some 
people lift cars, too" (13).  The average time it takes to write a book, according to 
Dillard, is between two and ten years.   
 Yet, just like the embodied energy of the writer also draws into existence the 
contradiction of that embodied energy (death), Dillard's and Hall's emphasis on the day, 
the best days when embodiment culminates in work-absorbedness "takes its power and 
its energy from the urgency of its contradiction"—that is, the worst day (61).  The worst 
day is sometimes depression, but that, Hall tells us, is a condition you can play through 
(again invoking the writer-athlete metaphor) (113).  In an absolute sense, the worst day 
is sickness or death.  He writes in defiance of it.  Once again, the concept of embodied 
process is invoked: the best day culminates in work-absorbedness; its opposite are the 
failings of the body.  In other words, death is the spectre lurking behind these 
discussions of temporality, the day, weeks, years, how much time it takes to complete a 
work—because time is limited.  Dillard's and Hall's joint agreement in their memoirs 
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reflects their metaphors of embodiment: writing involves the full consciousness of 
mortality.  Each faces the fact of their terminal existence; to use a term from new 
criticism, the face of death is a foil for their metaphors of embodiment.  The continuous 
emphasis on mortality serves to highlight the bodily consciousness of their writing tasks. 
 Further, because both writers' discussion of temporality leads them back to 
discussions of the body, habituation also adds another layer to their understanding of the 
writing life, the understanding that embodiment can never be divorced from place.  For 
lack of a better term, Dillard and Hall are referring to "when-where" experiences.  
Writing, in other words, is never a matter of internal subjectivities but a matter of 
relations: bodily, geographical, temporal.    
  
Embodiment and Composition Studies 
     A god can do it.  But will you tell me how 
     a man can penetrate through the lyre’s strings? 
     Our mind is split. 
      Rilke, The Sonnets to Orpheus 
 
 In "Writing Bodies: Somatic Mind in Composition Studies," Kristie S. 
Fleckenstein notes that perspectives on writing in composition studies “all depend on 
conceptual or epistemological frameworks that disregard physical bodies” (281).  The 
result of “sacrificing bodies" is “we cut ourselves adrift from any organic anchoring in 
the material reality of flesh” (281).  Ominously, Fleckenstein concludes, "without a 
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corporeal way to address the tragedies and victories that play out in our classrooms, our 
lives, and our worlds, we cannot change or celebrate our concrete existence" (281).   
Specifically, the framework she attributes the dispossessing of bodies in composition 
studies is James Berlin's social epistemicism, the point of intersection between 
poststructuralism and social constructionism.  Though she limits her critique to 
epistemicism, several other epistemological frameworks come to mind which have 
resulted in a theoretical effacement of writers' bodies. Process theory, for example, 
depends upon a concept of the mind that is separate from the body (and the bodies of 
others); if the mind were not autonomous then it could not perform mental processes.  
Also, process theory uses a temporal framework (first, next, then, repeat recursively), a 
framework that suggests the writing process is a universal truth regardless of place.  In 
other words, this is the writing process.  Similarly, studies in the collaborative nature of 
writing emphasize writers working together as one body while serving to deemphasize 
writers' singularity as individual bodies, past histories, and material circumstances.  
While theories about the collaborative nature of writing provided a necessary corrective 
to concepts of writing based on the idea of the solitary writer composing in the garret, 
collaborative approaches effect a similar de-emphasis of writers' bodies and differing 
material conditions as process approaches to composition.  More recently, as scholars 
have begun to explore the implications of technology and webbed environments, the 
materiality of bodies seems to be further abstracted; writers, like caricatured screen 
avatars, are less and less connected to skin and earth even as they "connect" to the 
internet and other end-users.  
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 Sharon Crowley's assessment of what she calls "body studies" in composition 
yields a concurrent view of composition studies' general elision of the body.  While the 
point of Crowley's essay isn't to determine the reasons why composition studies has 
neglected physical bodies but rather to give an overview of theories of the 
postmodernism and posthumanism that might be useful to fully embodied theories of 
writing, she does suggest one reason: 
 That all parties to discursive transactions are embodied remains  
  unmentioned in either rhetorical theory or composition studies because 
  both fields still cling to liberal-humanist models of the speaking subject—
  a sovereign, controlling disembodied and individual voice that deploys 
  language in order to effect some predetermined change in an audience. 
  (177) 
Though I do not to wish to argue the veracity of her statement or to suggest that the state 
of composition studies in relation to embodiment is other than hers and Fleckenstein's 
assessment of it (even though an argument can be made that some scholars such as 
Selzer and Mountford are bellwethers for a new attention to physicality), in this section 
of the chapter I reconceptualize the notion of "voice" as one that already has strong ties 
to corporeality and one that could be further thickened given Dillard's and Hall's 
narratives of invention.i  
 Writing before the time referred to by Crowley as the "posthumanist 
dispensation," Theresa Enos argues in "Voice as Echo of Delivery, Ethos as 
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Transforming Process," that ethos emerges as a result of voice, voice here importantly 
corresponding to the historical concept of delivery.  In her words, 
  The twentieth century concept of voice echoing from the art of delivery 
  particularly includes the conscious selection of patterns that project an 
  ethos.  Such stylistic, rhetorical choices are, like voice in the ancient art 
  of delivery, stylized verbal forms.  (186) 
The form, she goes on to say, "is closer to the structure of narrative" in the sense that 
"rhythmic patterns are paramount" in the meaning-making process.  In other words, "the 
conscious re-forming of stylistic patterns shapes not only language use but also 
meaning" (186).  The "speaking style" is one that "groups words in order to enhance 
rhythmic patterns" (186).  Though she does not elaborate on the point, her 
characterization of "speaking style" and its close association with rhythmic patterns 
connect the concept of voice to activity, motion, energy.  Her analysis suggests that 
voice, the effect of a text seemingly speaking to the reader, arises from the affectation of 
vocality during invention.  Embodiment thus is multidirectional: the experience of 
embodiment is stylized textually (by a writer) which projects the "voice" heard as 
readers consume a text.   
 Style is commonly described in terms that suggest a text's embodied quality or, 
on the other hand, the distanced, disembodied style.  Like good company, a writing style 
can be engaging, conversational, lively, active, personal, confessional, or welcoming.  
Alternately, a writing style can be dry, alienating, passive, managerial, flat, sterile, or 
robotic.  In addition to evoking the qualities of embodiment, such terms convey a sense 
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of doing things with other human bodies: conversing, welcoming neighbors into homes, 
sharing secrets in hushed tones.  One way of putting this is to say that the "speaking 
style" brings before the reader active images; In Roskelly and Ronald's estimation, 
however, images are static.  Enos's point, that of voice is created by rhythmic patterns, 
emphasizes the body-ness of style.  In other words, even phrases devoid of images can 
project a speaking body because of the rhythmic patterns.  You need only remember the 
opening dactylic foot of Walt Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking" 
repeated by the speaker at the beginning of the following two lines—"Out of the"—to 
understand that while no image is evoked a body-ness is nonetheless effected.      
 Peter Elbow similarly connects body-ness and voice, and for that reason Kate 
Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly have argued that Elbow's work reclaims the erotic, a 
term they derive from the writings of Audre Lorde.  Elbow is, like Audre Lorde, "trying 
to reclaim the body and felt sense in epistemology" by "exercising the use of the erotic" 
(213).  Erotic is defined this way:  "The erotic refuses the dichotomy between thought 
and feeling and between the body and the mind" (210).   They note that Elbow mostly 
makes this connection between body-ness and writing through his metaphors, 
concentrating "on the mouth, the skin, and the eyes, all sites of emotional, erotic, and 
physical satisfaction and tension" (215).  It is the connection to the mouth that Hall 
believes is the most overtly physical aspect of writing: "When you write a poem, you're 
not hammering out the sounds with a chisel or spreading them with a brush, but you've 
got to feel them in your mouth.  The act of writing a poem is a bodily act as well as a 
mental and imaginative act" (Paris Review 18).  In “Goatfoot, Milktongue, Twinbird,” 
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Hall gives the example of the children’s verse “Bah, bah, Blacksheep” as an example of 
experiencing a poem bodily.  Whether or not the reader knows the rhyme is about 
taxation or not does not reduce the pleasure we receive from it.  From this example he 
develops the concept of “goatfoot,” a pleasure that derives from the mouth or orality, 
“goatfoot,” which is the pleasure of the dance and movement, and finally, “twinbird,” 
the pleasure that readers and writers alike derive from the resolution of conflict.  Writing 
erotically seems to be about pleasure also for Hall for similar reasons: "The pleasure of 
writing is that the mind does not wander any more than it does in orgasm—and writing 
takes longer than orgasm" (Breaksfast 49).   
 Her language describing embodied writing resonates with Dillard and Hall: 
First, we write as bodies, attending to the undulation of inscription and 
response.  We immerse ourselves in—create a subjectivity out of—our 
own bodily reactions as writes.  We are our bodies; we are writing 
bodies, caught in that slippage between bodies that write as they are 
written.  Therefore, we need to attend to visceral rhythms as we compose 
writerly identities, readers, and textworlds at a specific time and in a very 
specific place (body, clothes, room, technology, culture, etc.). (297) 
Particularly relevant to this discussion are Flectenstein’s evocation of “visceral rhythms” 
as something writers “need to attend to.”  She points out the dangers of the social 
epistemic body as a dispossessed “flurry of floating signifiers” (283).  More radically, 
she argues that the body communicates on the cellular level semiotically; in other words, 
corporeal texts (how the body talks to itself) use metaphoric logic.  Further, anchoring 
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her argument in Bateson’s concept of being-in-a-material-place, she contends that 
“corporeal and discursive texts transact continually” in order to create meaning.  While 
corporeal texts can function independently of discursive texts, she argues, discursive 
texts cannot be meaningful without the prior corporeal texts (291).  For example, she 
cites Susanne K. Langer’s observation that “language evolves out of images, out of 
corporeal texts, and can never be amputated from its initiating matrix” (292).   
From a theoretical standpoint, Fleckenstein’s “somatic mind” attempts to 
reconnect what has historically been discrete—the processes of mind and the processes 
of the body.  While Fleckenstein’s “somatic mind” concept perhaps circumvents the 
individualistic aspect of the voice metaphor, it does not convey the essential quality of 
the voice metaphor, that of communication.  Darsie Bowden’s historical exploration of 
the rise of the voice metaphor describes the voice metaphor similarly: “The voice comes 
from the body; the body is utterly personal and this personalness somehow, in this 
pedagogy, is powerful.  Spoken language is naturally closer than writing to the 
lifespring, to consciousness, and to presence” (182).  The “somehow,” I believe is partly 
due to the fact that the mouth is a seat of desire for the erotic body, a site of 
permeability, respiration.  Erotic also conveys the idea that the whole of the body is 
invitational of arousal, the skin itself a plane of nerves through which our bodies 
commune with our environment.  More recently, Debra Hawhee argues in Bodily Arts 
that from its beginnings in antiquity, rhetoric was a body art and that particular bodily 
features have been “deemphasized and suppressed through centuries of disciplinary 
specialization and mind-body separation" (Hawhee 155).  In a later article (“Rhetoric, 
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Bodies, and Everyday Life”), Hawhee makes clear that she did not mean for her 
historical study to be prescriptive.  She was not, in other words, suggesting that 
composition curriculum should involve trips to the gymnasium.  However, she sees the 
possibilities for connecting everyday life with pedagogical aims: 
Our classes can really take seriously Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric as an 
art of discovery.  they can do so by attending to the material, mobile 
activities of everyday lives as lived in cities and parks, streets and 
museums, and even, yes, hallways, mailrooms, and classrooms, all of 
which routinely yield something like Aristotle’s ‘available means’ or 
Booth’s ‘range of resources that human beings share for producing 
effects.’” (163). 
Evoking de Certeau by using the phrase “everyday life,” Hawhee connects the rhetorical 
studies with the work critics like de Certeau are doing in cultural studies, theories that 
perhaps thicken rhetorical studies’ concepts like voice and embodiment.   
 In many ways, Dillard and Hall anticipated the current trend in composition 
studies that seeks to connect composition and the writing body.  In addition to a 
reassessment of the metaphor of voice as connected to delivery and thus the body, 
Dillard and Hall also anticipate and important shifting emphasis from studies in 
collaboration to the solitude required of the writer in composition.  She shift in emphasis 
represents a small corrective to the years of attention that collaboration studies received.  
In addition, the focus on solitude in Dillard and Hall is usually accompanied by a focus 
on nature.  The two subjects, solitude and nature, seem to be connected concerns for 
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both writers, a notion that is beginning to be studied in ecocomposition.  Finally, Dillard 
and Hall, as they describe the writing process in connection with the ultimate mystery—
death—suggest that when it comes to writing, mystery is still part of the process.  In the 
next chapter, I discuss essays by writers who also attempt to address the mystery of 
writing through competing metaphors of inspiration and instrumentalism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INSPIRATION AND INSTRUMENTALISM: THE NEW YORK TIMES WRITERS ON 
WRITING SERIES 
 
 In the last chapter, I discussed how Annie Dillard and Donald Hall's metaphors 
for writing create a concept of self which maintains freedom (rhetorical agency) and 
bodily presence as characteristics of their writing processes.  In this chapter, I offer a 
rhetorical analysis of the New York Times essays on writing, a rich source of material by 
writers originally featured in the New York Times and then collected in two volumes 
(Writer [on Writing]: Collected Essays from the New York Times, and Writers [on 
Writing]: More Collected Essays from The New York Times, Volume II).  
Contemporary writers' accounts of writing, especially inspiration, though their 
metaphors for inspiration have undergone a shift away from religious metaphors toward 
instrumental metaphors, reveal a continuity with religious meanings and understandings 
of writing and thus indicate a continuing importance of the discourse of inspiration 
within composition scholarship.   One way of understanding inspiration and 
instrumentalism is to imagine that the two concepts create a spectrum on which the focus 
of writing shifts from writing as a fully-conscious activity marked by intentionality and 
agency (on the instrumental end of the spectrum) to writing as an unconscious (or supra-
conscious) activity marked by the lack of intentionality and agency (on the inspirational 
end of the spectrum).  Using this approach, I argue that instrumental metaphors and 
metaphors of inspiration implicate one another in a way that creates a complicated view 
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of both sets of metaphors.  Specifically, the essays in Writers on Writing create a view of 
writing that is both instrumentalist and religious, which makes the spectrum an 
instrument of a false dualism in the discourse about writing by creative writers.  The 
essays, taken together create a concept of the writing self that maintains a sense of 
writerly control (rhetorical agency) as well as a sense of a diminished control; 
ultimately, the two concepts are married in the minds of the writers.  Finally, I will argue 
that there are negative pedagogical consequences (i.e., the effect of students of 
composition) if composition scholarship continues to insist on an instrumentalist view of 
writing and the absence of inspiration in the writing process: 
• a false sense of control over the writing process; 
• a sense of audience awareness that becomes oppressive in the sense that 
students become inhibited in their writing; and finally, 
• a totalizing version of the writing process which denies the unexplained or 
mysterious aspects of writing. 
In other words, theorizing inspiration provides a corrective for the field of composition 
that has become, in my view, overly instrumental in its approach to the writing process.  
   
Current Instrumentalist Tendencies in Composition Scholarship 
 Even though composition scholars have traditionally ignored what professional 
writers have to say about writing and the writing process, especially when it comes to 
matters like inspiration, how writers interpret the mystery of inspiration continues to 
capture the attention of a largely non-writing public.  The public's fascination with 
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working writers can be evidenced easily by the popularity of varying Writers on Writers 
series in magazines and newspapers, the questions posed by fans during book promotion 
events, and the books on writing sold year after year (among them the University of 
Michigan's writers on writing series initiated and edited by Donald Hall).  In the last ten 
years, the fascination has come to include the visual image of the working writer as well, 
to which the popularity of the photographer Jill Krementz's The Writer's Desk attests, a 
book of photographs depicting popular writers writing at their desks in their respective 
homes. 
 Part of the fascination with working writers that is particularly showcased in 
Krementz's photographs is the mystery of inspiration.  The intent of her book is to satisfy 
curiosity about the creative process involved with writing, to see what the inspired writer 
looks like while she is writing.  Eudora Welty's photograph features Welty at her desk, 
fingers poised above the keys of a black manual typewriter, the sun coming through a set 
of three windows, white curtains trimmed in feminine ball fringe, tied back to frame 
Welty's seated profile like stage curtains, and in the foreground the unfocused post of her 
bedframe from which the photographer takes her aim.  Walker Percy is pictured in bed, a 
side table propped up like a music stand to support what the viewer must assume are his 
current drafts.  Despite his repose, he is fully dressed in a button-down shirt, slacks, and 
dress shoes; among the bedspread and wool striped throw are newspapers, a Life 
magazine featuring a Dallas Cowboys helmet on the cover, and unopened bills.  Above 
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the bed hangs a crucifix.5  Katherine Anne Porter's photograph is a closeup at her desk—
her right hand on marked-up copy, her left hand on the keys of her typewriter.  She is 
working on a large table instead of a desk, the top of which is cluttered with paper-
clipped drafts, a glue stick still in its packaging, scissors, tape, and open boxes of paper.  
Visible underneath the table is a large trashcan. 
   Flipping through the pages of the book, it is clear that the photographer wanted 
to capture the spectacle of inspiration in a voyeuristic way—a writer caught in the 
moment, the moment that Barret J. Mandel described in "The Writer Writing Is Not at 
Home," as "the writer during the actual process of symbol-making" in which he or she 
"is not in that most familiar of all places, his or her conscious mind" (372, emphasis 
mine).  Ultimately, Krementz's purpose was frustrated by her efforts to get writers to 
pose for her.  The result: there is a falseness to the book because of the obviousness of 
the posing; the writers are decidedly at home.  The paradox of the beautiful book of 
photographs, beautiful and interesting, is that none of the writers are able to pull off 
looking inspired.  They all look posed (they are writers, after all, not actors).  We have 
caught none of them in the act.  Essentially, the book is a collection of pictures of writers 
pretending to write.   
 The book works, though, partly because viewers have an idea about what 
inspiration looks like or should look like.  What the book doesn't show are the between 
moments that all writers write about when they write about writing: being asleep and 
_______________ 
 
5 "Percy always composed lying down—a habit he acquired while a patient at Trudeau Sanatorium." 
Caption to the Krementz photograph included in Jay Tolson's Pilgrim in the Ruins: A Life of Walker Percy 
(NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
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dreaming when an idea suddenly appears to you in a dream, taking a shower and 
thinking about a writing problem and screaming "Aha!" like Archimedes, or the writer 
who might be just doing nothing.  All of these anecdotes suggest that writing is more 
mysterious than most composition scholars would like to admit (Mandel to the contrary).  
Despite the attention paid to the role of inspiration for the working writer, scholars 
working in the field of composition are reluctant to address inspiration as a serious part 
of the writing process, for more or less obvious reasons.  Here are a few of those 
reasons: 
1. Inspiration evokes a Romantic tradition that emphasizes originality and 
authenticity, a position argued by Lester Faigley in "Competing Theories of 
Process: A Critique and a Proposal."  
2. Inspiration aligns composition with a Modernist conception of the writer in 
which the “moment” of writing is stressed over the collaborative (and social) 
process of writing, a position argued by, among others, Linda Brodkey in 
“Modernism and the Scene of Writing." 
3. Inspiration privileges what has been alternately termed 
poetic/expressive/aesthetic discourse over transactional/referential/pragmatic 
discourse (based on the discourse models of Britton, Sapir, and Harris).   
4. Inspiration encourages students to view composition as an emotional 
endeavor that is disconnected with audiences and purposes, as Kinneavy’s 
discussion of expressive discourse in A Theory of Discourse argues. 
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 All of these objections were useful in grounding composition scholarship firmly 
as an independent academic field.  More recently, these objections served to offer 
alternatives to expressionist perspectives on the writing process, a corrective that 
allowed for other perspectives to be explored and considered, instead of one perspective 
having the intellectual monopoly on writing scholarship.   
 To many scholars, inspiration just sounds hokey.  It is a term that is widely used 
in popular culture by pop psychologists and others of the Hallmark or Chicken Soup for 
the Soul approach to spiritual development or self-improvement, causing academicians 
to shy away from the term for fear of sliding into the language of popular culture (and 
away from academic discourse).  To put it another way, composition scholars want to 
sound like scholars, and using a term like inspiration doesn’t suggest theoretical 
robustness.  John C. Briggs addresses this fear in his discussion of the term magic in 
“Peter Elbow, Kenneth Burke, and the Idea of Magic”:  
  Of course, the more one waxes eloquent over these phenomena, the more 
  one risks sounding like the self-help artists we see in grocery store book 
  racks.  Amidst the array of vegetables and potions, one reads a popular 
  discourse strangely remote from the languages of the academy; but that 
  language offers the means by which many persons begin to develop their 
  own discourses of power (368).   
Briggs, like other composition scholars, tends to view perspectives on writing that 
involve inspiration as opposed to perspectives which rely on instrumental perspectives 
on writing—that is, perspectives that focus on writing as a craft or skill.  The dualism 
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that is created by this opposition ignores how the two—inspiration and 
instrumentalism—are actually related to one another, as the analysis in this chapter will 
show.  
 The presence of instrumental rationality as it was conceived by Habermas in his 
works in the 1980's is immediately apparent in composition scholarship.  Briefly, the 
aim of instrumental rationality is efficiency, an efficiency born of the advent of the 
machine and the industrial revolution.  In a democracy, "the role of the citizen is 
restructured so that the citizen becomes a client of the system" (Killingsworth and 
Palmer 167).  In composition scholarship, the citizen is the student, who is directed by 
the instrumental expertise of the composition scholar.  In a general sense, the goal of the 
composition course is to make students competent contributors to the academic 
discourse community within the course of semester.    
 With this goal in mind, Stephen North recognized the tendency toward 
instrumental rationality among composition scholars in The Making of Knowledge in 
Composition, a tendency arising from the both the necessity to establish composition 
studies as field of study and the necessity for practical application of theory; however, 
North argues that the result of instrumentalism can be observed in conclusions from 
research that go beyond what the research suggests.  James Seitz, discussing Lad Tobin's 
"Bridging Gaps: Analyzing Our Students' Metaphors for Composing," observes Tobin's 
instrumentalism, noting that "the opening sentence of his essay indicates an emphasis on 
utility: 'Like most composition teachers, I have always relied on metaphors to get me out 
of tight spots'" (291).   Later in the essay, Tobin's instrumental approach to students' 
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metaphors for composing focuses on how students can best "use" metaphor 
"productively" (446). 
 Lester Faigley would resist any attempt to classify his "social view" of 
composition as instrumental, but consider that he, like many composition scholars, 
ignores the perspectives on writing from practitioners—in this case professional creative 
writers, a critique he makes of the field of composition: 
  Researchers and scholars define their own projects in relation to other 
  lines of inquiry and forms of knowledge and thus the relations of  
  knowledges are often ones of exclusion. The relations of knowledge 
  within the practitioner community, on the other hand, are ones of  
  inclusion. (Fragments 137). 
This quote appears within Faigley's discussion of North in Fragments of Rationality in 
service to his discussion of "making contradictions coherent" in composition scholarship 
and textbooks.  However, his critiques of both Baker's Practical Stylist and Lanham's 
Revising Business Prose reveal his concern for a unified, totalizing theory of 
composition—a hallmark of instrumental rationality in composition scholarship.  His 
critiques focus on Baker's "contradicting declarations about writing" (135) and Lanham's 
dual project of emphasizing efficiency [instrumentalism] and humanism.  Both critiques 
rely on a view of knowledge that is systematic, hierarchical, and serviceable to the field 
of composition itself as establishing a troop of experts.   
 Further, when Faigley in another essay ("Judging Writing, Judging Selves") 
responds to a statement made by one of Wayne Booth's students ("I know I have a long 
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way to go, but I want to get there"), Faigley asks, "But where is he going?" (119).  
Faigley admits "the ability to write in certain discourses is highly valued in 
technologically advanced nations"; even though his pedagogical stance involves 
teaching students how "to analyze cultural definitions of the self," a goal that seems to 
oppose and instrumentalist conception of writing pedagogy, the analysis of selves retains 
its usefulness as a route for the student to be able to write effectively and efficiently.   
 Another group of composition scholars, like Faigley, might also resist the label 
of instrumentalists: scholars whose work has been recently described as "post-process."  
However, post-process critiques of composition mainly rely on instrumentalist 
arguments about applicability and usefulness.  Gary Olson writes, "process theorists 
assume that we can somehow make statements about the process that would apply to all 
or most of our writing situations" (7).  George Pullman, writing in the same collection of 
essays (Post-Process Theory: Beyond the Writing-Process Paradigm), elaborates on the 
notions of applicability and usefulness in process orientations of composition 
scholarship: "If the writing process as it is taught can actually obstruct the production of 
an adequate document in certain circumstances, then it cannot be considered universally 
applicable; therefore, it cannot be considered a universally valid description of how to 
write" (27). 
  
Instrumental Metaphors for Inspiration in Writers on Writing 
 In the New York Times essay collection, some writers approach the subject of 
writing with practical advice and descriptions of writing that attempt to demystify the 
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process, often by the use of instrumental metaphors. Instrumental metaphors include 
metaphors that figure the imagination as a tool or aid to writing, as in Richard Ford's 
"Goofing Off While the Muse Recharges," in which the imagination is a tool—a drill— 
that needs to be recharged after use.  Also included in the family of instrumental 
metaphors are system metaphors in which the writing process is mechanical and can be 
operated like a machine.  Instrumental metaphors emphasize skill, practice, and tools.  
They conceive of writing democratically, in a sense, because the basic assumption 
underlying the metaphor is that given the right tools or instruction, almost anyone can 
write successfully, not just those favored by the muse.  The special quality so often 
invoked by the discourse of the "gifted" or "inspired" writer is absent in instrumentalism.  
Instead, the writer is able to write because she is a hard worker, has mastered a skill like 
a carpenter, and deserves the respect for her work because it was achieved through 
discipline.   
 In instrumental metaphors, the tenor is often the imagination, as it is in Thomas 
Fleming's essay, "Instant Novels? In Your Dreams!" in which the imagination is 
described as an "intellectual tool, closely wedded to the writer's intelligence.  What it 
chooses to imagine for a novel is integrally connected to the essence of what the writer, 
consciously or unconsciously, wants to say about the subject" (62).  The central idea in 
this view of the imagination as tool is that the imagination is accessible to the writer 
much like a pencil or other writing instrument.  Also, the imagination as tool is able to 
access the secret or otherwise hidden desires of the writer for the work (in Fleming's 
case, the novel).  The imagination as tool, in other words, can tap into the unconscious 
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desires of the writer (which also evokes a set of metaphors about the imagination as 
hidden reserve of memories, desires, a metaphorical ocean of the subconscious) in order 
to generate new ideas.     
 Fleming's distinction between "writer's imagination" and "writer's intelligence" 
also bears resemblance to an earlier conception of the writer's cognitive processes 
described by Coleridge as imagination (the secondary imagination as it is called in 
chapter 13 of Biographia Literaria) and fancy.  Like Fleming's distinction, Coleridge's 
imagination generates new ideas while fancy merely combines or associates existing 
elements in the writer's mind.  Coleridge describes the operation of the imagination as 
one that is subject to conscious will (as opposed to the primary imagination which is 
responsible for perception), having a "kind of agency" (321).  The imagination 
"dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate" (321).    Fleming likens this part of 
the mind (his "writer's imagination") to the ability to see what is not there, like a set of 
eyes or glasses that enable the writer to have visions.  In the context of his tool-
metaphors, the vision metaphors can be properly described as examples of visual aids; 
the tool in this case is a tool that allows the writer to see.  Fleming writes that he "saw a 
man" when he was writing (64) and, "[s]lowly the character appeared" (64).  Because 
this imagination has the power to create, it is called vital by Coleridge, and the 
description can be equally applied to Fleming's "writer's imagination" as a tool.  
 Drawing on the same family of metaphors, Annie Proulx calls herself a "digger" 
in "Inspiration? Head Down the Back Road, and Stop for the Yard Sales," and admits, 
"A whole set of metaphoric shovels is part of my tool collection, and for me the research 
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that underlies the writing is the best part of the scribbling game" (185).  Proulx doesn't 
make the same distinction between generative aspects of the imagination and collecting 
as Fleming does in his essay.  Experience and the reality of the world around her provide 
her with plenty of material to excavate.  She speaks of reality's abundance and 
inexhaustibility:  
  The digging itself is never done because the shovel scrapes at life itself.  
  It is not possible to get it all, or even very much of it, but I gather what I 
  can of the rough, tumbling crowd, the lone walkers and the voluble 
  talkers, the high lonesome singers, the messages people write and leave 
  for me to read. (190) 
Proulx is an archaeologist in this metaphor, with one important distinction: unlike an 
archaeologist, Proulx the writer is the intended audience for life's messages.  The 
messages establish an intimate connection whereas an archaeologist digs to make 
discoveries about cultures and civilizations.  Proulx is listening for talkers and singers 
that speak to her. 
 In addition to tool metaphors, instrumental metaphors also manifest under the 
guise of system metaphors, a metaphor that explains how an entire system works.  For 
example, Proulx calls writing a "game," a common metaphor to describe the function of 
language (most famously propagated by Wittgenstein) (85).  System metaphors are most 
commonly discussed in the context of information technology, especially in the design 
of programs and software. While the "desktop" metaphor for computers (that what you 
see on the computer screen is the top of a desk) is most often cited as an example of a 
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system metaphor, the more recent use of the "shopping cart" on retail websites such as 
Amazon.com is a better illustration of a system metaphor.  Browsing the website is 
equated to shopping in a grocery store where you see products you want and add them to 
your shopping cart.  When you are finished shopping, you pay for your goods and leave.  
The system, or process, in this metaphor is grocery shopping.   
 One way to think about system metaphors is as extended versions of tool-
metaphors.  For example, Ford's essay on the "recharging muse" could also be discussed 
as a system metaphor in which the entire process of writing is explained through the 
metaphor of the battery in which the writing of novels is an endeavor which "consumes 
almost entirely its own resources and generally leaves its author emptied, dazed and 
bewildered" (70).  After the novel is finished, therefore, the writer needs to rest: 
  Therefore a good spendthrift interval lasting a couple of seasons if not 
  more, or at least until you can no longer stand to read the headlines of the 
  newspaper, much less the articles that follow, can help to freshen the self, 
  to reconfigure the new, while decommissioning worn-out preoccupations, 
  habits, old stylistic tics—in essence help to 'forget' everything in order 
  that you 'invent' something better. (70) 
The reference to the passage of time in this example—"a good spendthrift interval 
lasting a couple of seasons"—helps extend the metaphor from a tool metaphor to a 
system metaphor for which the entire writing process is described via the battery 
working inside a machine.  The result, the self spent entirely so that a resting period is 
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required, Ford regards as the way writers "pay reverence to art's sacred incentive—that 
the whole self, the complete will, be engaged" (70). 
 The "complete will," as Ford calls it, is a key term for understanding the use of 
tool and system metaphors because it works both to emphasize the writer's insistence 
that writing is mechanical if one would just learn the way it works AND to suggest the 
opposite—there is an element of the irrational and therefore mystical in all of this.  For 
example, Ford says that he never thought of himself "as a man driven to write" (67).  
Instead, he reasons,  
  I simply choose to do it, often when I can't be persuaded to do anything 
  else; or when a dank feeling of uselessness comes over me, and I'm at a 
  loss and have time on my hands, such as when the World Series is over.  I 
  would argue that only in this state of galvanic repose am I prepared to 
  address the big subjects great literature requires: the affinities between 
  bliss and bales, etc. (67) 
The phrase "galvanic repose" suggests just such oppositional thinking.  A sudden state of 
rest is perhaps a state that is unattainable through what the writer calls his "protocol." 
Instead, he must wait for it to arrive like a change of weather, or the arrival of evil as the 
writer implies with his reference to "bliss and bales."  In this way, Ford's statement about 
the "reverence to art's sacred incentive" becomes more revealing of the multi-
directionality of the tool and system metaphors as a way to make up for the writers' 
inability to understand their own processes.   
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 Fleming's and Proulx's tool metaphors exhibit a measure of the irrational and 
mystical, also.  In Fleming's case with visual aids, he sometimes refers to the experience 
of seeing his characters like a messianic vision: "In a swirling moment I suddenly saw 
the story that had eluded me for so long" (63) and, "[i]n this whirling kaleidoscope 
Teddy Fleming as the immortal sergeant virtually vanished" (62)—both of which call to 
mind Yeats's gyre and vorticism, both of which find their roots in mysticism.  Annie 
Proulx's description of the "rough, tumbling crowd, the lone walkers and the voluble 
talkers, the high lonesome singers" who all write and leave her "messages" to read, too, 
recalls the religious tradition of receiving a message or someone speaking through 
another person, suggesting that her tooling around with tool metaphors carries another 
(perhaps unintended) implication—that writing can take on a religious cast, at times 
allowing her to hear the "messages" from people who are not present.  
 The state of "galvanic repose" for Ford, the visions of Fleming, and Proulx's 
voices all suggest that there is more going on with these writers than just the mastery of 
a tool or system.  For these writers, instrumental metaphors suggest a way that writing is 
related to using a shovel or recharging the imagination like a battery.  However, the 
metaphors also perhaps draw attention away from the fact that the writers are at a loss to 
explain exactly how it is they write.  In other words, the essays in which the instrumental 
metaphors appear still appeal to older conceptions of inspiration that rely on a religious 
or mystical understanding of the term.  
 Another essay from the collection further illustrates the way in which certain 
instrumental metaphors can function to support a view of writing that is more 
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complicated than simply the ability to learn how to use a tool or master a system and 
might, instead, be dependent upon things which the writers do not understand, taking on 
elements of the religious.  Carolyn Chute, the author of The Beans of Egypt Maine, 
begins her essay, "How Can You Create Fiction When Reality Comes to Call?" with 
abrupt framing: "This is a very personal and uplifting story of my life as a writer.  I will 
include intimate confessions.  The following is a typical day in my life" (35).  The text 
that follows is marked by a style designed to leave the reader feeling rushed and out of 
breath. Chute deletes most definite and indefinite articles and pairs subjects and verbs 
tightly together.  She keeps paragraphs short when she uses paragraphs (often she uses 
one sentence paragraphs).  The sentence lengths are short, almost telegraphic.  The 
description conveys the intimate chaos of a swarming household, complete with a 
wailing typewriter: 
   Guest leaves after another cup of tea. 
 Dogs line up for their heartworm pills. 
 Clock coo coos seven times. 
 Typewriter screams. 
 I do some dishes and take my bath and clock coo coos eight times 
and typewriter screams, and one of the Scotties starts to have a grand mal 
seizure.  I hold her so she won't smash her skull on the floor. 
 Truck pulls up in the yard.  Another guest, this a person who has 
read my book (the one with all the violence and class rage); and she 
comes in and sits in a rocker after we drive all the barking dogs out the 
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dog door, except for the one that is dizzy and wet from her seizure, 
Florence, who I hold. 
   Husband goes out to split wood.  Person tells me her name again 
and how hard she and her husband work, and yet they are losing 
everything and experiencing depression and rage, which they never 
experienced before.  They have always been able to  "keep up." 
 Typewriter screams. 
 I hear nine coo coos. 
 "Tea?" I ask the guest.  
 I hold Florence under one arm, make the tea. 
 Husband rushes in and tells me that Helen has been eating dirt 
again.  This could mean an emergency trip to the vet's to have her 
pumped out.  Helen is one of the Scotties.  (37-38) 
The typewriter is the baby of the house, demanding attention even while "mother" Chute 
must also attend to dogs, husband, guests, household—all of which are foregrounded by 
the coo-cooing clock that keeps announcing the fact that the day is passing the mother by 
without having accomplished any of her writing tasks.  Throughout the course of the 
essay, the typewriter screams over and over again: "Typewriter with page 1994 of novel 
screams from another room: I WANT YOU" (35); "Typewriter is starting to gasp and 
moan" (36); "Typewriter screams" (37); "Upstairs the typewriter is squealing and 
howling" (37); and, "Typewriter is thumping on the ceiling above" (41).   
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 It is within this "system" of caring for a child (the novel) in the busy household 
that Chute calls her writing life.  Yet, she adamantly attests that she must have solitude 
in order to write: "I am a person who can't teach writing or make a living in any public 
way, as I get confused when interrupted or overstimulated.  In a classroom or crowded 
room, I all but blank out" (36).  This presents an interesting contradiction: the material 
circumstances of her life are both overstimulating and the source of constant 
interruption.  Yet, she indeed does write (because we are reading her words), but when 
she does so is mysterious, as if she is outside her life looking in and narrating what is 
going on like a higher being.  Also, given that Chute is a writer whose subjects are class, 
community, and feminism, it would be difficult to imagine her writing from an isolated 
vantage point.  Her writing (the way it comes about) in this system metaphor is obscured 
by mystery.  The reader is left to assume that Chute writes somewhat without her 
willing. 
 
 Quests and Hunts 
 On the continuum between the writers who describe the act of writing using 
instrumental metaphors and those who embrace the more mysterious aspects of 
inspiration are the writers for whom inspiration is a thing they have to find, much like an 
artifact.  Like Carolyn Chute describes in "How Can You Create Fiction When Reality 
Comes to Call?", the psychological state required of the writing process is often in 
opposition to the quotidian and must be sought.  While the thing itself—inspiration—
remains shrouded in mystery like the Holy Grail, the way to go about finding it is 
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becomes an activity for which strategies can be employed successfully.  Because these 
writers often discuss the ways they go about finding inspiration, the metaphors they use 
can be described as quest metaphors.  For example, Carl Hiaasen writes in "Real Life, 
That Bizarre and Brazen Plagiarist," that he was trying to decide how to kill one of his 
villains in a recent novel when he decided to look in the newspaper for inspiration.  He 
found a story about dolphins that had been attacking tourists' crotches and became 
inspired.  His character was molested to death by a dolphin.  He comments, "Every 
writer scrounges for inspiration in different places, and there's no shame in raiding the 
headlines" (90). 
 Hiaasen's remarks are similar to Annie Proulx's comments about "digging" for 
inspiration at yard sales and back roads.  He draws from the same class of metaphors—
instrumental metaphors—since a quest is a kind of system.  However, Hiaasen's 
metaphor differs in tenor.   Instead of the imagination being the tenor, as it is most 
instrumental metaphors, the tenor of his metaphor when he "raids" the headlines or 
"scrounges" for inspiration is an idea or plot .  The distinction is key because it removes 
the seat of writing from the person of the writer with whom the imagination resides.  
Instead, writing is a matter of finding ideas in the material world.  Quest metaphors, 
when they are related to writing practices, indicate a movement away from the agency of 
the writer.  Compared to the metaphors in the previous section of the chapter in which 
the imagination served as tenor, the quest metaphor implies that the writer is not entirely 
responsible for his or her writing—it is no longer "in" her or him but is somewhere out 
in the world.    
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 The stress on ideas and the writer's quest for them often results in discussion of 
writing in which "getting an idea" becomes the key for the entire writing process. For 
these writers, the elusiveness of writing is all about figuring out what to write.  Allegra 
Goodman in "Calming the Inner Critic and Getting to Work," is one of the writers who 
uses this substitution (figuring out what to write about as a general description of the 
writing process).  The obvious problem for her and for writers with similar perspectives 
who use quest metaphors is what to do when the writer doesn't know what to write 
about.  She describes her strategies as directives in the imperative mood for the aspiring 
writer: 
  The only answer is to think and think some more, and then go out and 
  read and look and listen some more.  Do not sit and mope.  Do not sigh.  
  Do not throw up your hands and give up on the whole project.  Do not go 
  back to the drawing board.  There is nothing more depressing than an 
  empty drawing board.  No, go back to the world which is where all 
  characters originally come from. (71) 
The advice involves nothing revolutionary: to immerse yourself in the world is what 
many writers have suggested fosters the best writing, Whitman and Sartre among them.  
This perspective suggests that experience serves the writer best.  
 In the first set of instrumental metaphors, the tool metaphors in which the tenor 
of the metaphor is the imagination, the writer must retreat from the world to perform the 
task of writing.  In this way, tool metaphors in writing on writing discourse is related to 
the tradition in which writers are viewed to be isolated.  The related images in this 
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perspective include the writer's garret, Woolf's a room of one's own, and the lonely cabin 
in the tradition of rustification as preparation for the writing life.   
 Quest metaphors reverse this formula.  The writer goes out into the world, an 
adventurer.  For this reason, Goodman admonishes writers against isolation: 
  Go back to your library, your forest, your newspapers, your family, your 
  day job, your photos, your music, your maps and jottings of old dreams.  
  All these are teeming with life, and life is the stuff of fiction.  There are 
  no guarantees, but if you go out where stories congregate, it's far more 
  likely that characters will come. (74) 
Goodman leaves out the obvious indirect object in the last sentence: characters will 
come to you.  Here we can begin to speculate the different implications of quest 
metaphors and the cult of experience that suggests that all you need to go to write is to 
live, to have experiences.  To find the place where stories congregate is a matter of 
mystery.  The writer must have experiences, but more importantly recognize "the place 
where stories congregate" (74).  Also, the quest may or may not be successful: the 
characters are "more likely" to come, but they are not guaranteed to do so.  
On the surface, Goodman's advice seems to be practical.  Indeed, she gives 
aspiring writers a list of things to do to get back on track when the ideas just aren't there.  
Like the instrumental metaphors that involved more than just "recharging" the 
imagination, quest metaphors involve more than experience or doing.  The rhetoric of 
the quest also suggests a poetic in which the writer is a crusader, a hero.  The object of 
the quest, the idea, is holy.  The holiness of the idea and the relative unholiness of the 
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writer often results in essays on writing in which the quest for an idea overlaps with the 
writer's quest for salvation, a metaphoric salvation in which the sinful burden is the 
absent page, the unwritten work. 
 Goodman's advice also suggests that the act of writing is more passive than the 
quest metaphors suggest, and her remarks about going into the forest to find life could be 
considered part of another metaphor for writing, the hunt metaphor.  Writing is 
sometimes a matter of waiting and invoking.   
 Beth Kephart's "As Her Son Creates his Story, a Mother Waits for the Ending," 
suggests a similar understanding of writing.  In the essay, she teaches her son to write 
fiction, and the operating metaphor is her son as a frustrated hunter: 
  My son is on the hunt for a surprise ending.  He trails up and down the 
  hallway, sighs, goes outside, paces the yard.  It is late autumn, the leaves 
  have lately rained down from the trees, and as I watch him through the 
  window, I feel the melancholy of the season, the melancholy of a twelve-
  year-old boy whose own story cruelly eludes him. (133) 
Like the writer for whom Goodman writes to go out into the forests, Kephart's son can't 
find what it is he is looking for to write about in his story.  Also like Goodman's 
intended audience, Kephart's son is weighted down beneath the burden of the unwritten 
story.  Goodman refers to the depressing state of an empty drawing board, and Kephart 
observes the growing sadness of her son among the turning leaves of autumn, hunting 
season. 
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 Instead of telling her son to go to the forest, Kephart has a different set of 
strategies: 
  We have sat with the sprawl of his long first draft between us, charting 
  the story's terrain, hypothesizing plot.  We have analyzed characters, 
  settings, coincidences, motivations, the frissons between so many telling 
  details; we have sketched out what-ifs with words and symbols.  For 
  weeks he has worried his mystery along with a seriousness that has 
  become its own brand of worry, with a singleness of artistic mind that has 
  made me wonder what I was thinking when I first seduced him toward 
  writing. (133) 
Kephart's strategies to help her son find the end of his story include those common to the 
workshop approach to revision that can be found in creative writing classes.  They make 
maps and draw pictures, discuss the literary elements of the story—all within the context 
of the quest metaphor.  They are adventurers in pursuit of a treasure, or prey.  But 
ultimately, Kephart admits, stories are "just beyond us," causing everything a writer 
writes to be "subject to the scars of so much searching" (134).  In other words, the 
strategies, preparations, worrying, and seeking do not guarantee success.  The writer is 
subject to a force or power greater than herself or himself.   
 However, Kephart does describe the experience of writing when everything is 
clicking: 
  Yes, writing is almost always too hard, except for those breathtaking 
  times when it isn't, except for those almost ineluctable moments of  
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  deliverance when the lair's lamps burn bright, and the air carries a scent, 
  and through the silence one hears the chitterings of language.  Writing is 
  almost always too hard, except when the story blows in. (136) 
The moment of discovery in the extended quest metaphor is really an arrival, then: "the 
story blows in."  Instead of finding a thing, it finds you.  Like a moment of spiritual 
enlightenment or conversion, she describes hearing voices, the "chitterings of language" 
(136).  Her description evokes a mixture of sensuality and spirituality, of deliverance and 
ecstasy.  The voice speaks, blows in like the Holy Spirit filling the upper room, filling 
those in it with glossolalia. 
 Kephart's strategies to find the end of her son's story are the ones that most 
creative writing teachers would suggest—workshopping, plotting storylines, working on 
character development.  The practical advice, like Goodman's advice, seems practical, 
and it is on one level.  However, the quest metaphor supercedes the practical questing 
advice because ultimately finding the ending, a generalization of the writing process, is 
dependent upon the voice that blows in, the arrival of the mysterious, the ineffable.  In 
her words, the "ineluctable moments of deliverance" (136).  Again, the language of 
religious discourse finds itself at the heart of the mystery of inspiration.  In this way, 
Kephart and her son are pilgrims.  
 The implication of quest metaphor in the discourse of writing about writing 
suggests the intimate relationship between the discourse of craft and the discourse of 
inspiration, namely because quest metaphors in these essays almost always begin with 
the practical.  Goodman tells the writer to go back to her day job, and Kephart 
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hypothesizes plot with her son.  In other words, there are things writers can do to help 
the process along.  Reading these essays, the prewriting strategies suggested by Peter 
Elbow's believing game are called to mind.  It is the realm of the imperative mood in 
which writing is a series of steps to accomplish, the end result being an essay, a story, a 
poem, a novel.  However, in composition scholarship, unlike the writers on writing 
essays, the directives imply that results are guaranteed.  Do x and you will achieve y.  
When creative writers use quest metaphors, it is accompanied by the idea that the 
strategies must be used but must be accompanied by an x factor that is undefined, except 
in the most vague, spiritual terms.  Unlike tool metaphors, quest metaphors are not 
democratic.  Not everyone is granted the ears to hear the story that, in Kephart's words, 
"blows in" (136).   
 
Religious Metaphors for Inspiration 
 Even though most creative writers largely draw from instrumental and system 
metaphors in their writing memoirs, some writers also represent the experience of 
writing as one that is not the product of a set of practices or procedures but as a 
mysterious experience, an experience that could be characterized as ineffable or beyond 
rationality.  Rather than (or, in addition to, as I will discuss) relying on instrumental 
metaphors for inspiration, these creative writers rely on more traditional, religious 
understandings of inspiration.  Drawing on the Romantic mythos of the writer, 
inspiration is akin to the breath of God (as its etymology comports) or possession by 
something or someone other than the writers themselves, all of which calls into question 
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the subjectivity of the writer.  Agency, for this class of writers, is eclipsed by the feeling, 
vision, or voice that inspires them, much like the experiences of those who have 
described a religious conversion or contact with the divine, as Timothy Clark argues in A 
Theory of Inspiration (3).    
 When I discussed writers who use instrumental metaphors, I included among 
them Thomas Fleming, from whose essay, "Instant Novels? In Your Dreams!" I cited for 
its extensive instrumental metaphors.  Specifically, Fleming discusses the imagination in 
terms of a tool, a visual aid he uses while writing to imagine plots, characters, and scenes 
for his novels.  However, his representation of the imagination is less clear cut that just 
his depiction of the imagination as a tool.  In fact, the essay is one of a few in the 
collection in which the writer vacillates between an instrumental understanding of his 
writing process, one in which the writer discusses writing in terms that emphasize 
writerly control, and an understanding of his writing process that he admits is beyond his 
control or understanding.   
 For Fleming, most of the time the more mysterious aspects of the writing process 
involve dreams or visions of characters.  His first novel began as a dream about a 
gigantic angel in the sea, rescuing a German U-boat:  "This incredible creature embraced 
the dying boat in its immense arms" (60).  He awoke from the dream, raced to his 
computer, and in an hour had written the first chapter of his 1994 novel, Loyalties.  His 
essay in the Writers on Writing collection begins with his contemplations about the 
experience, and before he formulates his theory of the imagination as "intellectual tool," 
he speculates about the mysteriousness of his dream and the genesis of his novel:  
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  In succeeding years I've puzzled more than once about where this vision 
  from.  It utterly defies rational analysis.  I was not thinking about writing 
  a novel about the German resistance to Hitler, which is what the book 
  became.  I had only the dimmest knowledge about these tragic patriots, 
  gleaned from reading Anthony Cave Brown's Bodyguard of Lies two or 
  three years earlier.  Why did it erupt in my imagination? (61) 
The most salient feature of his account rests with the classification of the idea for his 
novel as a vision that appeared to him out of nowhere, specifically characterizing its 
arrival as an "eruption."  The concept of writing as "seeing" is a common one 
historically.  Coleridge's Kubla Khan was the result of an opium-induced vision, for 
example.  The idea of an "eruption," too, has historical connections, specifically to 
Wordsworth's description of poetry in his "Prelude" as an "overflow of powerful 
feelings."   
 Also, the experience, insists Fleming, "defies rational analysis."  Rhetorically, 
Fleming is positioning his account of writing the first chapters of the novel as something 
that cannot be understood or explained, which detracts from himself as the agent or 
producer of the discourse.  Like the burning bush, the vision of the U-boat appeared to 
him, and even he doesn't know why or wherefore it did.  The account reveals Fleming's 
awareness that his audience might question the authenticity of this account, and he 
justifies the audience's doubt by representing his own doubt about the vision.  It also 
reveals that he is aware, perhaps, of existing preconceptions about writers and how they 
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write.  Rather than write from the position of an expert reporting the details of his 
project, he proceeds from the position as a co-wonderer with his audience. 
 Fleming's visions are related to instrumental metaphors because he is using the 
imagination as a tool to see, as I described earlier in the chapter.  The relationship 
between the earlier instrumental metaphors and his religious metaphor of seeing a vision 
is significant because it marks a blurring between dualistic concepts of inspiration.  In a 
single essay, Fleming shifts from instrumental metaphors to religious ones quite 
seamlessly.  On one hand, his imagination allows him to tap into a cache of visions.  On 
the other hand, he represents his visions as religious in tenor.  With these shifting 
concepts of inspiration, it is possible to read his rhetorical question, "Why did it erupt in 
my imagination," in multiple ways: on one hand, he is questioning the reason or cause 
he had the vision; on the other hand, the question could be read with an emphasis on 
my—"why did it erupt in my imagination?"—emphasizing a perspective in which the 
writer is chosen.  Each reading could be cited as support for a view of inspiration that is 
instrumental or religious.  He later admonishes his reader: "Don't ask me how or why 
these things happen in my head" (64).  Again, this could be read in the dual ways the 
rhetorical question can be read, the "how" being a question instrumental in nature, the 
"why" a question of purpose related to an idea of chosen-ness in religious discourse. 
 Fleming's interesting mixing of instrumental and religious metaphors is only one 
of many essays in the collection that mix the two classes of metaphors in the collection.  
Hans Koning, for example, in "Summoning the Mystery and Tragedy, but in a 
Subterranean Way," describes inspired writing (he calls inspired writing serious writing) 
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as the "writing that you have to write, what you hear in your mind" (139).  Instead of a 
vision as Fleming described, Koning's inspiration is a voice he hears.  Added to that is 
the idea of a compulsive drive, the "writing you have to write" is done as if driven to do 
so by something external.  The word is revealed to him like holy scripture was revealed 
by the Holy Spirit.  The writer, in these cases, is a recorder—a vessel filled with a 
message from God—and to write it down fulfills a divine mission or calling. 
 The idea of writing as a fulfillment of a calling is supported by Koning's claim 
that serious writing "should be committed, what they call in France engagé" (138).  He 
goes on to describe what he means by this: "It means to me that if you want to write a 
serious novel, you should not only be out to entertain but you should also, in a hidden 
way, reflect on the world's justice and injustice, hope and illusion" (138).  In other 
words, Koning's serious writing is the kind of writing that is somewhat moralistic in 
nature, the kind of writing that perhaps requires divine authorship.  And as divine 
authorship usually means that the writer should not take into account the opinions of 
mere mortals, Koning says, "Don’t worry about what editors or reviewers may like or 
not like," because "[y]our own judgement is independent.  You don't accept any 
suggested change except where you made a factual or grammatical mistake.  My motto 
has been through all these years 'Not a comma'" (139). 
 All of these ideas suggest that Koning's account of inspiration is one that relies 
heavily on religious concepts of inspiration; however, because Koning considers serious 
writing an undertaking of the "world's justice and injustice, hope and illusion," his 
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version of inspiration is closely tied to a constructionist view of authorship.  To illustrate 
his point, he draws from literary history: 
  No writer can float in a void above the battle; there are always links.  
  There is a link between the potato famine and James Joyce's Ulysses.  
  There is a link between the heroes and heroines of Henry James and the 
  basics of their society; if they had to run off to nine-to-five jobs, they 
  would have lost most of their literary interest.  There is even a link  
  between the portraits of Rembrandt and the plundering of the Indies by 
  the Dutch East India Company.  To be above politics (politics in the 
  widest  sense) doesn't seem meritorious to me.  I believe one can only be 
  that way through total indifference to our world, or appalling  
  incomprehension. (139) 
The writer, in other words, should share these links with culture and history; however, 
Koning is clear that a writer can be indifferent or ignorant of culture and history.  The 
serious writer chooses to be in the world, to be engaged in the world around him, which 
isn't a clear constructionist viewpoint.  In a constructionist view of authorship, producers 
of discourse are subject to cultural influence like ambient light, absorbing the influences 
and automatically giving off his or her own radiance, a mélange of influences.  The 
process isn't one that depends on a writer's sense of calling or morality; it is automatic, 
amoral, and absolute.  It is a system, or so we are told by cultural theorists, and one that 
has its own set of instrumental metaphors tied to it.  For example, I've used a 
photosynthesis metaphor to explain it while Koning relies on the metaphor of chains.  
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Another common metaphor in social construction is digestion: one consumes language 
and then produces language. 
 Koning's inspiration for serious writing, then, mixes the religious concept of 
inspiration as hearing a voice ("what you hear in your mind," according to Koning) and a 
modified constructionist view of authorship that operates systematically like links in a 
chain (his "links" in the previous passage).  As it is in the case of the previous writer, 
Fleming, it would be a misreading to classify Koning as a writer who relies strictly on 
religious metaphors or one who relies strictly on instrumental metaphors.   The key 
sentence in which he defines serious writing—"It is writing that you have to write, what 
you hear in your mind"—could be cited to support either a religious or a social 
constructionist perspective on inspiration.   In religious discourse, hearing a voice is 
tantamount to receiving a message from God, one that, if it involves commands, must be 
followed.  In the language of theory, at least from the point of view of social 
constructionists, you write as a matter of course: you consume language so you must 
produce language, the latter bearing the mark of the former.  Although the two seem to 
occupy two distinct poles of thought—the ideal and the material—they share a space in 
Koning's description, suggesting that they share a relationship to one another.   
 Roxana Robinson's essay, "If You Invent the Story, You're the First to See How 
It Ends," is another example of a writer who draws from both an instrumental view of 
inspiration and a view of inspiration that relies on religious metaphor.  In addition to 
voices and visions as in Fleming's and Koning's essay, Robinson views writing as a 
purging or freeing of impurities or irritants, a process of sanctification, to use the 
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religious term.  According to the doctrine of sanctification in Judeo-Christian theology, a 
believer undergoes a continuous process of becoming more like Christ throughout life.   
In one passage, her metaphors get even more complicated:  the irritant or "sin" is 
represented as a virus causing physiological symptoms, the diseased body in need of 
cleansing in order to be balanced, healthy—spiritually and physically: 
  I write about the things that trouble me.  I write about the things that 
  disturb me, the things that won't let me alone, the things that are eating 
  slowly into my brain at three in the morning, the things that unbalance my 
  world.  Sometimes these are things I've said or done; sometimes they're 
  things I've heard about or seen.  Sometimes they're only a sentence, 
  sometimes scenes, sometimes complete narratives, I carry these things 
  around inside my head until I’m compelled to write them down to get rid 
  of them.  I sit down and begin." (193)  
Her account shares with Fleming and Koning the idea that writing depends on hearing 
and seeing (she hears sentences and sees scenes), an idea that is related to religious 
revelations.  She also contends that those sentences and scenes inhabit her; her writing 
arises from "the things that are eating slowly into my brain"—a compulsion that is 
strangely biological and inexplicable, unseen.  Like mad cow disease, writing (and the 
subject of writing) is represented as a kind of virus infecting the writer, making her 
unbalanced.  In other words, for Fleming and Koning, the seat of inspiration lies in the 
eyes and the ears.  While Robinson does use those familiar concepts of inspiration, she 
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more specifically identifies the seat of inspiration as organically systemic.  Something 
inhabits her body, and it is described in physiological terms.   
 This is a new understanding of the physicality of religious experience and the 
experience of writing when compared to Fleming and Koning, most notably because the 
source of inspiration is negative.  She doesn't describe the experience as pleasurable.  
Instead, it is akin to the effect of sin on the spiritual body, causing the need to purge or 
cleanse herself of the irritant.  Because words are involved, another way to think about 
the writing process is the religious understanding of confession—bringing the spiritual 
body back into a state of balance by iterating the sin.   
 What links her concept of inspiration as physiological irritant or virus to 
Fleming's and Koning's concept of visions and voices, however, is similar because the 
classification of the irritant or sin as a virus diminishes the agency of the writer.  Unlike 
sin, which is the result of choice, she contracts an illness whose transmission is beyond 
her control.  The element of writerly control enters the metaphoric equation only when 
she finally must "free herself" of the virus by writing, a process she likens to forgiveness 
(193).  "Then," she says, "the anxieties subside and let me sleep" (193).  This relief is 
only accomplished when the "troubling moment, the unforgivable statement, the 
irreversible act" is written in such a way that makes it possible to imagine characters 
"whose behavior I can forgive" (193). 
 The instrumental side of Robinson's account of writing concerns her primary 
subject in her creative writing, the family, "a rich literary source."  Her central metaphor 
for the family as it is related to inspiration is a river: 
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  You can't escape: those early feelings run at full spate for your entire 
  lifetime, even if you can't bear to think of them.  Even if you refuse to 
  acknowledge them, they are still there, pulsing and coursing below the 
  surface, in silence and darkness, like an underground river.  They govern 
  our surface lives more than we think, and at any moment they may rise up 
  from the darkness into full view, where they will explode into foam and 
  torrents. (194-195)  
Later, she discusses writing as discovering and absorbing the stories.  Inspiration, in the 
case of the river metaphor, is a tool that helps her access the "inexhaustible" source of 
family subject matter, much like the shovel in Annie Proulx's essay.   
 Because of the inescapability of family bonds and the fact that identity formation 
is characterized as subject to the experience of the family relationship, Robinson is 
emphasizing "family" material as common, like topoi in Aritotle's Rhetoric; thus, 
everyone can draw from this source of inspiration.  On one hand, her subjects inhabit her 
like viruses, like sin, and compel her to write them down in order to regain spiritual and 
physiological balance.  One the other hand, her subject of the family is one from which 
everyone could draw as source material for their writing, a commonplace, which grants 
agency to the writer as the discoverer of stories.   Robinson balances these two ideas, 
shifting between them, the source of writing the waters of life below the surface of the 
skin, in need of purification by the hands of the writer, stories that need to written 
"exactly right" (197).   
 145 
 In the two volumes of essays, one essay stands out as relying most exclusively on 
religious metaphors of inspiration, Susan Richards Shreve's "A Storyteller Finds 
Comfort in a Cloak of Anonymity."  The essay begins with an account of trying to 
publish "a book from the point of view of a young black woman who has barricaded 
herself in her college dorm room pursued by a man, either real or imagined, who finally 
materializes as the father she has never known" (225).  Because Shreve assumed the 
voice of a young African-American woman and her publishing house thought publishing 
the book would be risky for a number of other reasons, it was turned down for 
publication.  Shreve chose to take on a pseudonym and was successful publishing the 
novel with another publishing house.  She continued writing under a pseudonym because 
it made writing "[t]he pure, uncomplicated, unself-conscious delight in telling a story" 
that she had experienced as a child: "unnamed, unidentified, unacknowledged" (226).   
She describes writing as recapturing "the sense of freedom" that she'd had writing her 
first book, a "feeling of wonder, abandon, faith and—yes—innocence" (227).  Later in 
the essay, she states, "So much of what we do as writers, no matter how grounded in the 
particular a story might be, is a leap of faith" (227). 
 Taken together, the examples of religious discourse in the essay point to Shreve's 
central metaphor for writing as Christian salvation—the desire "to disappear," to become 
"unself-conscious," a subsequent "leap of faith" and "abandon" that results in "purity" 
and "innocence" (226-227).  Her account of writing adheres so closely to the idea of 
Christian salvation that it almost collapses into an instrumental understanding of 
inspiration: the writer must work to gain salvation.  The writer must "leap" and 
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"abandon," for example.  To write is to undergo a process of sublimating the ego (in this 
case, a selfish desire to receive praise).  At the close of the essay, the collapse of the 
religious into the instrumental is completed by her use of a common instrumental 
metaphor in discussions of writing—physical exercise: 
  I'm not an athlete, but I do understand what it means to push against your 
  own sense of endurance until a rush of energy takes you just beyond what 
  you thought possible.  Writing is like that, especially writing outside the 
  lines.  Not always, not often, but when the rush comes, we are taken to a 
  place at once strange and familiar, a place we didn't know we knew. (229) 
Like a runner's high, the feeling of writing is a "rush" of energy that extends the writer 
"beyond what you thought possible" (229).  Here, writing is something you do over and 
over again, and eventually you will experience the "rush," something everyone can do if 
they just run or write enough (229).  Shreve, in pushing her religious metaphor for 
inspiration to an absolute, ends up transforming it into an instrumental metaphor. 
 For that reason, Shreve's essay most accurately describes the relationship 
between religious concepts of inspiration and instrumental concepts of inspiration.  
Namely, they are not disparate categories; rather, the more exclusively one concept of 
inspiration is used, the other concept is implied.  If the relationship were represented 
graphically, with each concept on either end of a spectrum, then the more you move to 
each pole, the more the concept of inspiration bends back toward the other seemingly 
opposite concept of inspiration.  If you rely almost exclusively on religious metaphors, 
then you have circled back to an instrumental understanding of inspiration.  For 
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example, Fleming's religious visions become the imagination's tools, visual aids, which 
can be directed and (somewhat) controlled by the writer.   On the other hand, a reliance 
on instrumental metaphors makes the process automatic, completely out of the control of 
the writer. 
  
Instrumentalism and Inspiration in Composition Scholarship 
 To illustrate my point, consider Barrett J. Mandel's "The Writer Writing Is Not at 
Home," the article I referred to in the introduction of the chapter as being the more 
mysterious or religious concept of inspiration.  Mandel characterizes inspiration as "an 
insight or illumination or creation" (373).  He goes on to define "insight": 
  But insight: what is it, and where?  An insight is the flash which  
  organizes time and space anew, occurring when least expected.  It is as if 
  consciousness, so occupied with its own dim concerns, never notices that 
  the light surrounding the house is shining steadily and brightly.  One of 
  the astonishing elements of an insight is the speed with which it suddenly 
  appears (it has an 'all-at-onceness' about it) and the way it gradually fades 
  into the fabric of so-called reality as it is woven in by consciousness. 
  (373-374) 
Insight, a synonym for inspiration, is a "flash" that "suddenly appears," much like a 
vision is religious discourse.  Mandel's article suggests that writing is the result of an 
unteachable encounter with magic or the divine.  However, the article is concerned with 
the role of writing teachers as facilitators of insights: 
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  It does not work to teach coherence, unity, and emphasis, since these 
  follow insight.  They do not precede it.  What works is to stimulate 
  insights by creating contexts in which they are likely to occur. (375) 
Some of those "contexts," he goes on that say, include the practices of free writing, rote 
writing ("the copying of well-written prose passages, selected by the student on the basis 
of taste and appreciation, and written into a copy book"), modeling, and parodying 
(376).  The goal of these activities is "to create a climate in which nonconscious 
illumination can occur" (376).  The metaphor shifts here.  The "flash" here is more like a 
seed that requires the right kind of environment in which to grow, a "climate" in 
Mandel's terms.  Inspiration can be invited, in other words.  There is an element of the 
instrumental in Mandel's otherwise mysterious concept of inspiration. 
 To further illustrate my point that concepts of inspiration (both religious and 
instrumental) co-exist in discourse about writing, consider James A. Berlin's description 
of epistemic rhetoric in Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 
1900-1985 (what he later called social-epistemic rhetoric).  Epistemic rhetoric, 
according to Berlin, contends, "is the antithesis of the positivistic contention that reality 
is empirical, with language simply reporting what is determined outside its domain" 
(165).  In other words, knowledge is entirely in the realm of the symbolic: 
  The epistemic position implies that knowledge is not discovered by 
  reason  alone, that cognitive and affective processes are not separate, that 
  intersubjectivity is a condition of all knowledge, and that the contact of 
  minds affects knowledge. (165)  
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The "contact of minds" is later described as a kind of system, a dialectic: "the dialectic of 
language between the writer and the material world" "accompanied by a dialectic 
between the writer and the discourse community in which the writer is taking part" 
(172).  The interplay of world, writer, and discourse community mediated by language is 
the basis of the epistemic system.  
 According to Berlin, epistemic rhetoric contends that truth, in its religious sense 
as a knowledge that exists independently from human understanding, does not exist.  
Instead, truth is a linguistic construct.  Epistemic rhetoric, in this regard, more than any 
other perspective in composition studies, is further away from religious concepts of 
inspiration.  However, just as the previous passage demonstrates, the discourse of 
epistemic rhetoric, especially in its discussion of dialectic, devolves into the discourse of 
religious inspiration.  For example, it emphasizes that knowledge isn't based on "reason 
alone" and involves the "contact of minds" (165).  Aside from a religious understanding 
of a spiritual communion with others, it is difficult to understand what is meant by a 
"contact of minds" that isn't based on "reason alone." Quoting from Richard Ohmann's 
"In Lieu of a New Rhetoric," Berlin continues his discussion of the epistemic dialectic: 
  The second characteristic of modern rhetoric is that it regards the  
  discipline as "the pursuit –and not simply the transmission—of truth and 
  right."  Truth becomes "not a lump of matter decorated and disguised, but 
  finally delivered intact; rather it is a web of shifting complexities whose 
  pattern emerges only in the process of writing, and is in fact modified by 
  the writing (form is content)."  A corollary of this stance is that the  
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  "writer does not begin in secure command of his message, and try to deck 
  it out as beguilingly as possible; he sets his own ideas and feelings in 
  order only as he writes.'" (169) 
In this passage, writing is mysterious, and can be compared to the representations of 
writing by writers who use quest metaphors.  The emphasis on pursuit, for example, is 
one way that epistemic rhetoric is similar to the quest metaphors.  Also, in this passage, 
the description of knowledge as the "pattern" that "emerges" calls to mind the metaphor 
of vision in the more religious articulations of inspiration.  Finally, the description of the 
writer as "not in secure command of his message" similarly invokes the religious 
discourse of inspiration.   
 Within his discussion of epistemic rhetoric, Berlin also quotes a passage from 
Kenneth Pike's, Alton Becker's, and Richard Young's Rhetoric: Discovery and Change 
to further define the dialectical interchange that is the heart of epistemic rhetoric: 
  Constantly changing, bafflingly complex, the external world is not a neat, 
  well-ordered place replete with meaning, but an enigma requiring  
  interpretation.  This interpretation is the result of a transaction between 
  events in the external world and the mind of the individual—between the 
  world "out there" and the individual's previous experience, knowledge, 
  values, attitudes, and desires.  Thus the mirrored world is not just the sum 
  total of eardrum rattles, retinal excitations, and so on; it is a creation that 
  reflects the peculiarities of the perceiver as well as the peculiarities of 
  what is perceived. (25 as qtd in Berlin 172)  
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In this passage, the language of mystery is evident.  The world is an "enigma" in need of 
interpretation, for example.  Interpretation is called a "transaction" but one whose "sum" 
is more than its parts.  In fact, the definition of interpretation whose "sum" is more than 
its parts approaches a transcendental meaning of the writing process: "it is a creation" 
(25 as qtd in Berlin 172). 
 Given the analysis of the essays from the New York Times Writers on Writing 
collection and the metaphor the writers used, we can draw certain conclusions about the 
common characteristics of both the instrumental concepts of inspiration and the religious 
concepts of inspiration.  At each end of the spectrum, where instrumental metaphors are 
pushed to their absolute end and religious metaphors are pushed to an absolute end, 
common characteristics about the writing process emerge: 
  
 1.  A diminished sense of the writer's control over the writing process—In 
 instrumental metaphors the process of writing becomes automatic whereas 
 religious metaphors become to depend upon the efforts of the writer.  For each, 
 the shifting degrees of authorial agency indicates a diminishment of the role of 
 agency in the initial phases of the writing process.  
  
 2.  Indifference to the desires of readers in the initial phases of 
 composition— None of the writers analyzed reported that inspiration had 
 anything to do with audience awareness.  When readers and the desires of readers 
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 were addressed, it was to express a wish that readers would like the material OR 
 to insist that a  concern for readers would dilute the power of the work. 
  
 3.  A respect for the material and subsequent finished work as given to the 
 writer—As the essays showed, even writers who utilize instrumental metaphors 
 acknowledge that they felt a sense that their writing was the result of something 
 more than their just their efforts, especially those who understand ideas as things 
 that have been found as in the quest metaphors. 
 
 4.  A general view that the process of composition cannot be explained 
 completely and thus requires the use of both instrumental and religious 
 metaphors to describe it—This characteristic perhaps best conveys the value of 
 the continuum between instrumental and religious concepts of inspiration 
 because the writers whose discourse collapses into alternate understandings of 
 inspiration reveals how we might be mistaken as teachers and scholars when we 
 insist on one version of inspiration or deny the presence of inspiration altogether.  
 From the essays, we see that those who draw on instrumental metaphors also 
 draw on religious metaphors, and the two begin to bleed into one another.  They 
 are aware of an audience that realizes the nature of writing isn't as clear cut as 
 just a imagining it as the use of a drill or the appearance of a vision.  
 Acknowledging the mysterious elements in writing only serves to encourage 
 writers (students) who can't explain it either. 
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 Another way to think about the relationship between the differing views of 
inspiration is to consider the nature of metaphor itself as relying on notions of both 
instrumentalism and the religious: something understood in terms of something else.  An 
effective metaphor is a matter of belief, a leap of faith to connect one thing to the other.  
In other words, to explain the imagination is like a drill that needs to be recharged after it 
is used, the audience needs to believe certain things: the imagination requires energy that 
lies outside the body, the energy can be replenished, and a person can direct the energy 
(in this case, a drill) to help accomplish a task.  For the metaphor to be effective, in other 
words, a transcendent moment must occur—the imagination is a drill so the imagination 
takes on the attributes of the drill.  The value of the continuum in this sense is an 
understanding of language and the rhetoricity of metaphor. 
 Another value of the continuum is the way it reveals the function of quest and 
hunt metaphors and their potential effectiveness for student writers because of their 
overlapping understandings of multiple concepts of inspiration.  Writing, within the 
quest metaphor family, is purposeful, meaningful.  Although they still retain some 
elements of the mysterious, quest metaphors suggest that writers are able to employ 
strategies to get to the object of the quest.  This perspective also grants the writer the 
most agency over the control of the writing process compared to perspectives that stress 
either instrumental or religious concepts of inspiration.  For instance, in a quest, the 
writer takes on the role of the "hero."  Also, quest metaphors, while mixing the 
instrumental and religious, they do not collapse into an understanding of writing that is 
automatic.  
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 After analyzing the way the different concepts of inspiration used by practicing 
creative writers, the objections to it seem to be based on a very superficial understanding 
of the way the term is used by writers.  While some writers discussed flashes of 
illumination or dreams, those who did so represented the experience as one that occurred 
within the process of writing rather than the "moment" of composition that Brodkey 
argued was part of a Modernist conception of the writer in "Modernism and the Scene of 
Writing."  Also, the writers' concept of inspiration often involved ideas of borrowing and 
social engagement instead of originality and authenticity, a position argued by Lester 
Faigley in "Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and a Proposal."  Another 
common objection to the use of the term inspiration, that inspiration encourages students 
to view writing as an emotional endeavor, also can be considered as an objection based 
on either a superficial understanding of the way practicing writers understand 
inspiration.  
 Rather than sounding "hokey," the continuing use of the term inspiration and the 
religious discourse that it draws from reveals a profound awareness of the limitations of 
relying on a purely instrumental approach to writing.  Brent Royster, in "Inspiration, 
Creativity, and Crisis," like many scholars, argues that "[c]laims of inspiration discount 
the vast milieu of cultural influences that defines creative work" (30).  However, the 
essays that discuss inspiration within the writing process acknowledge cultural 
influences.  In many ways, the writers' accounts of their experiences writing, because 
they do not estrange the instrumental and the religious, seem to be more real than other 
models of the writing process.  With this in mind, it is arguable that composition 
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scholarship would benefit from a re-evaluation of inspiration as an element in the writing 
process that isn't estranged from instrumental metaphors for writing.  Also, as the essays 
on writing demonstrate, a writer's metaphors for writing and inspiration help to define 
the writer's own sense of purpose and value, two things that students in composition 
classes mostly lack when it comes to their views on themselves as writers and about the 
writing they produce.  If writing scholarship began to recognize that reflective writing on 
the writing process invests writers with purpose and value, scholarship might also begin 
to consider students' metaphors for writing as a basis on which to build sound theories of 
writing and to consider the analysis of student metaphors for writing as an activity that is 
worthy of addressing in a classroom setting.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: 
CREATIVITY AND THE COMPOSITION CLASSROOM 
 
Writing is busy idleness.—Goethe (11 Winokur)  
 
 The topic for this dissertation arose partly out of what I view as disparities 
between my practices as a creative writer and the scholarship on writing process that I 
(tried to) use as a basis for my pedagogical practices in the composition classroom.  Like 
David W. Smit, author of The End of Composition Studies, I noticed that  
  much of the discussion and application of the "process approach" seems 
  to imply a fairly straightforward linear model of composition—invention, 
  planning, drafting, revising, editing—and we can all cite exceptions to 
  this model in our own experience and in the published accounts of  
  professional writers. (63) 
For the first several years I taught composition, I blamed my lack of knowledge for the 
disparities.  I thought my own practices must be substandard or unprofessional compared 
to what was described as The Writing Process.  At the time, I was unpublished (aside 
from a student-run literary magazine at a community college), and I was a new graduate 
student enamored of theory, scholarship, and the institutional credentials of composition 
scholars in the field.  I reasoned with myself that the experts knew what they were 
talking about, and I should try to get on board with their theories and pedagogical 
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practices.  As a graduate student, I read and learned much about composition. I gained 
valuable knowledge and valuable insights about the composing process and the ways 
composition has been taught since it was institutionalized more than a century ago.  The 
unease I felt subsided. 
 That is, until a funny exchange I had with a fellow graduate student. We were 
finishing up our last seminar papers to complete our coursework and finally starting to 
work on our dissertations.  We were lamenting the repetition of specific words in our 
own papers and in the articles and books we were reading to prepare our papers: reveal, 
subvert, agency, ostensibly, etc.  We called these words "sounds from the academic 
swamp."  We pictured a swamp with frogs on lily pads, each with their own academic 
word to rib-bit over and over again.  I relate this story because it is one that many of us 
share: the moment, a tipping point of sorts, when we realize that we're smart enough to 
recognize disparities, problems, gaps in scholarship—the moment we finally feel 
confident enough about our knowledge of the field to say, hey, this isn't right.  I started 
to think about those disparities again. 
 While writing the chapters of this dissertation, I began to think about the ways 
the rhetorical situation of the composition classroom, specifically the constraints of the 
composition classroom, impede creativity.  Composition is a required or core curriculum 
class consisting of an instructor (sometimes a graduate student, sometimes an adjunct 
instructor, rarely a seasoned professor or full-time faculty member, at least not in large 
or high-prestige research universities) and students numbering 15-30, who are usually in 
one of their first few semesters as college students and usually are taking full loads at the 
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institution (at least 12 hours, although 15 is becoming a new norm for institutions 
offering a flat rate tuition).  Many of those students participate in extracurricular 
activities or hold down jobs to supplement their incomes.   
 Over the course of the 14-16 week semester, students compose 3-5 essays, all of 
which have specific assignment requirements, including due dates.  Sometimes the 
topics for the essays are given.  Sometimes a specific mode is required (narration, 
example, definition, process, etc).  Even though modes have fallen out of favor in 
composition scholarship, they are still assigned in many programs, especially the high 
number of programs not directed or staffed by composition specialists.  Composition 
classes are usually smaller than their core curriculum lecture-based counterparts (history, 
etc.), and for this reason the classrooms are usually smaller, consisting of individual 
desks or tables, perhaps computers if they are taught in a computer classroom.  Even on 
workshop days, however, anyone passing by the classroom could look in and recognize 
the power structure at play by the design of the classroom: rows of desks facing toward 
the front, a lectern and chalkboard at the front of the room, perhaps "no food or drink" 
signs hung neatly on monochromatic walls.  In some classrooms, like the ones I taught 
my first composition class in, the desks are bolted to the floor.  From the hallway, you 
could see the doorways of dozens of identical classrooms stretched out in hive-like 
fashion around the corner of a building named (appropriately) Blocker Building.   
 All of these elements contribute to the overall rhetorical situation of the 
composition classroom.  The exigencies are multi-dimensional: the exigence created by 
the course's required status, the exigence created by each writing assignment (a 
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fabricated exigence that students often comment on when I explain the concept: for 
example, when I ask what about this issue requires your address of it now, a student 
responded—because I have a paper to write).  The persons involved, an instructor and 
students, including their roles and differences in power, are part of the rhetorical 
situation.  After all, instructors issue grades to students, a fact that we as instructors 
sometimes forget while students never seem to forget it.  The location, the classroom, as 
well as where the students write while they are away from the classroom, are also part of 
the rhetorically situated classroom, as the work of Nedra Reynolds has shown. 
 The constraints of the conventional composition classroom work in collusion to 
hinder student writers' creativity.  This dissertation has identified active and passive 
writing practices by many professional creative writers.  Among the many practices 
identified, three of them are repeated by multiple writers: the practice of idleness, the 
practice of diligent indolence, and the practice of physical activity or exercise as part of 
their daily writing process (specifically rhythmic activities, such was walking).  The way 
composition courses are designed and executed as part of an institutional program make 
the possibility of implementing these practices (or even encouraging our students to 
practice them) highly unlikely and impractical.  As Donald Murray has noted: "often 
these conditions and the assignments [of writing classes] are inappropriate if you know 
what writers do and how they do it" (xiv). In this concluding chapter of the dissertation, I 
discuss the practice of idleness, the practice of diligent indolence, and the practice of 
physical activity and show how, in the case of these limited but important aspects of 
creativity, the composition classroom undermines creativity. 
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 What do I mean by creativity?  The term is highly contested, as Wendy Bishop 
points out in Keywords in Creative Writing—so contested, in fact, that I have avoided 
the term until now.  Creativity is usually defined along two lines: originality and 
functionality.  Since every writing task or problem has its own set of constraints, every 
act of composition constitutes an original solution to a specific problem.  Functionality is 
the aspect of creativity that is impeded by the rhetorical situation of the composition 
classroom.  In terms of functionality, creativity means the creative pose, an attitude that 
fosters the act of composing.  It includes a sense of ownership over what the writer is 
producing, a heightened level of engagement or motivation, and also the ability to 
complete a writing assignment to the writers' own satisfaction.  In this way, creative isn't 
an antipode of analytical.  The critical thinking skills that students develop over the 
course of their education are creative skills: the creative person is someone who applies 
"a logic, method, or set of techniques to a given domain of expertise" (Simonton qtd. in 
Bishop 71).  In a more reflective sense, creativity also implies a relationship to the self: 
"personal creativity is a continuous process of bringing forth a changing vision of 
oneself, and of oneself in relation to the world" (Miller qtd. in Bishop 75).  
 Studies on creativity have identified five steps in the creative process: 1) a period 
of preparation, during which a person is "becoming immersed, consciously or not, in a 
set of problematic issues that are interesting and arouse curiosity"; 2) a period of 
incubation, "during which ideas churn around below the threshold of consciousness" and 
"unusual connections are likely to be make"; 3) a moment of insight or "Aha!" moment 
(like the instant Archimedes stepped into the bath and realized the answer to his 
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problem); 4) a period of evaluation, during which a person evaluates the importance of 
the problem; and finally, 5) elaboration, which in the case of writing means the 
execution, the act of writing (Csikszentmihalyi 79).  Even though this model has 
problems similar to the problems of the writing process as they have been described by 
composition scholars (mainly due to the prescriptive nature and linearity of the steps), 
the steps in the creative process provides a useful starting point to discuss the problems 
with creativity in the composition classroom. 
 
The Practice of Idleness 
 The watershed moment for Virginia Woolf in A Room of One's Own occurred 
while she was doodling in the British Museum after having given up on discovering a 
writing topic: 
  But while I pondered I had unconsciously, in my listlessness, in my 
  desperation, been drawing a picture where I should, like my neighbour, 
  have been writing a conclusion. I had been drawing a face, a figure. It 
  was the face and the figure of Professor von X engaged in writing his 
  monumental work entitled THE MENTAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL 
  INFERIORITY OF THE FEMALE SEX. (31) 
She goes on to say: "Drawing pictures was an idle way of finishing an unprofitable 
morning's work. Yet it is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the submerged truth 
sometimes comes to the top." (31).  Idleness, for Woolf, is the opposite of work; it is 
time spent aimlessly.   
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 Woolf's realization that idleness yielded ideas lays bare a contradiction: one 
invents when thinking and doing something other than trying to invent.  A writing task is 
at hand, but it is laid aside mentally.  In those idle moments when one isn't thinking 
about the writing problem (like taking a shower), the solution occurs.  Of idleness and 
invention, Annie Dillard says, "I walked to the water.  I played the hateful recorder, 
washed dishes, drank coffee, stood on a beach log, watched bird," until she could begin 
writing.  The process "could take all morning, or all month" (50).   Like Whitmanian 
loafing, beginning to write sometimes means the writer must stop thinking about what 
needs to be done. 
 The necessity of idleness described by writers such as Woolf and Dillard 
corresponds to the period of incubation prescribed in the creativity models. It is the most 
mysterious part of the creative process, and partly for the mysterious nature of it, is 
considered the most creative of the steps. Csikszentmihalyi refers to the incubation step 
as a "dark" space because a person usually "does not remember any intermediate 
conscious mental steps" before arriving at a solution or idea (98).  He quotes physicist 
Freeman Dyson on the relationship between incubation and idleness: 
  I am fooling around not doing anything, which probably means that this is 
  a creative period, although of course you don't know until afterward.  I 
  think that it is very important to be idle.  I mean, they always say that 
  Shakespeare was idle between plays.  I am not comparing myself to 
  Shakespeare, but people who keep themselves busy all of the time are 
  generally not creative.  So I am not ashamed of being idle. (98-99) 
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Two things are important in this passage.  First, busyness is opposed to idleness.  
Second, the author (a physicist) reveals a bias against idleness through his hedging in the 
last sentence.  The last sentence reflects the cultural bias against idleness.  He is saying, 
look, I know idleness is a pejorative concept, but I can justify idleness if it is in the 
service of creativity.  In other words, the author believes idleness deserves legitimacy.  
 Here it is important to note that the demands of the composition classroom mirror 
the demands and values not only of the university but also of the demands and values of 
our culture (like the ones expressed by Dyson): efficiency, productivity, and 
competitiveness.  Scott McCracken in "Idleness for All," notes that "[a]cademic life is 
part of a larger culture of work that values visible products and perpetual motion" (65).  
The student is always doing in the composition class—attending lectures, studying for 
tests, writing drafts for papers, workshopping drafts of his or her peers, researching 
topics, preparing works cited pages, and "reflecting" (another activity that is required by 
most composition teachers, although rarely with the results that true reflection offers).  
As a teacher, I feel obligated to cram-pack my syllabus with work because I believe we 
(the class) have a lot of ground to cover over the course of one semester.  I don't want to 
waste any time.  I want to see results.  I want to see drafts, revised drafts, and 
responsiveness to my comments on students' previous drafts and essays.  It is worth 
noting that Lakoff and Johnson identified the TIME IS MONEY metaphor as a root 
conceptual metaphor, a metaphor that even I draw on when thinking about things such as 
course design (wasting time or spending time, for example).  
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 A well-intentioned teacher such as myself, however, manages to efface the 
creativity necessary for students of composition when busyness takes over the class.  
Take, for example, "prewriting activities"—invention strategies or heuristics designed, 
like brainstorming or thought-mapping, to elicit student responses.  Prewriting, which 
encompasses four of the five steps in the creative process according to creativity studies, 
is a stage in the writing process similar to every stages of the writing process—now do x 
and you will get to step y.  Another strategy I use when students appear in my office in 
need of a topic is to look of the UPENN calls for papers.  The message I'm inadvertently 
sending students is that invention can be faked.  If you can't find a topic, then look for 
someone or something to give it to you.  I have never recommended idleness. 
 Although process pedagogy insists that the writing process is recursive, it does 
not acknowledge that sometimes a writer must be passive.  The writer, sometimes, 
should be idle, according to what other writers have to say. However, to suggest idleness 
to students would reveal the profound artificiality of the composition class: the fake 
exigencies, the due dates that reflect a university semester calendar (having a few essays 
graded before the drop date so students can decide whether to stay in the class or 
withdraw, for example), and the idea that if students attend to the procedures outlined in 
the writing process then a product is guaranteed (the final draft of an essay).  The draft is 
due Friday, so hurry up! 
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The Practice of Diligent Indolence 
 In Richard Ford's essay for the New York Times Writers on Writing Series, 
"Goofing Off While the Muse Recharges," he describes his strategy for getting started on 
a writing project: 
  I simply choose to do it [writing], often when I can't be persuaded to do 
  anything else; or when a dank feeling of uselessness comes over me, and 
  I'm at a loss and have time on my hands, such as when the World Series 
  is over.  I would argue that only in this state of galvanic repose am I 
  prepared to address the big subjects great literature requires: the affinities 
  between bliss and bales, etc. (67, emphasis mine) 
The phrase "galvanic repose" is the key to understanding this passage.  Galvanic is 
associated with surprise and illumination.  Repose, on the other hand, is a state of peace.  
Together, the phrase reflects an attitude of expectant idleness very similar to what John 
Keats described as diligent indolence: "How happy is such a voyage of concentration, 
what delicious diligent Indolence!" (1).  According to Luisa Camaiora, Keats's concept 
of diligent indolence constituted the creative process.  The "indolent mood" wasn't an 
"absence of reactions," but one in which "the essential factor is a capacity for reception, 
a receptivity as minute as it is far reaching" (183). 
 Walter Benjamin also reflects on the contradiction that idleness imposes on the 
creative process in The Arcades Project.  His concept of idleness accounts for the 
resulting productivity associated with idle moments.  In one version of his account of 
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idleness and productivity, he describes the hunt as an appropriate metaphor, a metaphor 
used by many of the writers I discussed in this dissertation.  He says: 
  The hunter must know about the hoof of the animal whose trail he is on; 
  he must know the hour when that animal goes to drink; he must know the 
  course of the river to which it turns, and the location of the ford by which 
  he himself can get across. (qtd in McCracken 72-73) 
In other words, the hunter must be attentive and concentrate; ultimately, however, the 
hunter must wait: "They are a product of chance, and have about them the essential 
interminability that distinguishes the preferred obligations of the idler" (qtd in 
McCracken 73).  Appropriately, as McCracken notes, Benjamin "connects the primitive 
hunter with the modern student" (73).   
 The hunter-as-writer is a motif that appears in the descriptions of writing in 
chapter IV of this dissertation. Allegra Goodman in "Calming the Inner Critic and 
Getting to Work," is one of the writers who uses the metaphor of the hunt in the context 
of diligent indolence:    
  The only answer is to think and think some more, and then go out and 
  read and look and listen some more.  Do not sit and mope.  Do not sigh.  
  Do not throw up your hands and give up on the whole project.  Do not go 
  back to the drawing board.  There is nothing more depressing than an 
  empty drawing board.  No, go back to the world which is where all 
  characters originally come from. (71) 
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In a more direct passage, she tells writers to go to the source, where characters 
congregate, like telling a hunter to go to the watering hole: 
  Go back to your library, your forest, your newspapers, your family, your 
  day job, your photos, your music, your maps and jottings of old dreams.  
  All these are teeming with life, and life is the stuff of fiction.  There are 
  no guarantees, but if you go out where stories congregate, it's far more 
  likely that characters will come. (74) 
Key in this passage is the emphasis on the passiveness of the writer's task:  it is likely but 
not guaranteed that one will find the characters. 
 Beth Kephart's "As Her Son Creates his Story, a Mother Waits for the Ending," 
suggests a similar understanding of writing.  In the essay, she teaches her son to write 
fiction, and the operating metaphor is her son as a hunter: 
  My son is on the hunt for a surprise ending.  He trails up and down the 
  hallway, sighs, goes outside, paces the yard.  It is late autumn, the leaves 
  have lately rained down from the trees, and as I watch him through the 
  window, I feel the melancholy of the season, the melancholy of a twelve-
  year-old boy whose own story cruelly eludes him. (133) 
Kephart's son is, in effect, performing the practices Goodman admonishes writers to 
perform when they experience writers' block.  Yet, the story remains elusive, and 
Kephart's son, like many of our students, is frustrated and depressed about his failure to 
execute his writing project to his own satisfaction.  Before concluding, Kephart reminds 
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herself and her readers of the other times, when waiting has proven effective, that 
sometimes writing is hard, "when the air carries a scent" and "the story blows in" (136). 
 Though none of the writers I analyzed called this part of creative process 
meditation, diligent indolence shares with meditation some key attributes.  To meditate 
requires time and a relaxing environment.  It requires deep breathing and relaxing one's 
muscles.  Finally, one must be able to simultaneously focus his or her attention while 
focusing on nothing, a characteristic of meditation that is most like diligent indolence.  
Keats's "Ode to Indolence" reflects this meditative state:  
  Ripe was the drowsy hour; 
  The blissful cloud of summer-indolence 
  Benumb'd my eyes, my pulse grew less and less, 
  Pain had no sting, and pleasure's wreath no flower. 
  O, why did ye not melt, and leave my sense 
  Unhaunted quite of all—but nothingness.   
In other words, the meditative state is one in which a person is relaxed but attentive. 
 The idea of diligent indolence, like Camaiora noted, carries with it the idea of 
receptivity, of being ready for something to be given.  Lewis Hyde, author of The Gift: 
Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property, expresses a similar idea when he states in 
the introduction that a creative work is "a gift, not a commodity" (xi).  Because a gift is 
given and not earned, an artist "is happy to labor all day with no hope of production, 
nothing to sell, nothing to show off, just fish thrown back into the sea as soon as they are 
caught" (148).  The gift of the work of art, however, is "lost in self-consciousness": 
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  To count, measure, reckon value, or seek the cause of a think, is to step 
  outside the circles, to cease being "all of a piece" with the flow of gifts 
  and become, instead one part of the whole reflecting upon another part.  
  We participate in the esemplastic power of a gift by way of a particular 
  kind of unconsciousness, then: unanalytic, undialectical consciousness. 
  (152) 
Although his book doesn't discuss the how of artistic creation, it is clear for Hyde that 
the creative process requires the kind of "letting go" that is produced by conscious 
unconsciousness, by diligent indolence.  A commodity is produced by labor, but a gift is 
received with grace. 
 In the composition classroom, there is no time for thoughtful waiting or hunting 
for ideas or the receiving of gifts.  In addition to the due dates for essays, there are often 
intermediate due dates: a day when you must settle on a topic (my students write topic 
approval memos), a date when an annotated bibliography is due, as well as the date 
when drafts are due for peer review.  All of this is to say: we are driven by the clock in 
composition classes.  As much as we preach process, we are all product-model babies, 
encouraging our students not to wait but to just do it in the most commodity-driven, -
coporate-industrial kind of way. 
 Also, composition scholarship is haunted by the ghost of expressivism.   James 
Moffat, in "Writing, Inner Speech, and Meditation," and Donald R. Gallehr in "Wait and 
the Writing Will Come: Meditation and the Composing Process," make the connection 
between writing and meditative practices.  In "What is the Sound of No Hand Writing," 
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Gallehr describes the use of secularized Zen koans in his writing classes.  Instead of 
going in depth into meditative practice with students, Gallehr focuses on the "mind 
clearing, concentration, and holistic or intuitive thinking exercises" that he believes "to 
be essential habits of mind in any field, including, for example, baseball" (101). 
As a graduate student, I imagined the expressivist classroom as one with candles and 
incense, students holding hands and meditating together, a hangover from the sixties led 
by nostalgic instructors lately incorporated into the academic establishment.  Frankly, it 
seemed creepy, laced with a false spiritualism that didn't seem relevant to composition 
scholarship.  Expressivism, for reasons related to these (and others which I detailed in 
chapter II), has been criticized harshly since the early 1990's and even before.  However, 
in light of the descriptions of writing by professional creative writers, it seems that at 
least some of the insights provided by the expressivist orientation, especially those that 
cultivate focused attention, clarity, and a mental if not spiritual practice, need revisiting, 
such as the dada moment in composition discussed in Geoffrey Sirc's English 
Composition as a Happening. 
  
Idling Bodies 
 The practice of meditation as it is related to the practice of diligent indolence also 
adds to an understanding of the creative process that is discussed by many writers in this 
dissertation, the relationship of the body to invention. It seems improbable that a work 
like A Room of One's Own, so interested in personal spaces, spends so much time 
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devoted to the theme of idly rambling the concourses of Oxbridge and London, but A 
Room of One's Own does just that. 
 The importance of Woolf's ramblings involve more than just the mere act of 
walking, however.  Her encounters on the roads of Oxbridge and London are part of her 
exercise of experiencing reality, and ultimately experiencing harmony with nature. 
Recalling Emerson's mention of a warm October in the opening of the essay "Nature," 
Woolf recounts a harmonious encounter with nature by walking: 
  The spirit of peace descended like a cloud from heaven, for if the spirit of 
  peace dwells anywhere, it is in the courts and quadrangles of Oxbridge on 
  a fine October morning.  Strolling through those colleges past those 
  ancient halls the roughness of the present seemed smoothed away; the 
  body seemed contained in a miraculous glass cabinet through which no 
  sound could penetrate, and the mind, freed from any contact with facts 
  (unless one trespassed on the turf again), was at liberty to settle down 
  upon whatever meditation was in harmony with the moment. (6) 
Woolf further clarifies her attitude toward walking, thinking, and nature and their 
relationship to writing in her definition of “reality,” a keyword that she uses to describe a 
transformative experience in nature:  
What is meant by “reality”?  It would seem to be some thing very erratic, 
very undependable—now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of 
newspaper in the street, now in a daffodil in the sun.  It lights up a group 
in a room and stamps some casual saying.  It overwhelms one walking 
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beneath the stars and makes the silent world more real than the world of 
speech—and then there it is again in an omnibus in the uproar of 
Piccadilly.  Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in shapes too far away for 
us to discern what their nature is.  But whatever it touches, it fixes and 
makes permanent.  That is what remains when the skin of the day has 
been cast into the hedge; that is what is left of past time and of our loves 
and hates.  Now the writer, as I think, has the chance to live more than 
other people in the presence of this reality. (114) 
Rather than staying in one's own room, Woolf is admonishing writers to go out into the 
world (in this example, on foot) and experience the sounds, sites, and smells that the 
road has to offer.  For Woolf, the idle ramble through nature is beneficial to the writer 
because of what it has to offer.  
 The writers I analyzed in this dissertation also referred to the importance of the 
energy of the body, its rhythms specifically, when they discussed their own composing 
processes.  For Annie Dillard, the body's energies must be fired in order to write, much 
like an engine or a rocket.  The acceleration or momentum to which she is referring is 
also illustrated in a story she relates about the writer Charlie Butts, who fakes 
momentum by creating errands for himself, all in an effort to gain a sense of impetus in 
which the rush of the body overrides his own self-consciousness about what he's writing 
(2).  Upon returning to his house after errands, he "hurries in the door, and without 
taking off his coat, sits at a typewriter" and writes until "he notices he is writing and 
seizes up" (15-16). 
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Dillard's account emphasizes the physicality of the practice of writing, one not unlike the 
body performing exercises that require a warm-up period or a car that needs to idle 
before cruising the highway. 
 Donald Hall, rather than discussing the methods he uses to gears up for writing, 
describes the bodily effects of being fully absorbed in the writing process, what he calls 
absorbedness, the state Charlie Butts tries to maintain in order to write.  One description 
of the experience of absorbedness appears in a later chapter of Life Work in which Hall 
describes scythe mowing, an activity during which “one surrenders oneself to the 
guidance of object and task, where worker and work are one” (86).  Scythe mowing 
is a rhythmic motion like dancing or lovemaking.  It is a studious 
sweeping crescent in which the trick is to keep the heel (where blade joins 
snath) close to the ground.  I no longer mow with a scythe—a certain 
recipe for lower-back muscle spasms—but remember it the way the body 
remembers weights and leanings: riding a bicycle, skiing, casting flies.  
Finding a meter, one abandons oneself to the swing of it…There is 
something ecstatic about mowing a scythe. (86) 
It is muscle memory that actuates the loss of identity or presence in a place and the loss 
of time, like a musician playing a memorized piece of music or a pitcher sending the ball 
to home plate. Writing, which the mention of lovemaking makes clear, is erotic.  It is an 
embodied practice.  Like Peter Elbow, who Roskelly and Ronald note as making this 
connection between body-ness and writing through his metaphors, concentrates his 
metaphors "on the mouth, the skin, and the eyes, all sites of emotional, erotic, and 
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physical satisfaction and tension" (215).  It is the connection to the mouth that Hall 
believes is the most overtly physical aspect of writing: "When you write a poem, you're 
not hammering out the sounds with a chisel or spreading them with a brush, but you've 
got to feel them in your mouth.  The act of writing a poem is a bodily act as well as a 
mental and imaginative act" (Paris Review 18). 
 In "Body Studies in Rhetoric and Composition," Sharon Crowley reasons that the 
body has remained unmentioned in rhetoric and composition "because both fields still 
cling to liberal-humanist models of the speaking subject—a sovereign, controlling 
disembodied and individual voice that deploys language in order to effect some 
predetermined change in an audience" (177). On this issue, the issue of the body, I 
cannot think of anything I actively do to discourage students from making the 
connection between the body and composing.  However, this lack of anything is 
precisely the point.  Perhaps we can begin to include examples and exercises that 
highlight the connection between the body and composing.  In creative writing classes, 
one technique that is used is a modified freewriting in which students write as fast as 
they can, often with accompanying music such as "The William Tell Overture."  As a 
writer who often (and am now) composes while music plays, I can attest that the 
rhythms of the music I listen to show up in the cadences of my compositions.  Also, I am 
a writer who does her best work in the context of life practices that attend to the body, a 
fact that I have never shared with my students, and until now have never theorized about 
in an academic setting, but one I believe is a profoundly important component of 
creativity. 
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 Another suggestion made by Marianthe Karanikas in "Spiritual Empowerment in 
the Technical Writing Class," is an activity that highlights breathing and concentration 
through the act of eating, an exercise that writing teacher Renee Gatsis uses. As part of 
an assignment to write an advertisement and a Consumer Reports report, students bring 
to class their favorite foods.   After carefully eating the items, "mindfully, one mouthful 
at a time," slowly and with deliberate concentration and breathing techniques, being 
aware of "the experience of biting, tasting, chewing, and swallowing in the moment it 
happens," students draft descriptions of the foods (164).  Karanikas notes that this kind 
of focused activity "can help students not only to be better negotiators but also to think 
and write more clearly" (166).   
 Students in composition classrooms are still bodies, still in the sense of 
inactivity, but also still in the sense that they are bodies, rather than an abstracted notion 
of body in the phrase student body (as Crowley mentions).  When we ask them to invent, 
they are still bodies--tired from lack of sleep, some unable to pay attention, and some 
simply unaware, like I was, of the relationship between the body and the act of 
composition. 
 Another consideration that needs to be explored further in scholarship through 
the lens of body studies is the fact that many of our composition students are newly 
displaced bodies, meaning that most are in new environments—new cities, a dorm room, 
a new campus.  Many of the writers I studied in this dissertation discussed the 
importance of an established place for writing, whether it is the home or home office, a 
cabin in the woods, or a library carrel.  The most important part of the writing place was 
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the level of comfort established by routine, a habitus, as Bourdieu described it (see 
Nedra Reynolds).  Many composition students are facing more than just the challenge of 
writing assignments; they are coming to terms with their own bodies in new places and 
the establishment of new habits and routines.   
 
Conclusion 
 One of the aspects of creativity discussed in the introduction dealt with creativity 
as a process by which one engages in "a continuous process of bringing forth a changing 
vision of oneself, and of oneself in relation to the world" (Miller as qtd. in Bishop 75).  
This aspect of creativity is one that presents the most problematic feature of creativity 
and the composition classroom.  It is problematic for two reasons.  First, because of the 
artificiality of exigencies, students are compelled to lie when we ask them to reflect or 
write papers about personal experience, especially about learning processes.  Second, it 
is problematic if we consider that, when as teachers we present writing as a subject for 
which we claim absolute authority in our methods, we lie.  Writing remains mysterious, 
and we know this even when we present it as an activity that is easy, when we claim that 
if students would only do the work we ask them to do, then they will be successful 
writers.  Both lies, those of students and teachers, are discussed at length by John Boe in 
"The Degrees of the Lie." 
 A changing vision of oneself ultimately requires vulnerability and motivation, 
two attributes that have received little attention in composition scholarship.  
Vulnerability is related to the idea of being receptive to one's surroundings and the 
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revelations that coming into contact with the world will be rendered.  Motivation, a 
psychological and spiritual state, is the difference that makes a difference in teaching 
composition.  More work needs to be done to show the relationships between these two 
elements of creativity and the success of students in the composition classroom. 
 If spirituality seems to be an unsettling term to use in an academic setting, then 
Wendy Bishop's thoughts on spirituality might provide some consolation. She wrote 
about her own presumptions about the term, along with words like emotion and intuition, 
in "Teaching Lives: Thoughts on Reweaving Our Spirits," in which she focuses on the 
spiritual and therefore creative properties of teaching composition.  As a teacher, she 
says 
  I was interested in knowing in the self-sustaining, getting-connected-with-
  a-world-bigger-than-I-am sense, in the, well, spiritual sense.  I now 
  gravitate to this word spiritual because it clarifies certain aspects of my 
  life and points to experiences larger than affect and larger than mind.  
  That is, mind combined with affect creates an exciting experiential  
  tapestry.  For me, that tapestry represents the university campus, and the 
  university presents one form of real life, where writing is meditation and 
  teaching is a spiritual journey, benefiting both teacher and student.    
   How long it's taken me to say so! (129).  
Bishop is addressing the sensitivity that some scholars have with the term spirituality, 
and she does so with the purpose of telling her audience that composition matters to 
her—matters more to her than even the word vocation implies, the reason "I return 
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faithfully to the classroom year after year" (130).  Also, as she explains at the end of the 
article, she explores the essence of spirituality because of its connection with creativity.  
She wants to "(re)consider the active, creative well-springs of all passionately engaged 
writers and writing" (135).  Finally, she explores spirituality because "We need to 
question seriously the ways we make students (first-year and graduate) produce texts we 
don't value and the way we agree to do this ourselves for academic purposes" (134). 
 Bishop's subjects are weighty—value, purpose, spirituality.  Her reflection on 
purposeful and spiritual engagement in the writing classroom points ultimately to the 
essential lack in composition studies—an articulation of what we do, why we do it, and 
the meaningless of what we do and why we do it if not from a humanist perspective.  
The writers I studied in this dissertation grappled with these issues, as well, because they 
believe the act of writing is something bigger than themselves—although few referred to 
the bigness of their projects as spiritual.  As composition scholars, what is left to be 
done, and what is beyond of the scope of this dissertation, is to explore what it means to 
be fully-engaged practitioners as well as fully-engaged students of the mysteriousness of 
what we call writing. 
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